Today’s issue, the latest in my series on the rise and fall of reconstruction in Florida, kicks off right where Issue #180 ended just yesterday.
At the end of my last issue, the campaign of 1876 came to an end and the counting process began. Florida was expected to have a very close vote for President and Governor. For the state’s large Black population, a Democratic victory would spell disaster and the end of reconstruction in the state. Nationally, Republicans knew they needed to hold on to Florida, South, Carolina, and Louisiana in order to secure a narrow electoral college win.
With the Presidency in the balance, these three southern states would national political forces descend. Florida’s count, a slow multi-week process in such a rural and vast state, would be under intense scrutiny.
This article will look at the counting process and debate in Florida. The results of this count would lead to the end of reconstruction in Florida and America.
The Count Begins in Florida
Within a day of the conclusion of campaigning in Florida, tensions were already extremely high. The vote was expected to be very close and each county had to submit its returns to Tallahassee; a slow process often revolving on dirt roads and slow trains. Meanwhile, as the bitterly tight Presidential race came into focus, national forces for both Democrats and Republicans made there way to the state. Neither side trusted the other. Likewise, a campaign that had seen no shortage of violent threats (see my last issue) meant that a counting process could very well not be free of violence either. This account of events from this piece on fraud and intimidation in the 1876 Florida campaign sums the tension up in the days after the vote.
Although it would be many days before county returns reached the capital, both parties claimed victory almost immediately. Their claims were based on incomplete returns and partisan estimates. The Republicans feared that returns from outlying counties might be tampered with on their way to Tallahassee and accordingly sent couriers to the various county seats to obtain duplicates of the certificates. A train carrying some of these couriers was wrecked and Governor Stearns announced that it had been “ku-kluxed” by Democrats who wanted to alter the returns before the Republicans reached the county seats.
With tensions rapidly rising and the worry of insurrections taking place if the count went for Republicans, President Grant agreed to send federal troops to the three southern state capitals to protect the process. Grant, by all accounts, wanted an honest account of the vote and made it clear he saw his role as ensuring a fair canvass of the returns. In a letter to General Sherman, he wrote
Should there be any grounds of suspicion of fraudulent counting on either side, it should be reported and denounced at once. Either party can afford to be disappointed in the result, but the country cannot afford to have the result tainted by the suspicion of illegal or false returns.
Republican leaders, meanwhile, of course were willing to use tricks if needed to hold on to the state. They were matched by their Democratic colleagues, who likewise were willing to win by dishonest means if necessary.
National Figures Enter Florida
Both national parties sent visiting statesmen to Florida to view the counting, and of course to try and influence the results. The Republican team was led by New Hampshire Senator William Chandler. He was likewise joined by several additional men; including former General Francis C. Barlow, General Lew Wallace, and former Ohio Governor Edward F. Noyes. Barlow was the man sent by Grant specifically, and he would prove to be the most honest broker of the Republican dignitaries. Chandler, meanwhile, saw his role as to ensure a Republican victory. A letter he sent to Florida Republicans stating “render every possible assistance. Funds will be on hand to meet every requirement.” Bribe money would flow freely in Florida.
The Democratic Statesmen included Georgia Governor Joseph E. Brown, former New York World owner Manton Marble, and Pennsylvania Democrats John F. Coyle and C. W. Woolley. Marble was close friends with Tilden and was the clear money point-man for the Democratic efforts at bribery. Marble was found to have sent a note to Tilden’s nephew, Colonel W. T. Pelton, stating “We shall put Uncle Sammy through.”
The Counting Process
The national statesmen were there, more than anything else, to try and sway the state canvassing board on how to process results. This was the board that would receive returns from each county and decide on how to count them and make decisions on discrepancies. The statewide board was made up of three members, which was 2-1 Republican
Republican Secretary of State Samuel B. McLin
Republican Comptroller Clayton A. Cowgill
Democratic Attorney General William Archer Cocke
There was no shortage of issues with the counting of the ballots. Many areas had reports of fraud and intimidation. The suppression of Black votes was obvious and well documented, but the fact that money was being handed out to people of all parties and races to attest to either intimidation or fraud made claims hard to distinguish in terms of truth or lies.
“Money and intimidation can obtain the oath of white man as well as black to any required statement. A ton of affidavits could be carted in . . . and not a word of truth in them, except the names of the parties, swearing.” - Lew Wallace
The southern counties, the latest to report returns, were also very hostile to questioning. When a group of the national Republican statesmen tried to travel to Manatee County, they were met by armed men in Polk County who said no could traverse further without permission of the local Democratic Party. With this threat in mind, the statesmen opted to return north to Tallahassee.
Returns continued to come in to Tallahassee as November went on. Florida law had December 9th as the deadline for the canvassing board to announce the results for the state. However, this data was three days after the December 6th deadline that the electoral college of each state needed to meet to cast their ballots. As a result, the canvassing board first dealt with the Presidential contest when they began to meet on November 27th.
Counties with Disputes
When the state canvassing board began its deliberations, party representatives could offer challenges to results. As challenges and affidavits were heard, several key counties stood out for disputed results.
Baker County: Two sets of returns existed for the county. A set that included all four precincts and gave the Democrats a 94 vote lead. The other set omitted two precincts due to claims of fraud and the lack of signatures from proper officials. That set of returns gave Republicans a 41 vote lead. The Republican-leaning count was the “official” set of returns.
Manatee County: Governor Stearns had not appointed the proper officials to conduct an election there. Locals had hence formed an ad-hoc team to run the vote. This technically violated the law but had been a response to Stearns inaction. Questions arose about admitting any Manatee returns. The county was heavily Democratic.
Alachua County - Claims of Republican ballot stuffing existed at the Archer voter precinct by 200 or so extra votes. Republicans countered with affidavits saying the votes were legit.
Jefferson County - Claims of large numbers of voting done by people under 21. Further investigation revealed about 60 Republican ballots that were from those not yet old enough to vote.
Jackson County - Claims of Democratic ballot stuffing at two voter precincts, namely from Georgia voters. Claims of voter suppression were also rampant, including the possible destruction of a Republican ballots box. The total ballots cast in Jefferson were Democratic-heavy, despite the county being majority-Black. No doubt foul play was responsible for this result.
Hamilton County - Disputes about the proper procedures being followed in two Democratic-friendly precincts. In addition, the ballot boxes has been stolen and hidden away for several days under the claims of “protection.”
Clay County - Major claims of fraud and intimidation that put the entire county’s returns into question.
Monroe County - Claims of ballot stuffing in a Key West Precinct that Republicans argued boosted the Democratic margin in the county. Republicans wanted to exclude the entire precinct, a move that would make the county go for Republicans.
As questions about the count in several counties became clear, there was little clarity on how far the canvassing board could go in denying or accepting questionable returns. Originally both parties agreed that the canvassing board should use its quasi-judicial ability to reject returns from selecting precincts if fraud clear. This would change as totals became clear. Democrats would eventually come to embrace a position of counting the returns as they were delivered, making no changes. This came as return totals showed a narrow Democratic edge.
Through the time the canvassing board met, both parties tried to influence the decisions with bribes. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were floated in efforts to get Republicans on the board to defect to the Tilden side. Likewise Republican officials worked to keep the canvassing board in the GOP camp with their own offers of money and positions. Republican board member Clayton Cowgill was considered the closet thing to a swing vote, and by all accounts was offered money and promises by both sides as he struggled with the pressure of the process. Among the national statesmen, former General Barlow, whom Grant had dispatched, was considered the most honest and eager to see a fair canvas of the votes. This upset his fellow Republican colleagues, who iced him out of their meetings and plans.
The canvassing board stuck to debates of irregularities and fraud. Intimidation, whether direct violence or economic tricks like the numbered ballots with the railroad company, were not considered due to the short time-frame. The lack of a focus on intimidation should be kept in mind, as it no doubt stopped hundreds if not thousands of Republican-aligned Black votes from being cast.
To highlight this suppression issue, below are the counties where the Republican vote had a notably smaller percent than the Black share of the population. While turnout and registration rates can affect things, you can see the difference in places like Polk or Marion rather than places like Leon. In several counties, there is a notable absence of Black ballots.
Counties like Marion and Alachua, while under Republican rule, had rural communities with far more white regulator activity and suppression. Jackson saw a notable Republican vote drop as white violence had swept the county in the early 1870s. Areas like Polk or Hernando were isolated and rural, and the Black minority had little recourse if threatened. Compare these returns with Leon, where the 6% difference could be more of a turnout/registration difference - the double-digit gaps are much more likely due to the intimidation issues discussed in my last issue.
However, despite these issues of intimidation, which without would likely have guaranteed Republican victory regardless of the counting debate, the canvassing board would focus on only the veracity of returns. HOW to count the ballots would decide the outcome. Never forget, however, that many people were denied their right to cast a fair vote at all.
The Original Results
As the December 6th deadline approached, the canvassing board met to make an initial count that the electors could go based on. Disputes over the board’s authority to reject returns based on questions of fraud rose up as the vote proved to be very close. Had all returns been counted as initially sent by each county, the margin would have been around 100 or so ballots for Democrat Tilden.
However, the Baker County dispute became a major issue. In that Democratic-heavy county, the local board had rejected two precincts for irregularities and sent returns that only covered the remaining two precincts. The difference would cost Democrats 130+ net ballots.
The Republican majority of canvassing board, using the official Baker returns (which were the smaller figure), announced a preliminary result that at Hayes winning the state by just 40 or so ballots. A final announcement would be made soon, but the informal declaration was a boon for Republicans nationwide. Democrats, including Attorney General William Cocke, cried fowl over the decision. The argument from Democrats was the board could use its quasi-judicial authority to count the “full returns.” Over the next several days, fierce lobbying with the canvassing board would go on, with both parties trying to influence board members regarding Baker and other disputed counties. Here there was no shortage of reports of money being offered to sway votes.
The canvassing board would opt to use its quasi-judicial authority on counting the ballots. They would opt to count the Democratic-friendly returns in Baker. However, the Republican majority also made several rulings against precinct returns that harmed Democrats.
On December 6th, the deadline for the electoral college, the state canvassing board announced 2-1 that Hayes had won the state by 926 ballots. The formal results can be seen below.
These results came by rejecting Manatee County returns entirely and rejecting disputed precinct returns in Jackson, Hamilton, and Monroe. This gave Republicans the victory in Jackson and Monroe counties, despite full totals saying the Democrats had won. You can see vote comparisons for the major disputed counties below.
The board also threw out some 60 Republican-heavy votes in Jefferson from purported youths, but did not reject the ballots from the questioned precinct in Alachua. While the board had sided with Democrats on Baker, their rejection of Manatee and the precinct changes in the above four counties allowed for an easy Hayes victory.
The Republicans quickly spread the news that Hayes had won Florida and the electors met to cast their ballots the same day. Democratic electors, however, also cast their ballots for Tilden, backed up by Attorney General Cocke. Hence two slates of electors were sent to Washington DC. Similar events were happening in South Carolina and Louisiana. Once the Hayes decision was made, many of the visiting statesmen left the state. However, the count for the Governor contest between incumbent Republican Marcellus Stearns and challenger George Drew was just beginning.
Initial reports showed that Stearns and Hayes had similar vote totals, but that Stearns was tacking a few hundred ballots behind. National Republican figures were less concerned with keeping Stearns above water, worried that if the board went too far in tilting the count for Stearns, it would open up the Presidential count to further scrutiny. Florida Democrats, meanwhile, aimed to stop the board from using any of its quasi-judicial authority. They now argued that the board had a mere ministerial role to count the returns as they were submitted; a process that would give Drew a modest lead.
Democrats originally received an injunction from Circuit Judge Pleasant White, which ordered the board to simply count the returns it had and not make decisions on counties/precincts to omit. The canvassing board ignored this order, and using the same decisions on counties and precincts as they had with the Presidential contest, announced that Stearns won by a narrower 456 vote margin. The results were announced December 8th.
As best I can see, the only difference between the two canvasses was that in Hamilton another Democratic precinct was excluded. Other than that, Stearns trailed Hayes thanks to getting fewer votes in key counties like Duval, Orange, and Volusia.
The Congressional canvass used same decisions on omitted precincts/counties. The board ruled 2-1 that Congressional District 1 Republican Incumbent William Purman was re-elected by just 300 votes.
Purman’s victory was very precarious and would remain so as challenges to the counting process went on. Adding Manatee would cost Purman his race, as good changes to Monroe or Jackon county figures.
In Congressional District 2, Republican Horatio Bisbee was declared the winner by a similarly razor-thin margin of 145 votes.
Bisbee, despite having a closer margin than Purman, was actually in a stronger position as challenges to the canvassing board emerged. Bisbee’s win had come with Baker County using the Democratic-friendly version. Finley could possibly flip the results if the disputed Hamilton precincts were re-added. However, Bisbee had more “outs” if returns were later altered by court order.
The canvassing board wrapped up its reports with the state legislative breakdown. Here the Democrats had control of both chambers of the Florida legislature. Florida would hence have divided Government if these results held.
However, things were far from done in Florida.
The Courts Decide
In Washington DC, Congress was meeting to sort out the electoral college disputes. An investigative committee was formed and more officials showed up in Florida, South Carolina, and Louisiana. Meanwhile, Democrats sued in the state court over the decision regarding the Governor count and the violation of the injunction. The suit only pertained to the state elections, not President. However, Republicans worried a negative result would give ammo to the Tilden campaign as Congress worked to sort out the Presidential contest.
An initial hearing before Judge White was scheduled for December 11 to answer on contempt chargers for violating his order. However, all sides eventually agreed to seek an answer with the Florida Supreme Court. Democrats appealed for the top court to order the canvassing board to count the returns they had, serving a pure ministerial function. Republicans remained confident such an order would not come, as the court was 2-1 Republican.
Republicans were shocked when on December 14th, the court unanimously rejected the canvassing board’s actions. The court stated that the rejection of the Manatee returns was wrong, as was the rejection of select precincts in Jackson, Hamilton, and Monroe. Reversing such decisions would mark the Democrats the victors in both the Governor and Presidential contest. Many recriminations were laid at the justices, with some arguing the court made its decision based on personal rivalries with Governor Stearns and other officials.
The canvassing board, which initially had agreed to abide by any court decision, tried for several days to reject the order. They claimed the body no longer formally existed since its work was done. They also considered appealing to federal courts. National Republicans worried such an order would further the cause for Tilden but were much more willing to let Stearns lose. Two weeks of back and forth maneuvering took place, which can be read much more about here. On December 27th, Governor Stearns, bowing to the situation, conceded the election and encourage compliance with the court order.
Finally, on December 28th, the Canvassing Board came back into session to vote on and submit amended returns. Following the court order, the board approved the returns as submitted by the counties, with two exceptions. Both exceptions were allowed based on the court opinion.
The Baker County returns that only included 2/4 precincts were used, as these were the original reports certified and filed.
The Clay County returns were subject to so little oversight or proper documentation that they could be dismissed entirely.
These decisions meant that Hayes was still the winner of Florida, securing a 222 vote margin.
The canvasing board decision may have saved the electoral votes for Hayes, but they did allow Democrat George Drew to claim the Governorship.
Drew was declared the winner of the Governor contest by 195 ballots.
On January 1st, the court accepted these returns. The reason for why Clay was allowed to be omitted but not Manatee is not clear, but it was a decision the court accepted. Accounts from the time indicate many believed the results were the most illegitimate of any county. Why they were counted to begin with is not clear.
With these results, Democrats finally had control of the Florida Governorship. Governor Stearns suffered from running several hundred ballots behind Drew. Ticket splitting was very rare at this time, but in several of the eastern counties, business-minded moderates preferred Drew. Below are the counties were the most ticket-splitting took place. These were small numbers, but they made the difference.
Stearns had no areas where he outperformed Hayes by more than a couple votes. His bleeding of ballots in the east and along the coast made the difference. Drew also got a modest home-county boost in Madison.
BUT do not forget this fact. If not for the economic or violent intimidation of Black voters in several key counties, Stearns would have won the Governor election.
The re-canvas also impacted the Congressional races as well. In the 1st District, William Purman ended up losing his re-election to Democrat Robert Davidson by 500 votes.
Purman’s lost marked an end 8 year political career in Florida. If you remember from my earlier articles, he was nearly killed in Jackson County back in 1869, surviving a gunshot blast to the face. The fact that Jackson, which was majority-Black, went Democratic, is a clear indicator of fraud in the county. Allegations of ballot stuffing were likely true and years of violence had suppressed the Black vote. This election marked the end of Jackson County as a Republican-friendly county.
The re-canvass of Congressional District 2 did not flip the results there. Bisbee’s margin actually expanded to 300 votes with the changes in Baker and the rejection of Clay. Finley got extra votes out of Hamilton, but nowhere else.
Bisbee would hold the seat until early 1878. Finley challenged the results with the US House Election committee and was eventually ruled as the rightful winner by the Democratic majority. The exact method is not available as of writing, but I believe the House committee used Clay and the Democratic-friendly Baker returns, and rejected the questioned precinct in Alachua, to come to a Finley win. Bisbee would be back, however, which I will get to in a future article.
The Florida legislature, meanwhile, entered its era of firm Democratic dominance. By the end of January 1877, the State Senate had a 2-1 Democratic majority. Thanks to the malapportioned legislative system, which I wrote about more here, this super-majority only made up 48% of the total population of the state.
Initial returns had put the Senate at 13 Democrats to 11 Republicans. However, the court-ordered re-canvass had seen SD3 (Jackson) and SD14 (Columbia) go Democratic. Then in January of 1877, Democrats seated the Democrat in Escambia County by ruling that ballots cast at a naval base were only applicable for federal contests, not state. The removal of that heavily-Republican precinct flipped Escambia blue.
The State House was a similar 2-1 breakdown. Like with the State Senate, the re-canvass and the rejection of the naval precinct in Escambia further added to the Democratic margin.
Florida’s legislature would not become Republican again until the 1990s.
I will be doing a special issue on the history of the Florida Reconstruction legislature in later this month. The results here, giving super-majorities to a body despite close statewide votes, were the results of the horrible apportionment system set up in the 1868 constitution. That plan, pushed by conservative carpetbaggers, was originally designed to limit the influence of the Black-majority counties, as I wrote about here.
The goal of the early Republican leaders, folks like Harrison Reed and Marcellus Stearns, was to rule Florida while using Black voters as a support voting block, but never letting them form a majority in the legislature. Thanks to their efforts and their inability to see that white voters would gravitate more and more to the Democrats, they’d created a legislative map that was biased heavily toward the Democrats. Now folks like Reed and Stearns were out of power. They would leave Florida, and let the native Black population suffer under Democratic rule and eventually Jim Crow.
Reconstruction Comes to an End
The results in Florida were catastrophic for the Black population. The elevation of Drew to the Governorship and the firm Democratic control of the legislature meant that Black citizens had no recourse with the state government. Thanks to the power of the Governor to appoint virtually all local officials, the majority-Black counties would find themselves ruled by commissions and sheriffs made up of white Democrats. The 1868 Constitution, which made the Governor very powerful, meant that every election was life and death for Florida’s Black population. The loss of the Governorship was far more critical than the loss of the legislature or the Presidency.
Speaking of the Presidency, the results nationally were no better for Black voters across the South. The protracted fight over the electoral college had dragged on into 1877, with both parties claiming to have won the contests in Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida. Congress eventually decided to form an Electoral Commission designed to decide the disputed states. After much deliberation, the board voted 8-7 to award all the disputed states to Hayes, with the argument being he’d won the official returns sent to Congress. This hardly settled matters, however, as House Democrats threatened to grind certification to a halt and many southerners called for an uprising.
Violence did not occur, however, and House Democrats backed off to allow Hayes to assume the Presidency. The reason for this is often coined The Compromise of 1877. This informal agreement, widely reported by historians but with nothing in writing, broadly argues that Hayes and Republicans agreed to formally end reconstruction in the south. Federal troops, now only remaining in South Carolina and Louisiana, would be pulled out. The South would have free pass on how to handle its ‘internal affairs’ - in other words suppressing Black citizens - and Washington would recognize that Democrats had won the disputed Governor contests in South Carolina and Louisiana. Hayes would become President, the man Black people risked their lives to to vote for, but the new President would do nothing to thank them.
The nefarious deal is best immortalized in this political cartoon by Joseph Keppler, which shows Hayes strolling off with the southern states as the demon Mephistopheles (portrayed by Republican Senator Roscoe Conkling) watches on.
The deal with the devil indeed.
Hayes’ presidency would do nothing for the Black population of the south as Jim Crow repression took hold. This inaction is often attributed to the supposed Compromise of 1877, but if you remember, Hayes was already very non-committal to reconstruction. Hayes had been a “moderate” on the issue in his 1875 Ohio Governor campaign and called for local rule when he accepted the Republican nomination. This “compromise” was no doubt one he had an easy time accepting.
The results were the end of Reconstruction in the South, including Florida. Many more elections would come before a new Jim Crow constitution was put into place, but never again in the 19th century would Black voters be able to find an ally in the Governorship. The era of “white government” was beginning. As these men would claim, they had “redeemed” Florida.
Looking Ahead
This is not the end of my series, far from it. The second half is going to cover Florida politics from this point and through the turn of the century. While white Democrats now had power of Florida, it would still take several elections to cement their control. Several counties and districts would still elect Black candidates through the next decade. However, these elections would come as the white Democratic leaders worked to limit Black power with threats or laws as much as possible. It would take the 1886 “Jim Crow Constitution” to formally end any hope of Black political influence.
The process of getting to and drafting that document is a warning about the ways to legally suppress votes - rather than suppression via violence. THAT will be the topic of future articles; the “legal suppression” of Black voices in Florida.