Ooooooo…..Spooky!

In my many, many, many, many, many, many years of writing about elections, I covered LGBT candidates and issues countless times. This year has been so chaotic with redistricting and the fast-approaching midterms that several article ideas I had for this month have sadly fallen to the wayside for now. However, I still have at least two articles set to come out later this month on LGBT topics.

In the meantime, I wanted to use this article to link to some previous writings I have done on LGBT issues. These are pieces that many of you newer subscribers may not have spotted in my archives. Feel free to give any of these articles a look as I work on upcoming pieces.

I have divided my archives up into two sections, the REALLY OLD archive, and the more modern years of writing.

The Really old Archives

I started at FSU in 2005, and my entire college career was spent with the fight over gay marriage going on. In fact, I met my longtime closest friend, Danielle, when she was arguing with a conservative classmate that was celebrating a marriage ban in Texas. It was a time of disappointments. Gay Marriage was not popular with the broader public yet, and you could barely get a decent chunk of Democratic Senators to endorse the idea.

As the early 2010s came around, I began to start an early blog/website. This original WordPress, which is filled with terrible grammar, some takes I cringe at now, and really bad maps, saw me cover LGBT fights several times. You can read them below. I will stress the maps absolutely suck, as they come from an era where I was still learning the process.

• A 2011 article looking at the fight over Civil Unions in Washington State

• In 2011, the situation over Gay Marriage in Iowa and a special election for a pivotal legislative seat

• A preview of the 2012 North Carolina Referendum

• A Spring 2012 Article looking at polls showing Obama was not hurt by endorsing Same-Sex Marriage

• In 2012, I wrote about the failure of conservative to pass a Same-Sex Marriage ban in Minnesota.

These articles give insight into developments happening in the fight over same-sex marriage in the first term of Obama. The second-to-last article, looking at Obama endorsing same-sex marriage before his re-election, is a good read for seeing how so many people claimed Obama would lose the election for his stance. Not only did this not happen, but his support helped shift voter attitudes. Something modern Democrats should keep in mind now as the LGBT community is again under attack.

Lets now move on to my much more recent articles.

Modern LGBT Archives

The first article you can check out in the piece I wrote just last year. This piece covers some of the first openly LGBT officials ever elected in Florida.

This article highlights several important trailblazers in Florida election history. Arguable the original Florida trailblazer was Richard Heyman, who became Florida’s first openly gay mayor when he was elected to the post in Key West in 1983.

Heyman’s election may have made him the first openly gay mayor in the country (some have claimed this, I’m digging around). This election I only briefly touched on in my 2025 article. However, this year one of my Pride articles is going to go much more in depth on the Heyman political rise and the gay community that rose in Key West in the 1970s an 1980s. Expect that article around the end of the month.

The first-electeds article looks at several other important trailblazers. I cover the election of Dean Trantalis in 2003, who became Fort Lauderdale’s first openly gay commissioner when he won by just 50 votes.

The article also looks much closer to the present day. There I cover the election of Shevrin Jones to the State Senate in 2020. With his elections, Jones, already the state’s first openly gay Black man, became Florida’s first openly gay State Senator.

As I write this, Jones has just announced he is running for Congressional District 24, a race where he is the early front-runner.

Of course, not everything I write about is positive advancements. One article I wrote a full four years ago was a deep dive into the 2008 referendum that banned same-sex marriage in Florida.

The vote, which came at a time where a solid majority of voters nationwide still did not support same-sex marriage, was an easy win for the anti-equality forces, though pockets of opposition did exist. I delve into that in my article.

At the time of the 2008 vote, the most reliable pockets of opposition were students, Jewish retirees, and liberal suburbs.

One notable spot of opposition to the ban was Key West, which rejected the ban by a two-to-one margin.

Monroe County was the lone county to reject the ban, with Key West the anchor for this opposition.

Miami-Dade County, meanwhile, did back the ban on same-sex marriage. However, the story in Dade is much more mixed. Back in 2002, the county voted to reject an effort to repeal the county’s gay rights ordinance; a major victory for the LGBT community.

I documented that vote, and the public battles over gay rights dating back to the 1970s, in my article from 2024.

That article dives into the infamous 1977 vote block an gay rights ordinance; with a campaign led by Anita Bryant.

International Elections

My next archives article looks at an election just 90 miles away from Dade county - a look back at a same-sex marriage referendum in CUBA!

That’s right, back in 2022, Cuba had what is arguably their first free election since the rise of Castro. The vote in question was a public referendum on the nation’s family law code, which was being updated in many ways, one of them being to legalize same-sex marriage.

Now as I lay out in that article, I am well aware Cuba is not a free democracy and is often the home of sham elections. This vote, however, was the first to allow free campaigning and doesn’t show the typical signs of ballot stuffing. The Government appeared to want to use this low-consequence vote as a way to test public sentiment. The measure easily passed.

My article on the Cuba vote delves into the reason the Cuban voters of the island are arguably less religiously-conservative than in Miami and the novelty of a free vote on the island. I think its a very fascinating story.

Cuba is not the only nation to have a vote on same-sex marriage. Way back in 2015, I wrote about Ireland’s historic public referendum to legalize same-sex marriage. A vote that easily passed in a nation often seen as a conservative/Catholic island.

My article on that referendum was followed up several years later about Ireland’s growing socially liberal attitudes.

Looking at Florida’s Attacks on the LGBT Community

A far less pleasant topic, but one I did not want to leave out from this posting, was my looks at the anti-LGBT laws that have been pushed in Florida. My articles from 2023 dove into Florida’s infamous “don’t say gay” legislation and looked at attacks on Transgender care.

These articles go together. I especially recommend issue 99, as it aims to dispel many of the lies about what transgender care means. Spoiler, no one is talking about surgery. Both these issues are research heavy, giving you many resources for either understanding the issues at hand.

Final Article

As I wrap this special newsletter up, and resume my writing and researching for upcoming pieces, the last article I recommend is a piece I wrote right after the 2024 election results. This article addressed the claims that Trump’s 2024 victory was due to social issues harming Democrats; a view that led to a rush of people to claim Democrats needed to abandon LGBT and other social issues.

This article corrects the record on some mid-understood polling and highlights the importance economic conditions played in the election. The thesis of my piece is not that Democrats must abandon their social positions, but that they must make the bulk of their campaign rhetoric around economic issues - which is the largest driver of voter sentiment. I compare the 2024 reactions to the 2004 election, where pundits incorrectly believed Democrats lost because of same-sex marriage (they didn’t). I cite all my findings in the link above.

With that, see you all soon! Happy Pride!

Earlier in May, Tennessee became the first state to redistrict its congressional lines after the Supreme Court’s Callais decision came out. The ruling, which severely weakened minority voter protections in redistricting, opened up Tennessee Republicans to target the lone Democratic-held seat remaining in this solidly red state. The new gerrymander carved up the majority-Black city of Memphis 3-ways, creating an entirely white/Republican Congressional map.

This map was rammed through the legislature with rapid pace, coming amid chaotic scenes at the capital as Black lawmakers and citizens protested the destruction of the majority-Black 9th district. This article aims to consolidate all the events that happened in just the last few weeks, while also diving into the history of the Memphis area Congressional layout. When the article is finished, I hope you will all see how truly shameful this action was.

Lets dive in

Brief Review of the Callais Decision

Before I get into the Tennessee specifics, I want to make sure we are all on the same page about the Callais decision and the Voting Rights Act. If you are already familiar with this, no worries you skip down to the next section.

On April 29th, the Supreme Court announced the Callais vs Louisiana decision. I go over the decision in great detail in my History of the Voting Rights Act article. The key things to understand about the Voting Rights Act before the Callais decision were as follows….

1. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 allowed racial minority groups to sue if a redistricting maps was found to purposely diminish a racial minorities ability to elect a candidate of their choice to office. This could include “cracking” a community so that they could not make up the majority of a district, or “packing” them to keep them confined to as few seats as possible.

2. In 1982, Congress added the “results test” to the law, which meant that if a map diminished a minority community influence, even if that was not the express intent, the map was still illegal. Through this and several court cases, a general standard emerged where if a minority community could form a majority of a reasonable-compact district, such a district HAD to be drawn.

3. The law created a shield for minority communities, as they were safer from partisan gerrymandering efforts that expanded across the country.

The Callais ruling that came down from the court fundamentally gutted the voting rights act by in essence repealing the “results test.” The decision stipulates that a map can only be found to violate the VRA if the only possible reason for such maps was to limit a minority communities influence. At the same time, the ruling said that a state’s desire to partisan gerrymander was a legitimate consideration for drafting maps that disregarded minority communities. Even if map makers targeted a racial minority because that minority voted for the political opposition, that could be considered a political gerrymander, not a racial gerrymander.

This ruling, in basic terms, allowed lawmakers to use partisan gerrymandering as an excuse to disregard decades of standards for protecting racial minorities. The shield protecting minority communities from partisan gerrymandering games was affectively gone. Tennessee Republicans recognized this new dynamic quick and rushed to remap.

Lets now look at the dynamics in Tennessee before the remap, and then look at the redistricting process that just wrapped up.

Tennessee’s 2022 Congressional Map

The events that have taken place in Tennessee in the last few weeks are very much a continuation of the 2022 redistricting process. Heading into that redraw, just two of Tennessee’s nine Congressional districts were held by Democrats, a status quo that has existed since 2012. Both districts in question covered the Nashville and Memphis communities respectively; the lone Democratic pockets in the state.

In the 2012 redistricting process, which was held under a Republican legislative majority, there was a right-wing push to carve up the Nashville-based 5th Congressional district. However, with Republicans nervous about accidently making surrounding seats bluer by adding in the liberal Nashville voters, the plan instead was to isolate Democrats into the 5th and 9th districts. Republicans also did not have super-majorities in the legislature at that time, which could have allowed Democrats to slow the process down.

By the time the 2022 redistricting process emerged, dynamics were very different. Republicans had firmly cemented control of the state, holding super-majorities in the legislature and Democrats having no success at rebounding in the rural communities they once performed decently in. Republicans opted this time to go ahead and carve up the Nashville area, dividing Davidson County (the city makes up almost the entire county) three ways. The result was converting the heavily Democratic 5th into a steady Republican seat.

The remap in question led to the 5th being an easy pickup in the 2022 elections. Democratic Incumbent Jim Cooper did not run for re-election. In the open race for the newly-drawn 5th, Republican Andy Ogles easily won the contest. The result was Tennessee going to an 8-1 delegation.

The result has not been good for the city, as none of the three lawmakers with overlap give much time to the concerns of what is easily the state’s biggest cultural hub.

This summary of events from the New York Times lays the problem out.

None of the three lawmakers who represent parts of Nashville have an office in the city or the surrounding county, where about 730,000 people live. Federal funding for Nashville projects has become less reliable.

While Republicans were able to carve up Nashville, the same was not the case for Memphis and the 9th Congressional district. There the reasoning was not a concern over politics, but rather a concern over the law. At the time, the 9th district, which was over 60% Black, was protected by the Voting Rights Act. With that legal barrier clear for decades, Republicans did not dare mess with the 9th.

With that note on the legal protections that existed for the 9th Congressional district, lets take a quick look back at the history of Black politics in the Memphis region.

Black Representation in Memphis

Memphis has long been known as a hub of Black culture and politics in Tennessee. Even during Jim Crow, the city was home to a lively music culture and political growth. The neighborhood of Orange Mound, today part of southern Memphis, was founded as a refuge for Black citizens fleeing rural violence; becoming billed as "the largest concentration of blacks in the United States except for Harlem in New York City." Memphis was a mecca for many Black residents in the Jim Crow south.

Tennessee’s First Black Congressman

As Jim Crow began to get dismantled and election opportunities opened up, Memphis had no shortage of Black candidates to run for office. Thanks to a tight community that was able to weather violence and repression, Memphis was home to several prominent affluent Black political families.

Harold Ford Sr was one of these men, part of a long politically active family that also ran a funeral home business. Ford was elected to the state legislature in 1970; then just 25 years old. This made ford one of the just handful of Black state lawmakers at the time. Then, in 1974, Ford made a bid for Congress, challenging Republican Dan Kuykendall in the Memphis-based 8th Congressional district. At the time the seat was majority-white, as was the city of Memphis itself, but the Black population of the district was estimated to be 45%.

Ford did not run just on race, and in-fact ran a bipartisan and multifaceted campaign. This summary from a biography on Ford I think perfectly captures the campaign.

To strengthen his standing with black voters and the liberal whites in the district, Ford ran on a bipartisan platform that emphasized economic development for the community. “Inflation knows no color . . . that’s what the people will vote on,” Ford remarked.

His campaign enlisted an army of paid workers and volunteers that included blacks and whites and received financial support from black churches and luminaries such as Isaac Hayes, an African-American singer. An energetic campaigner, Ford “organized the headquarters and phone banks … put together caravans that … would wind slowly through residential neighborhoods carrying campaign workers who would put up yard signs and hand out candy to kids.”

The election wound up being very close. Ford would win the race by just over 500 ballots. In his victory, Ford became the first Black Congressman in Tennessee history.

James Ford Sr would go on to hold this district, which was re-numbered the 9th in 1982, for 22 years. Through this time, the district borders rarely changed in great detail. The district always remained anchored in Shelby County, covering most of the city of Memphis itself.

By 1982, the then-numbered 9th Congressional district was majority-Black and would remain so to the present day. The shifting demographics came partly due to a “white flight” out into the surrounding suburbs. The flight in question was heavily driven by court-ordered school desegregation policies, with busing to be used to enforce the orders. Whites left the city and moved into suburbs beyond the court orders.

Race relations improved over time, but make no mistake this was still very much an era of prejudice. This was seen most clear in a 1978 vote to repeal the state’s already unenforceable ban on interracial marriage. Such bans had already been invalidated in the Virginia v Loving Supreme Court decision. The vote was simply a clean-up of the state constitution that would have no real affect. Regardless, the measure passed by just 2%.

I actually did an article back in February looking at similar votes in other southern states. At the time, I was not even aware Tennessee had also held such a vote. You can see how these votes went in Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina here.

Harold Ford Jr and the Senate Campaign

Congressman Ford announced he would not run for re-election in 1996. Through this point the Congressman rarely faced a really threat in the district, with the family remaining very popular in the Memphis region. Harold Ford Jr, the 25-year old son of the Congressman, announced he would run for the seat. Ford, who was finishing law school and had worked as a special assistant in the Department of Commerce was the frontrunner for the seat from the moment he announced, easily winning the primary and general in 1996 and holding the seat for the next decade.

In 2006, Ford decided to make a run for the open US Senate seat in Tennessee. While the state leaned Republican by this point for President and US Senate, Democrats still had control of the Governors office and the state legislature, as well as a majority of the Congressional delegation. Ford was considered a very strong candidate due to his youth and moderate voting record. He faced Bob Corker in a general election that proved to be very close, with polls dead even through the race.

The race generated massive controversy in the final weeks of the campaign when an ad from the RNC starting running. The ad in question, while making many of the typical right-wing attacks, also played up Ford’s youthful good looks and implying he was not mature enough to be in the Senate. That alone may have been same old same old, but the issue that generate condemnation was when a young white woman giggled and said “I met Harold at the Playboy party.” The ad then continued with other topics. Then at the end, the same woman says “Harold, call me” and winks at the camera.

The ad quickly drew condemnation. The NAACP stated the ad was “a powerful innuendo that plays to pre-existing prejudices about African-American men and white women.” Even many Republicans condemned the ad as playing into decades old white fear about Black men and sex, with Corker himself trying to distance himself from the ad. The RNC initially stood by the ad but eventually it was removed from circulation. You can see the ad here.

Just a few weeks later, Ford would narrowly lose the Senate race by 3%. Polling was close the whole time and its hard to know if the ad made the difference. It almost surely did not help, as Corker did not suffer any clear backlash over it. Regardless, the ad remains one of the most shameful moments of the 2006 midterms.

I wanted to emphasis this campaign and this ad to highlight the charged racial atmosphere in Tennessee. The RNC would not have made such an ad if they did not think it would work.

Steve Cohen in the 9th Congressional

When Ford Jr left the Congressional seat to run for Senate, it created a crowded primary for the open seat. In the primary, only one member of the Ford family ran, Joseph Ford, a cousin of Harold and practicing attorney. However, Harold Ford Jr’s younger brother, Jake Ford, opted to skip the primary and planned to run as an independent.

The most well-known candidate at the start of the race was longtime State Senator Steve Cohen, who was also the only major white candidate in the primary. Cohen was a very liberal member of the legislature and enjoyed strong Black support in his legislative elections. He wound up winning the crowded primary with 30% of the vote, with attorney Nikki Tinker at 25% and Joseph Ford at 12%. Several more candidates scattered the remainder of the vote.

Ford’s win came with overwhelming white support, and around 20-30% of the Black vote. Many then wondered if Cohen would find trouble going against Jake Ford’s independent bid in the general. However, Ford quickly consolidated a good deal of Black support after the primary, both from voters and elected officials. Joseph Ford endorsed Cohen, as did the Mayors of Memphis and Shelby County.

Ford would easily prevail in the general election, taking 60% to Ford’s 22%. In the heavily Black precincts, Cohen secured well over 60% of the vote. I plan to look back at this 2006 campaign in the near future, so check back for more on this race down the line.

Cohen from this point on would never face a serious challenge in a primary or general. In Congress Cohen was a firm liberal vote and strong ally on all racial matters. While his request to join the Black caucus was denied, he enjoyed strong relationships with Black members of Congress.

Ford won his 2008 primary in a rematch with Nikki Tinker, taking 80% of the vote in the primary. That campaign saw Tinker try to play up anti-Semitic tropes against Cohen, a move that backfired so badly it saw Barack Obama, then running for President, endorse Cohen for re-election. In 2010, Cohen faced former Memphis mayor Willie Herenton in what many thought would be a real fight. However, Cohen secured 78% in his re-election there. After this, no one viewed Cohen as vulnerable.

Indeed in the most recent primary election, Cohen again easily prevailed in the heavily Black Democratic primary. In 2024, Cohen secured 74%, winning strong in the Black neighborhoods of the district.

Cohen quickly became the “candidate of choice” for the Black community. This is important when we talk about the Voting Rights Act. When the VRA is enforced to mandate the creation of a majority-minority seat, like the majority-Black 9th, the issue is not about ensuring a Black candidate is elected to this district. The goal is to give the Black community a united voice to be able to chose a candidate to represent them in Congress. In the case of the 9th district, Cohen has been the candidate of choice for Black voters for almost two decades.

However, thanks to the Callais decision and Republican lawmakers, the Black community of Memphis will not longer get to elect the candidate of their choice.

The Rush to Remap Post-Callais

The same day as the Callais decision came down, it became clear that the Memphis-based 9th was at risk of Republican meddling. As the Trump-initiated redistricting wars continued across the country, which you can read more about in my series here, Tennessee Republicans rushed to “do their part” and eliminate another Democratic-friendly seat. With the Callais decision lifting the shield for minority districts, Republicans could simply claim the cracking of the 9th was not a racial gerrymander, but instead a political gerrymander.

US Senator Marsha Blackburn, who is the frontrunner to become Governor later this year, quickly tweeted out a proposed 9-0 Congressional map.

Just one day later, Trump posted that he had talked with current Governor Bill Lee about such a redraw.

The messages from Trump and Blackburn made it clear that partisanship was an open and proud reason for the gerrymander. The Callais decision opened up these exact type of justifications, as seen by the comments from the Speaker of the Tennessee House.

Of course in Tennessee, with the way racial communities vote, Black and Democratic are one in the same, as is white and Republicans (outside of places like Nashville). Exit polls from Tennessee back in 2020 showed Democrats getting 88% of the Black vote and Republicans getting 70% of the white. Back in 2004, the Tennessee Outlook also studied how partisan and racial gerrymandering is virtually one in the same in Tennessee. This reality did not matter, however. The message from lawmakers remained on-message: “its not a racial gerrymander, its a partisan gerrymander.”

Democratic lawmakers in Tennessee understood the damage of the Callais decision and what the ruling was opening up. Memphis Democratic State Senator Raumesh Akbari said it best immediately after the ruling

“It hands Republicans across the South the legal cover to redraw districts in ways that will cost Black and Latino Americans seats in Congress, seats in state legislatures and seats at every table where decisions about their lives are made,” she said.

This is the reality of the Callais decision, and it was about to be born out in Tennessee’s legislature.

On May 1st, Republican Governor Bill Lee set a May 5th special session for redrawing the state’s congressional map. In his message, Lee said “We owe it to Tennesseans to ensure our congressional districts accurately reflect the will of Tennessee voters.” This has become a common refrain from Republicans as they gerrymander maps; arguing that since the state is Republican, the entire delegation should be Republican. Of course this ignores the concept of districts and we might as well go to state-wide votes; but that is a story for another time.

Governor Lee, btw, got flack several years ago when photos emerged of him decked out in Confederate uniform for a social event.

Special Session Begins

The May 5th session kicked off with flurries of protests not only from elected officials but from citizens as well. The statehouse became crowded as people flocked to make their opposition to the redistricting process known.

Congressman Cohen cited his time in the state legislature when lacing into Republicans.

“To think the legislature I served in for 24 years as a senator is doing this to the second largest city in the state and one of the most iconic cities in the country and doing it with impunity because they have no regard except to worship the most corrupt president we’ve ever known, it’s unbelievable,”

Memphis Democratic State Rep Justin Pearson aptly compared the attempt to eliminate Black representation in Tennessee akin to the 3/5’s compromise.

“This racist redistricting is an attempt to have a new three-fifths compromise (to) count the bodies for representational participation in Congress but deny the agency and humanity,”

As protests went on, Republicans in the first day refused Democratic efforts to be transparent about the process. Due to holding a super-majority in both chambers, Republican could easily run right over Democratic protests or motions. Democrats knew they could not defeat a map in the chamber, but tried to slow the process down. They tried to pass several rule changes…

• Expanded time for public testimony

• A 72-hour waiting period between the map being introduced and then passed

• An economic impact statement on the cost of late district changes and re-opening qualifying (which had already passed for candidates)

  • More on the qualifying date changes can be read here.

• Disclosure of who was involved in drawing any maps

All of these efforts were rejected by the Republican majority.

The Map is Introduced

It was not until May 6th, the second day of the session, that the Congressional map in question was introduced. As many predicted, the map split Memphis up three ways. All seats in this plan voted for Donald Trump by over 20%.

Tennessee Republican lawmakers said that the Trump White house “opined” on the map, but insisted they drew it themselves. Yah… sure. The map changes include several adjustments to aid other Republicans looking to run for office. You can see more about those changes here. For this article, however, I want to stick the Memphis issue.

The close-up of Memphis can be seen below. Three districts, the 5th, 8th, and 9th, split up Memphis and Shelby county. The Black population is scattered across districts that then stretch deep into the rural white interior of the state.

The three districts do an efficient job as splitting up Shelby County’s 490,000 Black residents.

Under the 2022 lines, virtually all of the Black population was in the 9th. That was not achieved by crazy lines either, but rather a reflection of how compact the Black population of Memphis is. It takes deliberate effort to divide up half a million Black residents across several different districts. This is very much the classic definition of racial cracking.

The insult does not end there, however. People quickly observed that the newly-structured 9th, which holds the biggest chunk of Memphis’ Black population, is added to a district that stretches half-way across the state. Within this new district is the city of Pulaski, Tennessee: the city where the Ku Klux Klan was born.

The new version of the 9th district revealed some old truths that many Tennessee residents would prefer to pretend do not exist. Tennessee had been the cite of racial struggles not just in the last few decades, but it is the home base of one of the most notorious terrorist organizations in American history.

Tequila Johnson, the head of the Tennessee Equity Alliance laid this history out clear as day

“Don’t get it twisted, this isn’t new. This is the same old Tennessee where the Klan was born in Pulaski, Christmas Eve 1865. The same Tennessee that wrote the first Jim Crow law in the country in 1881… this is the same Tennessee that tried to expel two Black lawmakers [in 2023].”

The racial reality of Tennessee, however, is something Republicans wanted desperately to avoid addressing.

Republicans Play Dumb about Race

The same day the map was introduced, committee work began on advancing the plan. This was then followed by full-body debates and votes the next day, May 7th. All told. the special session rammed through this massive change in just three days.

Throughout this process, but especially in the last two days, Republicans made sure to play as dumb as possible on the issues of race. As far as Republicans were concerned, this was entirely about partisan politics. Democrats did not let them get away with avoiding the race issue, however.

Nashville Democratic State Senator Jeff Yarbro was not having it with Republicans claims about race not being an issue

“Give me a break. It’s the most blatant dilution of Black voting power since the height of Jim Crow,”

Knoxville Democratic State Senator Sam McKenzie

“This is obviously about race. It’s about taking one county that has a majority African-American community and decimating it,”

Memphis Democrat State Senator London Lamar

“Racism doesn’t become less racist just because it’s called partisan.”

Memphis Democrat State House member Justin Pearson

“These maps are racist tools of white supremacy at the behest of the most powerful white supremacist in the United States of America, Donald J. Trump,”

The nonsense claims of being “race blind” by Republicans fell apart the most in the State Senate, where a series of back-and-forths between Democrat London Lamar and Republican John Stevens, who was the map’s sponsor, played out.

First, in the Judiciary Committee on May 6th, Lamar asked Stevens a series of basic questions on the demographics of the map. At one point, Lamar questioned Stevens when he insisted he had no idea what the borders of Memphis were (video here). In another exchange, Stevens claimed to have no idea about the racial makeup of Memphis. That video is here, but the important transcription is below.

Lamar: “Memphis is predominantly African-American, correct?”

Stevens: “I think you know the answer to that”

Lamar: “Yes or No”

Stevens: “I think you know”

This charade continued on the Senate Floor the next day, with a moment so ridiculous that it was covered by John Oliver’s comedy/news show. The video is in the link but I will also sum this latest exchange with a meme.

When the House committee voted to approve the map to the floor of their chamber, they did so among one key chant from protestors. As the vote was taken and as the Chairman tried to ignore what was happening, people shouted

“MEMPHIS IS BLACK! THERE IS NO DENYING THAT!”

“MEMPHIS IS BLACK! THERE IS NO DENYING THAT!”

“MEMPHIS IS BLACK! THERE IS NO DENYING THAT!”

You can see the coverage and video here.

The chanting foretold what would come on the final day of session. As the white Republican leaders would pretend they were not carving up Black voters, the citizens of Tennessee, and many lawmakers, would make sure the moment was as uncomfortable as possible.

Protests as the Map is Passed

The final day of the legislative special session was a scene of charged emotions, protests, and tears. A full look at comments from Democratic lawmakers can be read here. However, I want to especially highlight one set of comments from State Senator Raumesh Akbari

“Memphis is a city of sanitation workers that proudly proclaimed, ‘I am a man.’ Memphis is not an accident on a map. Memphis is the balcony where the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King was assassinated. Memphis is a place where he took his last footsteps. Memphis is sacred ground in our civil rights story in American history.

Both legislative chambers saw acts of civil disobedience from lawmakers and chants from citizens. A full breakdown of the events can be read about here. In the house, the clapping and chanting of citizens in the gallery eventually led to the Speaker sending the police to clear the gallery.

More photos of the events can be viewed here. This includes looks at lawmakers and citizen-led protests.

The House was the first to act on the maps. The debate and vote came amid high acrimony. Republicans in both chambers would largely remain quiet on the map, other than affirming it was for partisan reasons. Their fear of indicating anything about race was clear, but Democrats did not let them off, with countless speeches lacing into the map for racist intent.

In the State House, Democratic lawmakers formed a chain of lock-armed members who protested and chanted as the final vote occurred. These remembers then walked out in protest of the actions being taken.

As the House members walked out of the chamber, State Representative Justin Jones, who’d been passing out Confederate Flag printouts during the debate, lit one of the flags on fire as he walked through the chamber halls.

In the State Senate, things were just as heated. Senator Charlane Oliver denounced the map, chastising Republicans for bowing to “daddy Trump.” She then stood up on her desk and unfurled a banner that said “No Jim Crow 2.0.”

The banner was quickly taken away by the Senate staff, but Senator Oliver remained on her desk, denouncing the actions of the chamber. The Republicans pear-clutched their way through this entire process. I absolutely gagged reading the old-ass white Lt Governor of Tennessee, Lt. Gov. Randy McNally, claim that Oliver’s actions were “undignified” of the legislative body.

The protests of elected lawmakers and the pear-clutching from the Republican leadership perfectly highlights the flaw in obsession over “decorum” and “civility.” There is nothing civil about what this Congressional map does. It is not worthy of being treated with respect or decorum.

Contrary to the idea of these actions being “stunts” - ample reporting from the session shows how emotional Democratic lawmakers were. The Nashville Banner photo gallery of the session shows how heartbreaking the events were to multiple members.

The Senate approved the map, as was expected. Shortly after, State Senator Lamar cried as she lamented the fear that her young child would have less political rights than her grandmother.

Only a handful of Republicans bothered to reject the proposal, largely those from the Memphis area. State Representative Mark White explained why he could not vote for the bill.

“I hear and I listen and today was not a day for me to vote yes. If I lose the respect of my Black community or the respect of the white community, then I can’t make change,”

Representative White, to his credit, called out that such a vote would have cost him the respect of the 20% of his district that are Black. White sits in a majority-white Trump +8 seat, so he did not need to vote against the map out of political survival.

With these votes, and a quick signature by Governor Lee, the map was put into affect for 2026. A few days after the session ended, Republican House leadership suspended Democratic lawmakers from committees; citing “decorum violations” during the special session. It was the latest “stab in the back” - as Democratic leader Karen Camper put it.

Lawsuit Filed - Can They Succeed?

Once the map was passed and signed into law, lawsuits were immediately filed to try and reverse the process. Several suits have been filed in both state and federal court, with summaries available here.

While one suit deals with possible violations of Tennessee law, the key cases that will set precedent will be the NAACP and ACLU lawsuits challenging the maps in federal court. Those cases argue that the maps direct targeting of Memphis’ Black community violate the 14th and 15th amendments; which bar unequal treatment of racial communities in elections and the law. The suits reject any idea that Republican lawmakers did not know about the racial makeup of Memphis area’s they split up.

The Tennessee lawsuits will be the ultimate test of whether or not the Voting Rights Act has any legs left after the Callais decision. Tennessee lawmakers stuck to the script of the map being a partisan gerrymander, not racial. However, this was a clear and obvious façade.

Once more, the Memphis Black community is so compact, that it is entirely reasonable to to believe any race-blind map would still generate a majority-Black seat. A New York Times analysis, which involved having a computer algorithm generate maps with no regard for racial mandates, found a compact map that happened to be majority-Black was almost always the result.

I also tried to draft my own proposed Memphis-based 9th district. I used no partisan or racial data. I first included the entire city of Memphis, which makes up 633,000 of the 767,000 people in the district. I then included the city Bartlett and then made adjustments to get population equality. When I checked the racial demographics, this seat was 58% Black in Voting-Age population.

For such a historic Black city to be carved up so coldly shows that the Voting Rights Act still matters a great deal. We will have to watch the courts to see how things progress. If such a map change is allowed to stand, then truly the Voting Rights Act is not just weakened, it is entirely dead.

In the meantime, the fight against the rise of Jim Crow 2.0 is just beginning. My only question for you is.. after reading all this…. “which side are you on?”

A few weeks ago, the US Supreme Court announced its Louisiana v Callais decision. The ruling, which was 6-3 and written by the far-right majority of the court, gutted the legal protections to minority voters afforded under the Voting Rights Act. The court specifically gutted the sections of the law that mandated the creation of majority-minority districts when certain conditions were met. The ruling in question had neutered that section of the law thanks to prioritizing partisan redistricting as a legitimate excuse to not draw minority seats.

The result of the ruling is already causing a rush of states in the deep south to draw out a handful of Black-majority districts. The ruling will do tremendous damage to minority protections not only in the south but across the country; as minority voters become nothing but pieces on a game board in partisan redistricting fights.

While much of the coverage has been around the partisan impact of this ruling, I wanted to step back for a moment and look at the VRA law in more detail. The Voting Rights Act is really underappreciated for how transformative the law was. The law is responsible for breaking Jim Crow in the 1960s and 1970s and transforming how we elect our leaders in the 1980s and 1990s. It has since served as a a shield for minority communities against partisan games in the 2000s and onward.

With this law now under threat and severely weakened, I wanted to look back at the VRA and the impact it’s had.

The History of the Voting Rights Act

When talking about the Voting Rights Act, we are not talking about just one piece of legislation passed at one time. The VRA has been amended and reauthorized several times, often changing to address concerns not considered before. I think it's important then to look at how the VRA went from combating “vote denial” and then to “vote dilution.”

Combating Vote Denial

Originally passed in 1965, the Voting Rights Act set up federal protections for voting rights; sweeping away many of the old Jim Crow restrictions placed on Black voters in the deep south. Throughout the course of the post-Reconstruction era, the southern states barred Black voters from the polls either with direct violence, intimidation, or legal blockades. Whites-only primaries, literacy tests, poll taxes, and limited registration hours were all used to stop Black citizens from registering or daring to vote. These were all examples of vote denial; a key practice that the VRA was designed to combat. When the act passed Congress, the opposition came largely from the Jim Crow south.

I have written several articles on Jim Crow era voter restrictions. These are largely centered around Florida, which was a firm Jim Crow state. They give a broad understanding of the life under segregation and repression.

• The Betrayal of Florida’s freed slaves - An article looking at how reconstruction in Florida sought to limit Black voting power and how ex-confederates eventually took control of the state and began Jim Crow

• Black Registration in the 1940s - A look at the Florida registration efforts of Harry T. Moore. This examines how Florida began to allow Black registration in the 1940s, but it varied wildly by county, with some violently resisting any efforts. Moore and his wife were eventually killed by the KKK.

• The Voting Rights Act in Florida - Breaking down how the 1965 Voting Rights Act finally sparked major registration drives in counties that had resisted efforts before. Florida was not as repressive as Alabama or Mississippi, and this article delves into its own county-by-county differences.

• Jim Crow and the move of Black voters to Democrats - A detailed look at the horror of Jim Crow and the period of the 1940s to 1960s that saw shifting voting patterns as Democrats began to embrace civil rights and Republicans moved in the opposite direction.

The VRA and its vigorous enforcement eventually secured much stronger rights for voters to register and cast ballots. Black registration and turnout began to increase across the south. An excellent breakdown of its effects can be seen here. In Florida, the VRA saw major spikes in registration in rural white counties. In Liberty County, for example, Black registration went from 0 to 177 after the law passed.

A decade earlier in Liberty, an effort of 12 Black individuals trying to register to vote led to cross burning and threats of violence. With the law and its enforcement by federal officials, Black voters finally had the right to even cast ballots in Liberty.

The VRA had impacts across the country; from urban cities to smaller rural towns. However, as voting practices increased, there were still many issues to address.

Redistricting and Vote Dilution

The other key component of the VRA was its fight against what is known as “vote dilution” - which is an election practice being implemented that weakens the voting strength of a community, even if that community now has the right to cast a ballot.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act governs this issue and aims to protect racial minorities by baring either election maps or methods of election that harm the ability of that minority community from having a say in electoral politics. This section covers election administration issues, like multi-language ballots and how precincts are assigned, but for this article we will stick to redistricting-related matters.

The VRA took aim at several ways that a minority community could see its electoral influenced diminished in redistricting. These include….

• Packing Voters - Lumping a minority community into as few districts as possible to keep them from influence other districts.

  • Example: A county in South Texas may be able to draw two 60% Hispanic commission districts. Instead they lump everyone together to get one 90% Hispanic district.

• Cracking Voters - Spreading a minority community across several districts, with no district having a large enough minority block that they can influence the election.

  • Example: Black voters in Memphis are large enough to make up 60% of a Congressional District. Instead they are split between three different seats, each with just 20% Black population.

• Use of At-Large Voting - If a racial minority could never win countywide/ citywide elections, but could make up the majority of a single-member district, then moving away from at-large voting was often ordered.

  • Example: In Osceola County Florida in 2006, the Hispanic population was 35% and clustered in the north of the county. At-Large elections always saw white candidates win. The commission was ordered to move to districts; which include a compact majority-Hispanic seat in the north of the county.

The law opened up states, counties, and cities to be sued if their election methods and redistricting systems were designed to keep minority communities from influencing politics.

The Fight Against Minority Representation

While the Voting Rights Act set out parameters to aid in minority representation in legislative bodies, there was no shortage of resistance to these developments. Parties in power across the states sought to protect their own incumbents against insurgent minority candidates. In these efforts, they turned to any map-making method they could to maintain the status quo.

One common tactic for limiting minority voices, which is much rarer today, was the use of multi-member districts. These systems, where a larger district was drawn but it elected multiple members, was often designed to keep districts from being small enough to be dominated by a specific community. This sentiment was perfectly summed by in 1976 by white Miami-Dade State Senator George Firestone, who argued against moving away from Florida’s use of multi-member districts.

[We’d be replaced by] “a senior citizen representative, a black community representative, a condominium representative, and a Cuban-American representative”

The sentiment of Firestone was not uncommon across much of the south, and indeed other parts of the country. The argument for multi-member districts was that it would reduce specific factional politics. However, the key reason minority communities clamored for their own districts was because they felt their issues were not being listened to. Having a proper seat at the table was paramount for ensuring community-specific issues got addressed.

While multi-member districts fell out of favor by the 1980s, with Florida agreeing to abandon it as public pressure grew, “cracking” became the common method to limit minority voices. Here again Florida has a good example to draw from.

Up in the Tallahassee area, Black voters asked for majority-Black Gadsden County to be united with the Black community of southern Tallahassee; which would have formed a majority-Black State House seat. The panhandle area was, and still is, known for severe racially polarized voting, and Black voters struggled to make inroads with white voters. However, lawmakers instead passed a map that specifically kept these two large black communities in separate districts.

Here the goal was to use Black voters to shore-up white Democrats in both of these seats. The specific call from Black voters, who had only been given the right to vote a few decades earlier, was ignored. You can read my article about the 1980s Florida redistricting process here.

These were the type of map issues that minority voters had to constantly deal with; and it happened across the country. Whether it was rural white politicians in the south, or city political machines in the north, minority voters continued to be used as pawns in redistricting fights.

Adding the “Results Test” in 1982

The 1970s had initially seen a flurry of lawsuits over redistricting practices that hampered the ability of minority communities to elect candidates of their choice. However, in the 1980 Supreme Court case of Mobile v Bolden, the court said that for discrimination claim to be brought forward under the VRA, discriminatory intend needed to be clear. It wasn’t enough that the map or method of voting had a clear negative affect on minority voters; you needed proof of racism being the driving force.

The Mobile case was seen as a major blow to the Voting Rights Act. Proving discrimination was hard, as politicians would not openly state their map decisions were designed to limit minority representation. Excuses about geography or partisan considerations were shields from racial discrimination suits. The court case was not the end of the VRA, however. Instead Congress resulted to update the law to give it stronger teeth.

During the 1982 debate, the Senate judiciary committee issued a report to accompany the legislation. The report suggested courts could look at several additional factors to determine if “in totality of the circumstances” a jurisdiction was subject to a VRA suit. These factors, taken directly from the DOJ website, were…

1. the history of official voting-related discrimination in the state or political subdivision;

2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized;

3. the extent to which the state of political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority-vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting;

4. the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes;

5. the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;

6. the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and

7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.

The 1982 amendment would prove to be a watershed change in redistricting law, setting up several states, counties, and cities to restructure their elections.

Subsequent Supreme Court cases would further shape the the voting rights law. The 1986 case of Thornburg v Gingles is a groundbreaking case. In that ruling the court laid out when the Voting Rights Act could be used to challenge election maps/systems.

1. The racial/language minority is large enough and compact enough to make up a majority of a single member district

2. The minority group is politically cohesive (aka they can/do vote as a block)

3. The majority racial block often votes as a unit to deny the minority candidate of choice victory in elections.

The final piece of the Gingles test is important, as it made clear the VRA only concerned areas where a minority district was the only way for a minority community to get a candidate of their choice into office. If a state, county, or city had shown that racial-block voting is not a major issue, then a VRA suit would fail.

There was no shortage of areas, however, where VRA suits were very successful.

Early Map Changes

With the 1982 amendment passing so close to redistricting time, many of the map changes of the decade came from individual lawsuits.

Mississippi, for example, was home to many lawsuits challenging at-large election methods across cities and counties. Included in these lawsuits was a challenge to the Congressional map layout. In 1983, a federal court mandated a redraw of the Congressional lines, drawing a firm majority-Black seat in the delta region.

In 1986, Mike Espy would win election from this district to become the state’s first Black congressman since Reconstruction.

Additional Congressional redraws took place in Louisiana. In 1984, a majority-Black seat was drawn inside Orleans Parish. This seat was actually won by Lindy Boggs, a white Congresswoman who was a firm Civil Rights ally. Boggs won re-election in the newly-drawn seat thanks to winning large chunks of the Black vote.

The Louisiana results actually reinforce an important point about the VRA. This was not about ensuring a Black candidate won. It was about giving the Black community a united voice to elect a candidate of their choice. While Israel Augustine likely narrowly won the Black vote, he did not do so by a wide margin. Boggs was a strong Black ally and any white candidate hostile to Black voters would not win such a seat. Hence the district gave power and weight to Black voters, even as Boggs remained Congresswoman. When Boggs then retired in 1990, the seat was won by William Jefferson, who became Louisiana’s first Black Congressman since reconstruction.

Local Election Changes

While we view the VRA largely as an issue around Congressional districts, the VRA has effected far more down-ballot office elections than it has Congressional. Issues like at-large voting for city council or county commission districts have been debated and challenged in hundreds of VRA suits.

For example, the 1980s-1990s saw a shift away from at-large county commission races in the panhandle of Florida. Many of these counties had sizeable Black minorities, up to 30-40%, but data showed white voters would not vote for the candidate of choice of the Black community. The result was orders to go to single-member districts to give Black voters the ability to have a commissioner speaking for them.

The changes in North Florida were specific to communities with racial-block voting. While many cities were also ordered to go to district-level elections, Tallahassee notably was not. This was because by the mid 1980s, a liberal college town like Tallahassee was showing less racial-block voting and electing the candidate of choice for Black voters. Tallahassee hence was never sued about going to a district-system.

These changes were not just about white vs Black in the south. Lawsuits and map challenges occurred across the country and over different racial dynamics. In Dade County, a legal battle finally paved the way for county commissioners to be elected at the district level. In Dade, whites had dominated elections thanks to strong financial backing and massive turnout disparities. Despite being just 30% of the county population, whites held 7 of 9 county seats. The 1993 special elections ordered under a district map resulted a fundamental reorganization of county government.

One area I have written about when it comes to local elections and the Voting Rights Act was San Juan County, Utah. This low-populated county is nearly evenly split between white and Navajo citizens. It has struggled with decades of racial strife and open discrimination against the Navajo. The county went to single-member districts under a court order decades ago, but the last 10 to 15 years have seen many back and forth redistricting battles over how to shape its commission seats. You can read backstory on this saga here.

While we think of the VRA around the drawing of legislative or Congressional elections, the affect down-ballot truly cannot be overstated.

The 1990s and Map Limitation

The 1992 redistricting process was a seminal year for the history of the Voting Rights Act. The mapping process, the first held after the 1982 amendments were implemented, also came at a height of computer technology that allowed for far more precise mapping. While some suits forced district changes in the mid-decade period, it was when every state had to redraw its lines after the 1990 census that the full effect of the VRA would be felt. Several states were going to be ordered to draw districts that united their minority communities and give them a chance to elect candidates of their choice to Congress.

As states found themselves with new mandates for the creation of minority seats, they also had new technology that could aid such a process. Mapping down to the census block level, and with each state having hundreds of thousands of said blocks, allowed for some very creative maps. This also came as the Department of Justice, under the Presidency of George H W Bush, made it clear to states that they fully intended to implement the racial mandates of the Voting Rights Act.

States like Florida, North Carolina, and Alabama, all with no majority-Black districts at the time but with large Black populations, would be ordered to draw minority seats. States like Texas, Florida, and California, for example, would also be mandated to look at the creation of Hispanic-majority seats. The desire to adhere to DOJ directives also clashed with the desire of partisan actors to protect their incumbents and party prospects. To see how these competing desires played out in Florida, you can check out my articles on the 1992 State Legislative Redistricting and the Congressional redistricting saga in the attached links.

The combination of racial mandates and computer technology, with no real mandates on compactness, led to some of the most bizarre districts ever used. A famous example is the 3rd Congressional District in Florida, drawn by a federal court to be a majority-Black seat after the legislature failed to produce a map.

The district stretches all the way from Jacksonville to Orlando and back over to Gainesville. It essentially “collects” Black voters across North Florida and uses highways to narrowly connect communities. This was a plan to give Black voters a voice in North Florida. However, it was not anything remotely considered a proper community. The Florida 3rd was similar to many bizarre districts that came up in the 1990s. The reflected the wild-west era that mapping was in thanks to the new technology available. These map would also not last through court challenges, however.

States were given further legal clarity when the Supreme Court released two major cases in the mid 1990s. These are the Miller v Johnson and Shaw v Reno decisions. These cases struck down odd-looking districts that court found were drawn with only race in mind. In Miller, the court stated

“a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular and bizarre in shape that it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate voters based on race”

In the Shaw case, Justice O’Conner wrote that such race-based districts are subject to strict scrutiny, meaning they must satisfy three conditions: a compelling government interest, narrowly tailored to achieve the goal, and use the least restrictive means to achieve the goal. Maps that based all of their borders purely on race were found to be in violation of the 14th amendment, which guaranteed equality before the law on the basis of race.

In other words, the court did uphold the goal of the VRA and its mandates to draw minority districts were possible. However, the VRA was set to safeguard from unfair mapping practices that limited minority voting influence where they otherwise could form minority districts.

These cases forced many district redraws in the 1990s. In some cases, they eliminated the ability to draw a majority-minority seat. However, many changes simply made districts more compact but less packed with a racial minority. Other maps changed some majority-seats to districts with large minority populations. Georgia, for example, originally drew 3 majority-Black districts in 1992; with two looking ugly as sin. A court-ordered Remap for 1996 saw two of the seats become around 35% Black. However, both districts re-elected their Black Congresspeople.

Future cases would further refine what was a permissible district and how much race could be considered. Up to present day districts from congress to city council are argued based on if they are “racially predominant” or merely “racially conscious.” That said, no maps debated today look quite as bizarre as the maps of the 1990s.

The Effect of the Law

The Voting Rights Act and its subsequent 1982 amendment had a massive impact on racial representation in America. By the end of the 1992 elections, the impact of the law was clear. Thanks to court mandates, Congress had 32 majority-Black seats and 19 majority-Hispanic seats. Localities across the nation saw first time representation for Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Native Americans.

No graph sums up the effect of the law more than the graph of Black Congresspeople by year. From the end of Reconstruction and to the passage of the 1965 law, no more than half a dozen Black men sat in Congress. By the end of 1992, that number sat at 40.

The 1992 elections saw a massive spike over just two years, a product of the redistricting cycle. In those elections, Alabama, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Florida elected Black individuals to Congress for the first time since reconstruction.

The law continued to shape representation in all levels of government for decades after 1992. However, the law is not just there to lift up minority voices. It is also there to shield them from partisan fights. This shield has become all too important in recent years.

A shield from Partisan Gerrymandering

When the VRA “results test” was initially passed in the 1980s, many of the states it would affect the most were in the south. At the time, most of these states were actually in the hands of conservative Democrats. While race relations in the south had seen improvement since the civil rights era, and many segregationists being forced out of office or switching parties, there was still a clear sentiment among white leaders that Black voters were secondary in the coalition. This was despite the fact Black voters were the most loyal constituency.

That is why we see maps in the 1980s like the Florida panhandle example from earlier, where Black voters were cracked and used to prop up white districts. The 1990s maps would see white Democrats forced to abandon their cynical effort to use Black voters to secure their own re-elections. While many Democrats at the time would subsequently blame Republican gains on the mandate for minority districts, I discussed this in my article on 1992 Florida Legislative redistricting, and pick apart that myth. The point being, the VRA finally gave Black voters a voice that they would not have gotten despite being in states run by their own party.

Dynamics shifted greatly by the mid 2000s as Republicans began to take control of more and more southern states. The 2010 midterm specifically was a watershed moment, as Republicans took control of almost all southern legislatures. This meant that the 2011-2012 redistricting process in the south would largely be at the hands of Republicans, a dynamic that would repeat in 2021-2022. However, as many of these states worked to gerrymander out any remaining white Democratic members, of which few remained, Black-majority districts could not be touched.

The same protections applied to Black and Hispanic Democrats in the northern states, who could not be cynically used to prop up other districts at the desire of Democratic leaders. Just like Republicans could not carve up Black-majority seats to elect more Republicans, Democrats could not carve up Black/Hispanic city voters to save white incumbents outside of Chicago or New York City.

The 2010s saw gerrymandering become a much bigger topic in American political discourse. I wrote about this time in this article from last year, so check that out for more details on the fight for redistricting reform. To sum things up, many liberal and Democratic groups began to make the push for federal redistricting standards. Republicans, who controlled a majority of state legislatures thanks to the 2010 midterms, controlled redistricting in more states and hence opposed any such reform. In 2019, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in Rucho v. Common Cause that while partisan gerrymandering was anti-democratic, the court would not regulate the issue. The ruling fell on ideological lines, with the four liberal justices in the dissent.

With the courts unwilling to reign in the practice of partisan gerrymandering, minority communities had at least one reprieve. Thanks to the VRA, existing minority districts were shielded and protected from the political games in the map making process. In Mississippi, for example, Republicans could have easily carved up the Black population in the delta region to create four white Republican seats. However, with the 2nd district protected by the VRA, no such cracking took place.

We see a similar story play out in Tennessee. There Republicans resolved to maximize their gerrymander. Two democratic districts remained; a majority-Black seat in Memphis and a white-majority seat Nashville. Republicans carved up the city of Nashville & Davidson County three ways, eliminating that as a Democratic seat.

The result of this change was a map with firm 8 Republican-friendly districts and just one Democratic-district district. However, Republicans made no moves against the Memphis seat, as it was protected by the Voting Rights Act.

We saw the VRA also protect Black voters in Missouri just last year. In 2025, Republicans in Missouri redrew their Congressional map, cracking Kansas City to eliminate one of two Democratic held seats. I wrote about that whole process here. In that new map, however, the heavily Black 1st Congressional district was not touched, as Republicans feared a VRA challenge.

I have largely stuck to discussing Black districts in the south because these are some of the most prominent and straight forward examples of VRA protections. However, trust me when I say these protections stretch across multiple racial groups and all the way up and down ballot. Whether its a Black-majority Congressional district in Tennessee or an Asian-majority city council seat in California, the VRA serves as a potential shield against partisan games in the annual remap process.

Or at least it did provide a shield before the Callais decision came in.

Louisiana and the Callais Case

The Callais decision stems from the redistricting drama that took place in Louisiana over the last few years. I actually wrote a very detailed breakdown of Louisiana’s Congressional redistricting in this October article. I highly recommend giving that article a read for far more details and history on Louisiana redistricting. However I will cover the key factors here.

The Congressional debate in Louisiana centered around whether the state was obligated to have one or two Black Congressional districts. Despite being around 1/3 Black, Louisiana Republicans drew a Congressional map that had just one majority-Black seat. The 2nd Congressional district in question packed Black voters from Orleans and up to East Baton Rouge. With Louisiana well known for racially polarized voting, with white voters often voting 80% for the Republican party, this created a 5-1 partisan breakdown of the map.

The state of Louisiana was sued under the VRA to force the drawing of a second majority-Black Congressional district. The plaintiffs suing offered maps showing a compact plan was entirely feasible. I even drafted my own proposal, which aimed to limit parish splits as much as possible.

Louisiana Republicans lost their battle in the federal court, with judges agreeing that Louisiana’s Congressional map backed Black voters in the 2nd Congressional district in order dilute their influence in other seats. Lawmakers were given the right to draw their own proposal to remedy the situation, otherwise a court would do it for them.

Lawmakers knew that in the redraw, they would lose one of their Republican members, as any new majority-Black seat would lean Democratic. Lawmakers did not want to draw a compact plan like my proposal, however, as it would endanger Congresswoman Julie Letlow; who was well liked. Republicans instead aimed to screw over Republican Garret Graves. As a result, lawmakers decided to meet the court mandate by saving Letlow’s seat and instead created a district Black-majority sat that tore apart the old 6th and create a meandering seat that stretched from East Baton Rouge and all the way to Shreveport.

This ugly ass looking district met the racial mandate of the court, being 54% Black. However, it followed no true redistricting principles other than to collect Black voters from one end of the state to another. That said, as my October article lays out, this mapping decision was still driven by which Republican incumbents to protect. Such an ugly 6th was not necessary.

With the map approved, a lawsuit eventually followed challenging the plan. A group of voters sued, arguing the plan was a racially predominant map that hence violated the 14th amendment; basically that the plan discriminated against non-Black voters. This became the Callais case.

The case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court in 2025, with oral arguments being held in March of that year. The case could have related just to the issue of the map itself and whether the 6th was racially predominant. Like many court cases from the 1990s and after, the court could have struck down the map but simply ordered a new configuration. The court also could have ruled that having at least one majority-Black seat met the VRA criteria, and that a 2nd majority-Black seat was not a right under the law.

The court appeared to expand the scope of the case when, instead of issuing a ruling, they called for re-arguments to be held in October of 2025. The court wanted defendants and plaintiffs to submit briefs on if the maps violated the 14th and 15th amendments. This move told legal experts that the court was considering weakening Section 2 of the VRA, potentially arguing that the VRA racial mandates were in conflict with the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. The long-held argument from conservatives has been VRA cases like this are discriminatory against white citizens by creating special protections and mandates for minority voters. I wholesale REJECT this claim but I will leave that for a future article.

Considering the far-right bent of the current Supreme Court, there was a real fear that the Voting Rights Act would be entirely struck down, or at the very least fundamentally weakened.

This worry proved sadly true.

The Callais Decision

On April 29, the Supreme Court released its ruling, written by Justice Samuel Alito. The ruling came down 6-3 on pure ideological lines. While the ruling did not strike down Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, it weakened it in fundamental ways, arguably to a point few redistricting lawsuits would ever succeed.

I am only going to cover some key points here, as I am not a legal expert and this article is long enough. However, I recommend analysis here, here, and here for much more detail on the ruling.

How the VRA is Gutted

First thing to get out of the way, the court did NOT strike down the consideration or use of race in redistricting maps. In the opinion, Alito said that racial preferences/discrimination (again many white conservatives view the VRA as discrimination against whites in redistricting) are rarely allowed, but notably not banned. The court sites the history of discrimination as a need for legal remedy. The court, however, makes it clear they are going to restructure how the VRA is “properly construed.” Of course their definition of “properly” differs radically from my own.

The ruling essentially states that Section 2 is sometimes warranted. However, the ruling sets up a major obstacle for proving that map-makers tried to dilute the influence of a racial minority.

The ruling states that discrimination based on race must be the intention OUTSIDE of partisan considerations. In other words, if a map cracks Black voters to draw more Republican districts, that is not the same thing as racial discrimination under the court’s view. The court in essence prioritizing partisan considerations OVER racial representation in a legislative body.

Scotusblog summed this up best when it came to the Louisiana case.

Among other things, Alito said, the Black voters “did not provide an illustrative map that” protected the state’s Republican incumbents. Alito acknowledged that the Black voters had “offered evidence that black and white voters consistently supported different candidates, but their analysis did not control for partisan preference.”

In past cases, when plaintiffs suing for a new map have to submit supporting documents, they have to factor in some key items. The major issues to prove are that a majority-minority seat can be drawn compactly, and that such a seat is needed due to racially-polarized voting. Alito, now, is adding in that plaintiffs must prove a majority-minority seat doesn't conflict with the partisan aims for state lawmakers.

The ruling, in essence, says a state’s partisan redistricting goals matters more than racial representation.

Restructuring Gingles

As the ruling goes on, Alito affirms that the three considerations for drawing a minority seat, as laid out in Thornburg v Gingles, are not overturned. A reminder of those conditions were….

1. The racial/language minority is large enough and compact enough to make up a majority of a single member district

2. The minority group is politically cohesive (aka they can/do vote as a block)

3. The majority racial block often votes as a unit to deny the minority candidate of choice victory in elections.

Alito did not overturn these, but added in several new considerations, citing “40 years of changes”. These key changes Alito considers as the following. Btw, I will give each reason Alito lays out, and then give my opinion below the number.

1. Social change in the south had reduced discrimination based on race

   1. My Answer: While Jim Crow is hardly as powerful as it was in the 1960s, there is no shortage of racial discrimination cases that emerge out of the south.

2. The South is now in a two-party system, where partisan vote is heavily correlated with race.

   1. Answer: Here Alito is saying that racially polarized voting is more a factor of partisanship than it is race. Hence the race-block voting the Gingles case references is less than it was in the past. However, as I documented in a local non-partisan election from Louisiana here, there is still AMPLE racial block voting, regardless of Party ID.

3. The court said it would not take up partisan gerrymandering claims in Rucho v Common Cause. With that ruling, Alito believes plaintiffs are bringing VRA cases that actually are just about partisan gerrymandering, not racial.

   1. Answer: In legal language, Alito is accusing people who bring VRA suits of simply trying to add Democratic districts in the deep south. This sentiment is without ANY evidence and ignores that VRA suits have been going on before and after the Rucho decision. Likewise VRA suits come all the time for local non-partisan races. This is just a political accusation that has no place in a court opinion like this.

4. New Computer technology allows plaintiffs filing lawsuits to easier prove they can draw maps that produces fair racial maps while also adhering to the state aims.

   1. Answer: Here the state aims can include incumbent protection and partisan desires. In reality, this means the state has an easy excuse for why racial-minority seats are eliminated.

All of these legal back and forth and this is the fundamental summary of the ruling….

The new frameworks in practice strike down the “results test” originally formed in the 1982 amendments to the act. It shifts the burden back to plaintiffs to prove racist intent in map making, but adds a bunch of new excuses map makers can give for why they carved up or packed minority voters.

There is already scandal in the ruling, as data that Alito sites is being openly questioned. One of the justifications for the ruling was that Black voter participation has come to parity with white turnout in much of the country, including the south. However, data analysists have pointed out this fact is NOT true, and relies on flawed metrics for defining “turnout.” So in essence, Alito struck out the results test and made it harder to sue, partly because of claims over data that is inaccurate.

The Impact of the Ruling

While the ruling “upheld” the VRA, it is made borderline useless. As Justin Levitt, an election law expert at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, stated…..

“This is a full gut. This is burn the house down and pretend the house still exists because you can point to where the foundation used to be,”

Justice Kagan, a liberal who wrote the dissent in the case, agreed, calling the ruling one that turns the VRA into a “dead letter.”

In a review of the decision by the Harvard Kennedy School, experts agree this decision fundamentally weakens the ability of racial minorities to sue for relief under the voting rights act. The issue at heart is tying up the Gingles considerations with partisan considerations.

On the first condition, Justice Alito’s opinion makes clear that plaintiffs now must also show that a state redistricted based on race and not party. In a way, this is the same test, but with “partisan objectives” included in “traditional redistricting criteria.”

Second, Justice Alito says that for the second and third conditions, which are often analyzed together, plaintiffs must somehow “control for party affiliation” and show that racial bloc voting “cannot be explained by partisan affiliation.” Given the high correlation between party and race, especially in the American South, this will likely be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to do.

So, while formally the Section 2 Gingles test remains in place, it has been narrowed to a degree that makes it incredibly difficult to use.

Further in the analysis, experts lay out a very bleak picture for the future of lawsuits under the voting rights act.

This paints a bleak picture for the future of Black representation in elected offices, particularly in the South. Across the region, race is a very strong predictor of how people vote: Southern whites tend to be among the most conservative and Republican-leaning in the country, while Southern Blacks are among the most reliably Democratic.

As a result, Republican state legislators throughout the South will have a strong incentive to eliminate Congressional districts that currently elect Black representatives. After this ruling, they can simply justify those changes on partisan grounds, and for this Supreme Court, that will be enough. In fact, Justice Alito’s majority opinion effectively invites states to frame their decisions as driven by partisanship whenever possible, even in places where race almost perfectly predicts vote choice and party identification is deeply polarized along racial lines.

The ruling fundamentally guts protections for minority communities. This sentiment is not just alarmist talk either, as the events that have transpired just in the past few weeks have shown.

The Rush to Crack Black Voters

The affect of the ruling is already been felt across the deep south. With lawmakers now free to make partisan goals their main consideration in redistricting, the shield for Black-majority districts was gone.

Within days of the ruling, Tennessee lawmakers worked to revamp their Congressional map. The lone Democratic-held seat, the majority-Black 9th located in Memphis, was divided up three different ways.

The three districts in question, the 9th, 5th, and 8th, all divvy up the city of Memphis. The lines cut right through the black community of the city.

The division of Memphis rendered no district majority-Black. Thanks to the racially polarized voting that takes place in the south, this meant all 9 majority-white districts were now firmly Republican seats.

The chaotic remap of Tennessee, which I would like to dedicate a separate article too, came as Republican lawmakers fell back on the excuse that this was purely for partisan reasoning. These lawmakers went out of their way to avoid bringing up race, almost to a comical degree. At one point, a State Senator insisted he had no idea what the racial makeup of the city of Memphis was.

The Republicans hid behind their proposal simply being “race blind” - and rather just a partisan gerrymander. All of this has been endorsed by the courts now. The ability to crack Memphis, easily one of the most logical and compact majority-Black seats in the south, really does mean the Voting Rights Act is a “dead letter.” The shield is now sadly off.

Looking Ahead

Things are not stopping there, as South Carolina is currently beginning a special session to try and eliminate its lone majority-Black Congressional district as well. Georgia wants to remap as well, and Alabama has already remapped to eliminate one of its two majority-Black seats. Mississippi has likewise planned to redistrict as well.

This ruling will spark a massive assault on minority communities across the country. Right now the south is doing exactly what the ghosts of Jim Crow and the Confederacy want. I sadly cannot say I am surprised. I will be working on breakdowns of these map changes in individual articles. Sadly I fear I will have no shortage of items to right about.

The fight for equality is not over!

Both plans can be viewed back to back below. First the 2022 map, then the 2026 map.

I go over this plan in much more detail in this article below.

The plan in question is currently subjected to several lawsuits seeking to stop it from being implemented. The map not only is a blatant partisan gerrymander, something barred by Florida’s Constitution, but the map cracks Hispanic voters in the Central Florida region. This was the topic of my first follow up article after the map was introduced.

This article is going to look south, specifically at the Broward County region. Here, with several districts changing their makeup, there is a rumor developing that white Congresswoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz may run for the plurality-Black 20th Congressional district. This potential move has generated great frustration with Black leaders, and is likewise a move I am firmly against. However, many of you may be unfamiliar with this situation and why its so contentious and heated. This article will serve as an explainer for what is going on down in Broward County politics and why Schultz (DWS for short) making such a move has generated so much anger.

Lets dive in.

Changes to the 20th and 24th

When Ron DeSantis made the call for redistricting in Florida, one of the districts he cited was the 20th Congressional district. The seat in question was a majority-Black district that united the Black communities of Palm Beach and Broward County. Such a layout has existed for several decades and was continued in the 2022 gerrymander that DESANTIS HIMSELF proposed to the legislature. You can look back at that whole saga here.

When the rumbling of a possible 2026 remap began last year, I wrote that changes to the 20th Congressional district was entirely possible. You can see my September article here.

In that piece, I pointed out a Black-plurality seat could be drawn just in Broward that would still be majority-Black in a Democratic primary (tantamount to election in such a seat). As I saw it, redrawing the 20th would be the excuse to start the mapping process, and then other changes would “just so happen” to benefit Republicans in surrounding seats.

The new layout for the 20th came out similar to what I expected, with the new seat being a plurality Black seat entirely in Broward. Meanwhile, the black-plurality 24th district, largely based in Miami-Dade County, moved inland and stretches further into Broward.

With the new layouts for the 20th and 24th, both still give Black voters an opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. The 24th has a Democratic primary that is over 70% Black. The 20th, meanwhile, has a primary over 50% Black.

In terms of damage the map does to racial communities, the biggest story for Florida this time is more the changes to Hispanic districts. DeSantis already screwed over the Black community of Florida when he dismantled the North Florida Black district in 2022; which you can read back on here.

However, concerns about the future of Black representation from Broward County took a turn when the question emerged about who planned to run in what seat under the new map.

South Florida’s Musical Chairs

The changes to the makeup of Southeast Florida has caused major headaches for two of the regions Democratic members. Before the remap, three white Democrats, Lois Frankel, Jared Moskowitz, and Debbie Wasserman Schultz, all sat in light blue seats that backed Harris from a range of 2% to 6%. The new layout, however, converting two of those seats into much more Republican-aligned districts.

Lois Frankel saw her Palm Beach district, once numbered the 22nd but changed to the 23rd, become a Democratic vote-sink. She will run there, a region she has represented for decades across all levels of Government. Jared Moskowitz has made it clear that he will run in the new coast-hugging 25th district; which does have a large number of his current seats voters. The 25th voted for Trump by 9% in 2024 but voted for Biden by 5% in 2020.

This situation has left Debbie Wasserman Schultz unsure what she will do. Her district has been carved up pretty thoroughly. None of the new districts hold a majority of her current seat. How her current district is split up can be seen below.

If Schultz is to run for re-election, she will be forced to do so in a district that is very different from the one she currently represents. In theory she has claim to try and run in either the 22nd, 25th, or 26th. I include the 20th in the below map because she had indicated she is considering that move, but as you can see, there is little overlap.

The new 20th only has a very small overlap with the current 25th district; only about 15,000 residents. Schultz indicating she may run in the 20th is stunning considering if she wanted a safe blue seat, she has more overlap with the 24th; which will take in around 150,000 of Schultz’ current constituents. However, Schultz has shown no indication she will run in that seat; which is held by Democrat Frederica Wilson.

Schultz is no doubt partly considering a run for the 20th because the seat as no incumbent. Scandal-plagued Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick, who was likely on the verge of being expelled for financial impropriety, resigned in late April. While McCormick has now also claimed she plans to run for the seat again (she is delusional) - she is not the frontrunner by any means. By all accounts, the 20th is an open seat with a litany of candidates running, and possibly more to file.

Schultz clearly feels this is the best area for her, with a massive financial war chest, to jump into. This would be a mistake. Before delving into why the 20th is not a good idea, lets lay out two other key options - the 22nd or the 26th.

Where Should DWS Run?

Of the three white Democratic Congresspeople for South Florida, DWS is easily in the worst position. Frankel benefitted from the vote-sink in Palm Beach and Moskowitz has a tough but winnable fight in the 25th - a race I will talk about in the future. Schultz, meanwhile, had two major options that both have drawbacks.

An important factor for the Congresswoman is that she has only modest at best crossover support. In the 2024 elections, while Kamala Harris won her district by 5%, Schultz managed only a modest improvement with a 9% win over Weston City Commissioner Chris Eddy.

This victory came from over-performances that were strongest in heavily Jewish communities, improvements otherwise were limited. Her under-performance in Weston, her residence, can partly be explained by going up against a local commissioner.

Schultz hence can count on some over-performance but likely needs a blue wave that lifts all candidates to have a chance in any red-leaning seat she runs in.

Some have floated Schultz to run for the 26th Congressional District; the seat that includes Southwest Broward and the Hialeah area of Miami-Dade. This 70% Hispanic district swung heavily to the right in 2024. However, this seat also was very close in 2020 and voted Democratic back in 2016 and 2018.

Schultz’s current 25th is actually plurality Hispanic, but this is a far different story. The Broward portion of this seat, the area DWS already represents, is 44% Hispanic; with around 141,000 Hispanic residents. It is made up of many different Hispanic communities, namely from South America, that lean less Republican historically. The Miami-Dade portion, which is heavily Cuban, is 90% Hispanic and includes 418,000 Hispanic residents.

Schultz would be running in a seat with far more new voters than familiar with, and doing so against longtime Congressman Mario Diaz Balart, who by all accounts should be able to outperform with Cuban voters. It is more ideal for Democrats to have a Hispanic candidate in this seat. However, the results in Miami from last year show that a white Democrat can win Hispanic areas. That said, Balart himself would be hard to beat - while the Miami Mayor’s race was an open contest.

The real best option for Schultz, as I personally see it, would be to run in the new 22nd district. The district backed Trump by 10% in 2024 but backed Biden by 3% in 2020.

This ridiculous seat links together bits and pieces of Broward and Palm Beach, then goes across the everglades to grab Hendry and Collier county. The district doesn’t include Naples, but includes Marco Island on the far west coast of the state.

The seat includes Schultz’ longtime base of support - the Weston/Davie/Sunrise region.

Broward as a whole makes up 44% of the population, following by Palm at 27%, Collier at 23%, and Hendry way back at 5%. The Broward and Palm regions have trended further to the right in recent years, but are more traditionally Democratic. This seat includes Jewish communities in Parkland, Coral Springs, and western Palm Beach.

Collier is absolutely meant to be the Republican wall designed to make the seat firmly red. It will be a tough thing for Schultz to overcome, as no doubt she has little love out there. However, the Palm and Broward bases can in theory be swung back to the right to make an upset possible.

Schultz has been indicating, however, that she is not looking to run in the 22nd. Instead, she is seriously considering running in the 20th district. That news has caused a great deal of understandable anger from the Black community. Lets dive specifically into why that is the case and why such a move is a bad idea.

The New 20th District

The Broward-only 20th district is designed to be a Democratic vote-sink for the area. The seat not only grabs most Black voters north of 595, but it grabs many heavily white Democratic communities as well. White Democratic communities like Ft Lauderdale, Oakland Park, Coral Springs, and Wilton Manors are included in the district. The racial makeup of registered voters is plurality Black, with white voters close behind.

While the seat had a great degree of racial diversity, the key dynamic here is what the Democratic Primary will look like. The district in question backed Kamala Harris by 37% and is never at risk of going Republican. Who emerges from a Democratic Primary is the assured winner in a general.

The racial breakdown among registered Democrats is much more favorable to Black voters. Over 50% of the registered Democrats in the district are Black.

Turnout dynamics can affect the actual primary makeup in great deal. Hispanic voters have far weaker turnout in August primaries compared to white and Black democrats. Historically white Democrats outpaced Black Democrats in primary contests. As a result, the 2024 Democratic Primary in the new 20th was a bit closer; with 51% of the vote being Black vs 35% white.

This puts the 20th district in a position of favoring the candidate of choice for the Black community, but it not being an overwhelming minority seat. Originally, the district changes didn’t appear to alter the calculus for most of the candidates running for the seat. While Palm Beach has been cut out, that was always the minority of the district; which has long been dominated by Broward votes. The major candidates right now all hail from Broward

• Elijah Manley - A longtime activist and candidate who has support in parts of the Black and LGBT community. Rose to challenge McCormick has her ethics issues got worse (even being sued by her for defamation - which a court rejected)

• Dale Holness - A former County Commissioner strongest with the Caribbean community.

• Luther Campbell - Best known as Uncle Luke from 2 Live Crew who had long floated the idea of running for office

• Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick - She has claimed she is running again, but whether she makes it to actual qualifying remains to be seen.

Most expected the race for the 20th to be a crowded affair among many candidates, especially with McCormick’s resignation. However, plans have been thrown into chaos and anger as the rumbling of a DWS carpetbag to the 20th gains greater traction.

The Problem with DWS in the 20th

When the new Congressional map came out, Debbie Wasserman Schultz made it clear that she planned to run for re-election. In conversations with political leaders, she has argued her long seniority brings value to the region, which is not an incorrect statement. Schultz is a well-known workhorse for her district, which is the main reason she survived her serious 2016 primary challenge amid the DNC leadership debacle. Initially, Schultz did not make it clear where she planned to run, only saying

“ I will be running in a district where I have an opportunity and the privilege to continue to represent my constituents in South Florida.”

This vagueness quickly honed in on the 20th district; with such a move being seen entirely as a reason to ensure she remains in Congress. Schultz has very little geographic crossover with the district in question. I looked at her times in the Florida legislature and into Congress, and she has never represented more than a handful of areas in the new CD20.

If Schultz were to run in a 1-on-1 race for the new 20th, its very unlikely she would be able to win a primary there. While she has never been a poor performer with Black voters, she has little strong loyalty within the Black community. To most voters in the 20th, especially Black voters, she would be seen as a carpetbagger cynically looking for a safe political haven.

The only way that Schultz can win in the 20th Democratic Primary is with a split Black field. The DWS playbook for victory would no doubt come from aiming to consolidate white voters while the Black majority fractures across candidates. This makes such a move all the more cynical. It is very similar to what occurred in 2022 when former Congressman Alan Grayson tried to win the Florida 10th Congressional district amid a fracture Black field. I wrote about that race here. That race had come at the time when DeSantis had dismantled one Black-performing district and altered the 10th in a way that undermined Orlando’s Black population. The Grayson run was decried by many, including myself, as a profound lack of solidarity with the Black community. Grayson ultimately would not win, with Maxwell Frost going on to become the Congressman for the region.

Showing Solidarity with the Black Community

On this issue of solidarity, I also want to make one things very clear. This is not about the 20th being entitled to a Black representative. This actually has nothing to do with the race of the elected official. Districts drawn to give minority communities a voice, whether through the Voting Rights Act or Fair Districts, are designed to give a racial minority a unified voice and elect THEIR CANDIDATE OF CHOICE to office.

If the Black voters of the 20th said “we like Debbie and we want her to be our voice in Congress” then this an entirely different conversation. However, the reality is a DWS win only comes with a split Black field and being the candidate of choice among white voters. That is where the anger is stemming from.

This was clearly felt in the Press Release from the Broward County Black Caucus, who have taken great exception to Schultz’ maneuvering

“If a non-Black Democratic incumbent can come into a vacant Black-opportunity district, consolidate against a fractured Black field, and win, every other Black-opportunity district in the South that loses its incumbent becomes available to the next displaced non-Black Democrat the same way.”

The press release hit on the fact that the DWS maneuvering comes not in a vacuum, but comes amid a new onslaught against Black representation in America. With the Supreme Court gutting the Voting Rights Act in its Callais decision, making it harder to protect racial minorities from being carved-up in redistricting plans, more southern states are looking to destroy Black districts. Just a few days ago, Tennessee passed a new Congressional map that cracked the Black population of Memphis into THREE DISTRICTS. The majority-Black 9th has been dismantaled, with all remaining districts being heavily white Republican.

The carving up of the Tennessee 9th is also relatable to this situation because it is represented by a white Democrat - Steven Cohen. The Memphis-based district, which originally elected Harold Ford Sr as Tennessee’s 1st Black Congressman in 1974, has been Represented by Cohen since 2006. However, Cohen has represented this seat as the candidate of choice for the Black community, routinely winning landslide margins across white and Black precincts. Cohen has long had a reputation as a firm Black ally. This photo of him with John Lewis is incidentally one of my absolute favorite images.

Cohen’s presence is an example how such minority seats are not about the race of the winner, but if a racial minority has the ability to elect a candidate of choice for their community. What has happened in Tennessee will be the subject a future article I am working on about the Callais decision.

This is the national context that absolutely informs the reaction to Schultz considering such a move. Several Black leaders, including local State Senator Rosalind Osgood, have made strong pleas to the Congresswoman to reconsider her plans.

"We don't want it to be her legacy that she remains in Congress by disenfranchising the Black community,"

Osgood also does lay out an important point about the racial makeup of whoever emerges from the district. As I said, the district is not about electing a Black candidate, but rather electing the candidate of choice among Black voters. In theory, the Black community could elect a white man, Asian woman, Hispanic woman, or anyone. However, there is value in representation, in giving young people someone to look up to. As Osgood stated in her talks with the press…..

"We've had it for 34 years. We want little Black boys and little Black girls to see somebody that looks like them so that they can dream and have an idea of a possibility of an opportunity."

The sense of representation, of looking at someone like yourself in a position of power, is powerful and important. There can always been exceptions to this. Congressman Cohen, before he represented the 9th, was at least a State Senator for the area, and someone who has worked firmly to be a voice for the Black community. Schultz, as I have shown, has never represented a large portion of the district she wants to run in. YES she is an ally. However, she isn’t familiar there. She would be carpetbagging in.

And of course, this all comes with the most important fact - Schultz is looking at a district where she NEEDS a fractured Black vote to win. It it just not a sign of proper solidarity to make such a cynical move.

Final Thoughts

Debbie Wasserman Schultz will have a decision to make very soon. I would hope that the pushback she has received regarding her trial balloon about running in the 20th will cause her to rethink her decision. Through all of this, I do want to stress that of course the biggest villains here are DeSantis and the republican lawmakers that passed this horrid gerrymander. DWS is a victim of the map, like so many others.

There is no guarantee Debbie Wasserman Schultz should will be in congress by next year. I hope she is, I really do. A win in the 22nd Congressional district is not impossible even if its tough. If DWS does go down fighting, let it be in such a district. A victory there makes her a hero while a loss makes her a martyr.

To close this article out, lets envision that this redistricting map is the TITANIC.

Debbie should ask herself, using this metaphor, do you really want to be some guy that tried to sneak onto the “women and children first” lifeboats? Or do you want to go down with honor? Take some stock of the words that wealthy businessman Ben Guggenheim stated as he stayed on the ship as it sank.

“I am willing to remain and play the man’s game, if there are not enough boats for the women and children. I won’t die like a beast. Tell my wife I played the game out straight and to the end. No woman will be left on board this ship because Ben Guggenheim was a coward.”

I know you are not a coward Congresswoman. Stand and fight in the 22nd district. Resist the comfortable lifeboats and make plans to survive in the cold water below.

The new map was a further Republican gerrymander over what had already been solidly Republican Congressional plan. The original 2022 map, which DeSantis had forced through the legislature, had already squeezed Democrats into just eight seats. This new map, however, took aim at eliminated half of the remaining Democratic Congresspeople.

I go into detail on the changes to the Congressional map in my article from last week. Check the link below for more details and district-level maps on the new plan. There I also go into the reasoning behind the new DeSantis plan, which included a claim that Florida’s Fair Districts Amendments (which ban partisan and racial gerrymandering) are no longer enforceable.

Now I have a good deal I want to say about the DeSantis logic for why a remap was needed or warranted. If you read my twitter coverage as debate went on in the legislature, or seen me referenced in any news articles, you will know I regard the DeSantis reasoning for the map with “some skepticism.”

For this article, however, I want to focus in on just one of the affected districts and communities. This article is going to hone in on the cracking of Hispanic voters in Central Florida.

Targeting Darren Soto

One of the four Democratic Congresspeople targeted by the DeSantis map was the Hispanic-majority seat held by Darren Soto. The district, as it currently stands, was based entirely in Osceola County and includes pieces of neighboring Orange and Polk.

Congressman Soto, who is the state’s first Puerto Rican member of Congress, rose in Florida politics as the Orlando metro region saw a massive demographic shift. The last few decades have seen the Hispanic population, with a solid plurality being Puerto Ricans from either the tri-cities area or the Island of Puerto Rico itself, make the region their home.

Soto was initially elected in 2016 in what was then a seat with a large Hispanic population, but was not a majority. However, the 2022 census showed that the population had expanded so much that the new 9th could easily be drawn as a 50% Hispanic district. While traditionally the Puerto Rican community has been heavily Democratic, recent elections have shown the community become much more of a swing voting block; something I documented right after the 2024 Elections.

The district itself swung heavily to the right in that election, going from Biden by 17% in 2020 to Harris by 4%. Soto, however, won re-election by a much stronger 12%. The results reflected the community being a new swing constitutency, and one that could split its tickets based on candidates and issues.

Republicans could have tried to continue the right-ward shift with Hispanics in Florida, perhaps eventually winning the 9th Congressional district. Instead, however, the new Congressional map decided to reshape the district into a firmly white Republican seat. It did this by carving up the Hispanic community of the region between 5 Congressional districts.

I discussed this more in my initial reaction article last week, but one claim from DeSantis was that the proposed map was “race neutral.” Myself and many others have called bullshit on this claim. The lines dividing the Hispanic community, which includes dividing part of Osceola County itself, are clearly deliberate - designed to weaken the unified voice of the Puerto Rican constituency.

As a result of this plan, the new 9th District, which you can see below, stretches all the way down to rural Glades county. The district is no longer majority-Hispanic and easily backed Donald Trump in the last election.

The new 9th only retains 58% of its original population. The changes are very deliberate in how they target Hispanic communities. As the graphic below shows, the areas removed from the district (in red) had large Hispanic populations. The communities added in (blue) were overwhelmingly white.

As a result of this new layout, Florida has gone from having four majority-Hispanic districts to just three. Following the destruction of Black-performing districts in the 2022 redistricting process, this latest move is another effort by DeSantis to weaken the political voice of racial minorities in Florida.

There is no way to assume this new district layout is anything but an attack on Hispanic voters. In his reasoning for a redraw, DeSantis insisted districts needed to look more compact. Ask yourself, what is more compact? The new district or the old?

DeSantis also said that updated lines were needed to account for population growth in the state. Well no group has driven population growth more than Hispanics. Today Hispanics make up 26% of the population. Since 2000, Florida Hispanics have grown in population by 112%. Non-Hispanics, meanwhile, have only grown by 19%. If it was not for the Hispanic community, Florida wouldn’t even have as many Congressional districts as it does.

Despite this reality, we now suddenly have fewer Hispanic-majority Congressional districts; with the Orlando Hispanic community scattered to the wind. This map, if it is allowed to go forward, would make the first reversal in Hispanic political power in modern Florida.

I want to put this possible change into history context. Lets look back at the rise of Hispanic political power in Florida, with a specific focus on Central Florida.

Florida Hispanic Political Growth

As mentioned, Florida’s Hispanic population is hovering around 26%. These residents are concentrated heavily in the southern half of the state. While the Miami-Dade region is the classic area everyone thinks of when they think of Hispanic residents, there has been growing Hispanic presence in both the Tampa and Orlando region. This map below shows the concentration of registered Hispanics by voter precinct.

Consistent Hispanic growth had meant that after every census, and hence when the redistricting process begins, Florida has seen an expansion of Hispanic districts. What initially started in the Miami area has seen expanded districts in Orlando, Tampa, and West Palm Beach.

The Hispanic population is also very diverse. Traditionally Hispanics in Florida are thought of as Cuban. This makes sense, as Cuban migration was the big story of Florida politics from the 1960s through the 1990s. I discussed this history in my article on Miami as a refugee haven. However, as this nationality map below shows, Florida also has a large number of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and South American Hispanic residents.

While today Florida’s Hispanic community is much more diverse, the story of Hispanics before the 1990s was much more a story of Cuban and South American migration. This migration transformed Miami-Dade County, which went from a solidly white county to majority Hispanic by 1995.

With these changes came increased political power. Florida’s first Hispanic districts were based in Miami-Dade. It was in the 1980 redistricting process that the region got its first set of majority-Hispanic State Senate and State House lines; which I documented here.

It was then in the 1990s that Florida got its first majority-Hispanic Congressional districts. With Voting Rights Act mandates in place, Florida lawmakers were obligated to draw at least two Hispanic seats. However, after the legislature could not agree on a plan, a court was forced to draw them. That whole saga can be seen here. This was followed up in 2002, where Hispanic growth allowed Florida to get a third Hispanic Congressional district; which I documented here. Historically these districts have been firmly Republican; with Democrats winning them only in a few instances; namely in 2012 and 2018.

As the population growth in the Miami metro region began to slow, the region retained the same number of seats. The new DeSantis map keeps the status quo, with little change made to the 28th and 27th districts. The new 26th has moved into Broward county; but all three remain over 70% Hispanic.

The story of Hispanic political power in Miami-Dade is a well documented event; but it is very much the story of politics in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The 21st century has seen a new site of major Hispanic growth - the famous I-4 Corridor.

Hispanic Growth in the I-4 Corridor

If you have followed Florida politics for a great deal of time, especially in the pre-Trump era, you would often here about Florida’s I-4 Corridor. This referred to a batch of 7 counties, stretching from St Pete to Daytona Beach, connected by Interstate 4. The area was the ultimate swing region of the state; highly predictive of statewide elections in the early 2000s.

In late 2020, just before that year’s Presidential election, I wrote about the history of the I-4 corridor as a swing region. In my article, I discussed how demographic shifts were occurring in the corridor; namely the growth of Hispanic voters in the region; especially in the areas between Tampa and Orlando. This growth has been heavily driven by Puerto Rican residents. Many of them have come from the island itself, but the original drive came from people in the NYC region; who came to Florida for cheaper costs of living and a warmer climate. The 1990s to 2000s saw the initial surge and began to cement the area as the “place to go” for Puerto Ricans looking to move.

This growth is really stunning when you plot it out over time. Below I mapped out the Hispanic Voting Age Population by census tract from 2000 to 2020.

Hispanic growth has been massive in the Kissimmee region; which sits on the border of Orange and Osceola counties. Growth is also very strong in the Polk County region; namely in the Haines City area.

This Hispanic growth has driven the population boom in the I-4 area. From 2000 to 2020, the non-Hispanic population has only grown by 600,000. The Hispanic population, meanwhile, has grown by 1,000,000 residents JUST in these counties.

No county has been more transformed by the influx of Hispanic residents than Osceola County. Once a rural county that was heavily white, it is officially majority-Hispanic as of the 2020 census. The population shift in Osceola from 1980 to 2020 can be seen below.

With these demographic shifts have of course come shifts in voting behavior. Since Puerto Rico is a US Territory, anyone moving to the I-4 region from the island is already a citizen and is eligible to vote. This means that the central Florida region has a much smaller gap between Hispanic % of the population and Hispanic % of voters.

The growing power of Hispanic voters first made itself felt in a 1999 special election for State House District 35. In this low turnout race, Democrat Anthony Suarez pulled off an upset win thanks to strong turnout among the growing Hispanic population. Suarez became the first Hispanic lawmaker for Central Florida.

It was in the 2002 round of redistricting that lawmakers began to look at drawing the lines to reflect Hispanic growth. In that year’s redistricting cycle, the first time that Republicans had control of the process, a new State House seat was drawn to unite many of the Hispanic voters in the south Orange and North Osceola area. This was the new HD49.

This seat quickly became the site of a major battle between two Hispanic candidates; Democrat Jose Fernandez and Republican John Quinones. While both were Hispanic, Quinones was Puerto Rican himself and ran under the argument that as a member of the majority party, he’d be able to get more for the community. While the district overall leaned Democratic, Quinones would win the race. He’d then serve in the legislature until 2007, when he would run for and win a seat on the Osceola County Commission. This came as Osceola moved to single-member districts (and away from county-wide voting) amid the Hispanic population influx and drew a Hispanic-majority commission seat. House District 49 was won in a special election by non other than Darren Soto.

By the time the 2012 redistricting process came around, the Hispanic population in Central Florida had rapidly expanded. By this point it was easy to draw TWO state house seats that would be over 50% Hispanic. In addition, a Congressional and State House seat were easily drawn to have large Hispanic populations.

With the creation of the newly-Hispanic plurality Senate 14, Darren Soto ran for an easy won the seat. Both house districts elected Hispanic Democrats; as by this point the Puerto Rican population was firmly Democratic.

The newly drawn 9th district was 43% white and 39% Hispanic. Compared with the 2010 census figures, the growth among Hispanic residents is clear.

The Congressional district was initially held by Alan Grayson. However, when Grayson decided to run for US Senate in 2016, a major three-way democratic primary took place. This also came as the Congressional districts were being redrawn amid a court order. The whole saga is documented in this previous article of mine. Long story short, Darren Soto won the Democratic primary in the newly-drawn 9th Congressional District.

With this primary win and follow up general election win, Darren Soto became Florida’s first Puerto Rican member of Congress. His state senate seat, meanwhile, was won by Victor Torres; who likewise as Puerto Rican descent. Soto would face off with Alan Grayson in a 2018 Democratic Primary, but easily prevail.

When the 2020 Census figures came out, they again confirmed massive Hispanic growth in the region. With the new figures, the number of Hispanic seats at all levels of government expanded. The 9th Congressional district was easily drawn as a Hispanic-majority seat. The number of Hispanic majority or plurality state legislative seats also greatly expanded.

You will notice that it was easy to draw the 9th as a compact seat. While the right-wing constantly frame minority-access seats as always being bizarre-shaped districts, the 9th was incredibly compact. It included all of Osceola County, portions of Orange, and portions of Polk. With Hispanic voters heavily concentrated in a corridor, it is easy to draw a seat that includes a large chunk of that population while also adhering to county and city boundaries.

The power of the Hispanic vote in this region has only continued to grow. Not even discussed here is the growth of Hispanic representation at city and county levels; but the figures there are just as notable. The story of Hispanic political power growth in Central Florida is playing out the same way it did decades ago in the Miami region. Only time will tell how these figures continue to evolve.

Until now, the story of Central Florida redistricting was a steady increase in Hispanic representation. What the new Congressional map does, however, is roll political influence for Hispanics BACKWARDS for the first time.

I think there is a very specific reason this happening now.

The Hispanic Backlash to Trump

As I referenced earlier, one of the first articles I wrote after the 2024 Election was how Puerto Rican voters in Florida had swung further to right. Driven largely by concerns over the cost of living and inflation, Puerto Rican voters split their tickets across central Florida; voting Republican or Democratic depending on the race. Republicans in the region felt a boon to their chances in the area. Republicans had held on to the Hispanic-majority 47th House seat and almost secured an upset win in the majority-Hispanic 25th district. While Congressman Soto had much easier held on, there was a clear swing to the right in his seat. Many Florida Republicans believed they were on the cusp of converting Puerto Rican voters into a Republican constituency like Cubans broadly have been.

This hope from the GOP, however, was quickly dashed by elections over the last year. Hispanic voters, whether Cuban or Puerto Rican, have shown they will respond to events and are not a lock for either party. With Trump’s administration engaging in its inhumane attacks on immigrants AND Hispanic US citizens (who get accosted by ICE agents for the crime of looking brown) - electoral reckoning has come for the GOP at the ballot box.

Across the country, special elections and regular elections have shown major Hispanic swings back to Democrats. This was seen in special legislative races in Texas as well as the New Jersey Governor election. It has also clearly been the case in Florida, with the first major election result being the Democratic flip of the Miami Mayoral Election. That race saw Democrat Eileen Higgins secure a landslide win in a city where the vote was 60% Hispanic; with about half of that Cuban.

I documented the race and results in detail, and you can see my final report for detailed looks at the race. The long story short is that Higgins won by winning non-Cuban Hispanics and significantly narrowing the Republican lead with Cubans. ICE tactics and Trump’s failure to address cost of living issues were cited as major issues in the race.

This trend continued in March, when Democrats won two special elections for Trump-voting State Legislative districts. I wrote about these victories here; but the key item to gleam from the elections was how Hispanic voters swung in the races.

In the race for State Senate 14, which includes Tampa’s Hispanic population; which is more heavily Cuban than Puerto Rican, Democrat Brian Nathan far outperformed Kamala Harris. The most heavily Hispanic precincts swung from Trump +12% to Nathan +1% in the race. Considering how close the result was, this secured Nathan the victory.

The other major Hispanic swing did not even come in a district Democrats were targeting. While the second Democratic flip came in the largely-white House 87 seat located in Palm Beach, a third legislative race was up that same night. House 51, a seat covering northern Polk County, had a much quieter special election.

In that race, Democrat Edwin Perez ran a grassroots campaign against Republican-funded Hilary Holley. This Trump +14% seat saw a swing to the left, backing Holley by 8%. However, the precincts on the east end of the district; areas that are much more heavily Puerto Rican, saw swings well over 20 points.

The combined Hispanic precincts saw their vote go from Harris +1% in the 2024 election to Perez +19% in the special election. Massive Democratic gains. Check out my post-election analysis article for far more detail on both of these races.

With the recent election results in Florida, it is clear that Republicans are not optimistic in their ability to win back over Hispanic voters. That also isn’t just limited to the Orlando region either. If we look at the changes to Congressional lines in Tampa, the new lines (left side) split the Hispanic community by Tampa directly in half. They were united in the 14th district in the 2022 map (right).

This change, which I document in more detail in my article from last week, was designed to make Democrat Kathy Castor’s 14th district much redder. With the recent special elections showing that very block swinging to the left, they suddenly find themselves sliced in half.

Final Thoughts

The new Congressional map has no shortage of issues, and I will be writing about even more in the coming weeks. This was the first topic I wanted to discuss, however, because it is not just an issue of political gerrymandering, but racist gerrymandering. The line changes in Orlando specifically seek to minimize the influence of a community that is the single biggest source of growth in the region. The Hispanic influx in Orlando had made the area a new economic hub that far outpaces Disney World and brought an entirely new and diverse culture to the region.

With their new map, Republicans have sough to reverse the political influence of these voters. A compact racial minority has seen itself cracked and hence its influence with any individual district diminished or erased. It marks the first time in Florida history that the number of Hispanic Congressional Districts has declined.

Hispanic voters in Central Florida have shown themselves to have an independent spirit and not beholden to any party. That was not good enough for Ron DeSantis and the Republicans in the legislature. When Hispanic voters began to swing back to the left, the only choice in the mind of people like Ron was to diminish their united voice.

I’d expect nothing else from our George Wallace fanboy of a Governor and the lemming lawmakers of this state. We can only wait and pray that perhaps the Florida courts have some sense of decency when the inevitable lawsuit over these lines reaches their desk.

DeSantis had already pushed a gerrymander through Florida back in 2022, drafting a map that created 20 Republican seats for just 8 Democratic seats.

DeSantis began laying the groundwork to redistricting way back in the summer of 2025. With the legislature asleep on the issue, it was clear that DeSantis himself would propose a map himself and that the legislature is likely to just sign off on such a plan with little debate.

Well the map is out, and the new layout shrinks Democrats to just four Congressional seat; a 4 seat gain for the GOP (at least based on Presidential data).

The plan has 24 districts that backed Donald Trump in 2024. Two of these districts, the 25th and 22nd, voted for Biden in the 2020 election, however. I’ll get into Democratic upset opportunities in a minute. However, the plan very likely adds some Republican seats for 2026. How the 2024 margins shifted in each district can be seen below.

The map achieves this extreme partisan goal by cracking and packing many parts of the state in aggressive ways. A handful of seats, namely in Miami-Dade and in North Florida, either see no change or very little.

• No changes at all

  • 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th

• Very minor changes

  • 21st, 27th, 28th

The central and upper-south part of the state are seeing dramatic changes, however.

The plan targets four Democratic incumbents for defeat. Darren Soto, Kathy Castor, Jared Moskowitz, and Debbie Wasserman Schultz are all drawn into solid Trump districts. (Note due to a numbering change, Congresswoman Lois Frankel is in the 23rd, while Moskowitz lives in the 22nd).

I’ll dive into the issues for each of these targeted Democrats in a moment. First, lets look at DeSantis’ insane rational for this remap to begin with.

DeSantis Says “Fair Districts” are Invalid

If you have been following redistricting in Florida for any period of time, you know that Florida is different from several states in that it has its own mandates on redistricting. While many states allow partisan gerrymandering to be the norm, Florida has provisions that aim to limit the practice. The Fair Districts Amendments have two provisions in Florida’s Constitution.

• Tier 1 - Ban on drawing lines to benefit a party or incumbent. Protection for minority-performing districts.

• Tier 2 - Compactness and minimizing city/county splits

These amendments (one for Legislative lines and one for Congressional lines), we passed by the voters in 2010 ballot measures. I wrote about the campaigns for these measures here.

The amendments caused great headaches for Republicans in the 2010s. It eventually led to the Congressional (backstory here) and State Senate (backstory here) maps being forced into redraws in 2015 and 2016. The court cases there were a victory for protecting maps from partisan gerrymandering.

This has not always gone according to plan, as DeSantis was able to push through a gerrymander in 2022. See my review here for how all that happened. However, even as bad as the 2022 map was, it was not as bad as it could have been (as we see now based on this new draft) because DeSantis and Republicans were giving lip service to Fair Districts.

In a memo that was released with his Congressional plan, DeSantis claims that ALL of these Fair Districts provisions are void. DeSantis makes this claim with no court order, but rather insists based on potential future rulings. He namely ties things to the Louisiana v. Callais Supreme Court case, which is testing the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. No ruling has come, but advocates like myself worry it may strike down the VRA’s provisions that protect minority communities in redistricting. The law protects racial and language minorities that could form a 50% seat from being divided up or packed too tightly to limit their influence. These same types of provisions have been repeated in the Fair Districts Amendments.

DeSantis insists that the Supreme Court is likely to rule against the VRA in the Callais decision. They may do this, but there is also no guarantee on if such a ruling will affect the state-level racial protection provisions like we see in the VRA.

For example, when the Supreme Court rejected arguments against getting involved in partisan gerrymandering debates several years back, they did affirm that states had a right to pass their own limits on the practice. The Court may hence say Congress can not regular race and redistricting, but states can.

DeSantis, of course, says otherwise and says that race and redistricting is wrong and should never be used. The memo directly states…

The use of race in redistricting should never happen.

DeSantis, who I have compared to George Wallace and declare I believe is a massive racist, clearly wants forgo any protections for racial communities. That does not surprise me. However, that is just where he starts. The key to the memo is that he has decided to declare Fair Districts’ racial provisions are by default invalid. In addition, he then declares that since the racial provisions in invalid, ALL OF FAIR DISTRICTS IS INVALID. The bans on partisan gerrymandering? Invalid. The compactness provisions? Invalid.

DeSantis had declared all of Fair Districts is invalid based on a hypothetical court ruling that we don’t have. That is why he had drafted a map that makes no secret about not following the fair districts provisions.

With that understood. Lets look at some key decisions made in the map.

Cracking the Hispanic Community

In his memo on redistricting, DeSantis insisted that the map is “race neutral.” However, one of the first changes to the map calls that entire notion into question.

In the area south or Orlando, with the goal of eliminating Darren Soto’s chances for re-election, the new plan cracks the Hispanic community into four or five different Congressional districts. These Hispanic voters are heavily Puerto Rican and and lean more Democratic; though have become a major swing group in recent elections.

The plan divides up Osceola County, which was whole in the 2022 Congressional plan, cleaving out part of its Hispanic voters into the Polk-based 18th. Additional Hispanic voters are added to the solid-red 11th and solid-blue 10th. This is textbook “cracking” of a racial minority. It is not race neutral, it is clearly deliberate.

The result of this is that Darren Soto’s 9th is no longer a Hispanic-majority seat. The district goes from 50% Hispanic to just 36% Hispanic with the new lines. As you can see below, the district stretches from the Democratic-heavy Osceola/Orange region and down into Glades County!

With this plan, Darren Soto would have a very tough time holding such a district. He is much stronger than other Democrats with Hispanic voters, but he has now lost a good deal of his base. As a result of this plan, Florida shrinks in the total number of Hispanic districts.

In his memo, DeSantis claimed the new map was needed to reflect changing demographics and politics in the state. Well the Hispanic community continues to grow in Florida, and he just kneecapped their political influence with this plan.

Absolutely racist and cynical proposal.

Cracking up Tampa Bay

Over in the Tampa Bay, DeSantis took aim at longtime Democratic Congresswoman Kathy Castor. Her solidly blue seat, designed to be a Democratic vote-sink in 2022, was carved up and left nothing by Republican-leaning districts.

There was real debate heading into the redistricting process about how much could be done in Tampa. The Democrats of the old 14th had to go somewhere, and it could put other Republicans at risk. However, with DeSantis disregarded compactness requirements with fair districts, the plan devised limits these issues.

The City of Tampa and its suburbs, the main block of Democratic votes, are carved up between three key districts; the 14th, 12th, and 15th. The 15th District goes all the way from solid-red Citrus County and into downtown Tampa itself.

Tampa is split up 3 ways, an increase from the 2-way split in the 2022 map. Such a division would likely violate fair districts, but as we discussed DeSantis is ignoring that. All these districts voted or Trump in 2020 and 2024. The 14th is the least red seat, backing Trump by 10% in 2024 but just by 3% in 2020. Castor would probably be strongest running there, but it will be a tough haul if she does run.

Further south, the heavily Democratic portion of St Pete, on the south end of Pinellas County, is taken into a Republican seat that includes Manatee, part of Sarasota, and the inland farm counties of DeSoto, Hardee, and part of Polk.

This district is likewise pretty steadily Republican; though its a more lighter shade of red. The seat backed Trump by 14% in 2024 and 5% in 2020. This is only a couple points less red than the current 16th.

Democratic Vote Sinks in Southeast Florida

Down in South Florida, DeSantis made serious efforts to target Congresswoman Debbie Wasserman Shultz and Jared Moskowitz for defeat. As many Democrats as possibly are crammed into three seats; the 20th, 23rd, and 24th.

The 20th and 24 will both be Black-performing seats thanks to being heavily blue and over 50% Black in Democratic Primaries.

The new 20th, which is now vacant after Congresswoman Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick resigned, will be entirely within Broward County now. The district is 51% Black in a likely primary, but also has taken in a good deal of white Democrats to syphon them off from Moskowitz and DWS.

Meanwhile, down in south Broward and part of Miami-Dade, the 24th district, held by Fredericka Wilson, has been been drawn to gather as many Black voters as possible and free up space along the coast for a different district. This seat now has a solid 71% Black Democratic primary as result.

The 23rd, meanwhile, based in West Palm Beach, is solid blue and will be fine for Congresswoman Lois Frankel.

However, the rest of the Broward and Palm regions of South Florida are drawn with Trump-backing seats.

Targeting Moskowitz and DWS

With as many Democrats as possible crammed into three other seats, this leaves Jared Moskowitz and Debbie Wasserman Shultz forces to play musical chairs for two Trump seats.

First we have the 22nd district, a crazy district that grabs voters in western Palm Beach and Broward, then moves west across sugarcane fields and Everglades land, to then grab Republican-aligned voters in Collier County.

This district, which in theory either Moskowitz or Shultz could run for, did back Biden by 3% in 2020, but swung to the right in the 2024 election. This is one of the Democrats best chances for a hold despite the new lines. However, it will depend on who the candidates are and broader trends in the midterm.

The strongest chance for Democrats to hold a gerrymandered seat is definitely the 25th. This district voted for Trump by 9% but also backed Biden by 5% in 2020. The seat is a coast-hugger that stretches all the way from Boca Raton and down into Miami-Beach. It is almost surely the most heavily Jewish district in the state; including Boca Raton, Dania Beach, Hallandale, Aventura, and Miami Beach.

I absolutely believe that Jared Moskowitz is the best candidate to run for this seat. He represents a good chunk of the northern section of this district already and can likely win back over many of the Jewish voters who swung to the right in the 2024 elections. I will surely be looking at this district in more detail soon.

Another note for Southeast Florida is the changes made to the 26th district. The seat in question, held by Mario Díaz-Balart, is heavily Cuban and Hispanic; stretching from Hialeah to Collier County. However, DeSantis made some notable changes with his plan, with the district now connecting Hialeah to the southwest end of Broward County. As a result, this district, which initial backed Trump by 34% in 2024, is now a Trump +18 seat.

The seat, even with the narrow Biden loss in 2020 (and Clinton won it in 2016) is still very likely to remain Republican. However, Balart has now suddenly found himself in a district he cannot entirely keep his eye off of.

Final Thoughts for Now

Over the next couple of days, Florida’s legislature is almost sure to pass the map. I will be looking at these districts more in the coming days. When it comes to projecting the 2026 midterms, I am going to track additional data, including recent voter registration trends and who decides to file where. FAR MORE is to come on this from myself.

We also surely will have lawsuits quickly filed. It is always possible, and cross your fingers, that the courts may put a hold on any such map as lawsuits progress. Now with the conservative courts, that is hardly a guarantee, so I’m not holding my breath. However, there is at least a chance.

Regardless of court movement, which I will be following, I will continue looking at these lines and have updates in the short future.

The story of 1876 - 1900 will be the topic of future articles. However, this article I want to actually look backward to the start of reconstruction in 1867. One theme in my series of articles was how Black citizens, despite making up half of Florida’s voter population, were constantly having to fight for their political seat at the table even from their white Republican “allies.” Florida was beset by white carpetbaggers that wanted to use Black voters to hold power, but also wanted to prevent a full manifestation of Black political power. This left Black voters being forced to compromise and work with these more nefarious white Republicans in order to prevent the rise of the old confederate Democrats.

This internal Republican clash began way back at the start of reconstruction. As Florida worked toward drafting a new Constitution in the post-war era, a fight over how to apportion the state legislature would take center stage. The final result of this fight would be unquestionably Florida’s FIRST racial gerrymander. A plan designed to short-circuit Black power and prevent a Black-majority legislature kicked off reconstruction in Florida - a bad sign for what was to come.

That fight and final plan is what I want to discuss today.

Florida’s Racial Geography

Before we get into the fight over legislative districts, its important to get a feel for the unique racial geography of Florida at this time. Like many of the slave states, Florida came out of the Civil War with a large free Black population that was heavily concentrated where plantations had been located.

A census taken in 1867 indicated that Florida was nearly split between white and Black citizens. Using the 1870 census, which has more complete records, you can see that Florida’s Black population was heavily clustered in the northern counties of the state.

At this time, Florida was the least populated of the former Confederate states. Many of its counties had very few individuals, many of them spread out across dotted settlements. It was only the former plantation counties, as well as Duval (Jacksonville) and Escambia (Pensacola), that you had large concentrations of people. The map below highlights this population density better.

The population clustering was so significate that Florida’s 8 majority-Black counties had a larger population than the other 30 counties combined. These counties, seen in red below, also held 74% of the Black population - a reflection of how plantation placement was a major indicator where the state’s Black population resided. Few had moved away from the communities they were once in bondage.

The concentration of Black voters would make gerrymandering against Black representation an easier feat than it was in other states. How those eight counties were afforded legislative seats became a massive fight at the state’s 1868 Constitutional Convention.

The Battle for the Republican Party

The political scene leading into Florida’s 1868 Constitutional Convention is something I covered in extreme detail in Part 0 and Part 1 of my Reconstruction series. I will summarize and give the important points in this article, but if you want to learn more details, I recommend those pieces.

Florida’s reconstruction history began in 1867 when Congress passed its own set of Reconstruction Acts and took over the process from President Andrew Johnson. These acts suspended civilian government in the former confederate states and placed them under military rule. A return to civilian government required passage of the 14th Amendment and holding elections where Black men had the right to vote. The laws also designated the Freedman’s Bureau, an agency under the military that was established to aid the newly freed slaves, to work toward mass voter registration of Black citizens.

Florida underwent a massive voter registration drive through the summer of 1867. Freedman’s bureau agents worked county by county to oversee and at times directly run the process. Meanwhile, many native whites either boycotted the process or were denied the ability to register due to past confederate support. When the voter roles were completed, the state had a 58% Black voter roll.

Once the registration process was complete, Florida was set to hold a November election. That election would include a referendum on whether to hold a constitutional convention and elections for delegates to said convention. For the referendum to succeed, a majority of REGISTERED voters were needed to vote YES.

As this registration drive had begun, Florida’s Republican Party began to formalize and quickly fracture.

Early Republican Divisions

The Freedman Bureau became an increasingly political institution as reconstruction went on; namely thanks to the push for voter registration. Many of the bureau leaders, largely white military men, would become major Republican politicians in Florida and were some of the first “carpetbaggers”. Not all carpetbaggers were white, with many being northern Black citizens who came to Florida to help organize the freedmen. The carpetbaggers, as well as some native Republicans, were largely divided into two ideological camps: the moderates and the radicals.

• The radicals were more true-believers in Black equality, not just in voting but in economic concerns. This philosophy was best seen in the “40 acres and mule” principle; giving freed Blacks the chance to maintain economic independence and have the vote. Nationally, figures like Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner carried this mantra.

• The moderates were those that sought to fill out their mission to register voters and establish a civilian government that had protections for the newly freed slaves. However, these individuals also did not want to overtly antagonize the native white population, instead aiming to placate them. Some where incredibly racist, only begrudgingly supporting Black voting rights to ensure they stayed in power. Others were more egalitarian and support Black rights, but also foolishly believed the native white population would eventually be swayed to accept the new status quo.

As Florida’s Republican Party began to take form in 1867, the battle for control between the more moderate and radical sides played out. Sides were fluid at this time, as men with ambition shifted allegiances as needed.

The moderates had the upper-hand however thanks to their Government positions. This not only included the military leaders, but civil servants who worked for the Treasury department and other agencies. Several of the most powerful early Republicans were on the much more conservative end of the moderate factions. Harrison Reed, William Gleason, and Marcellus Stearns, all of whom would play major roles in the political events to come, were deeply racist and sought to limit Black political power - only using it as a tool for their own advancement.

While these conservatives worked to keep Black political power contained, they were challenged by the emerging radical sect of the party.

Early radical leaders were Liberty Billings and Daniel Richards, both white men from the north, as well as William Saunders, a Black northerner. These leaders had strong support among the freedman population and were dedicated to pushing for political power for Black voters. Early Black radical leaders were Jonathan Gibbs, who’d been born free in Pennsylvania, Josiah Walls, born into slavery in Virginia and Charles Pearce, born into slavery in Maryland.

There were many emerging Republican leaders at this time that would not fall easily into either radical or moderate camp. However, the battles lines were being drawn as Florida headed toward upcoming elections. The conservative wing of the moderates were especially eager to keep Black Floridians as “clients” and not political equals.

The Republican divisions continued heading into the November convention referendum.

The Convention Referendum and Delegate Races

Voters going to the polls in November of 1867 saw two issues on their ballot…

• Whether to hold a Constitutional Convention

• Elections for delegates to said convention

Per the reconstruction acts, the YES vote for a convention needed to be 50% of all registered voters, not just ballots cast. Native whites, opposed to Black suffrage and Congressional oversight, boycotted the vote, seeing it as the best way to stop the success of the convention. As a result, the vote was almost entirely made up of the newly-registered Black voters. Of the 16,000 Black voters registered, around 13,000 cast ballots - ALL YES on a convention. These voters made up almost the entire YES vote, which secured just over 51% of the registered vote roll, allowing the referendum to narrowly pass.

A vast majority of white voters boycotted the vote, with only 1,300 or so backing the measure. If it was not for the strong voter turnout among the registered Black voters, the convention question would have failed.

The same day as the convention referendum, delegate elections were held. The state was divided into 19 electoral districts, each electing between 1 and 6 delegates. Thanks to the boycott by native whites, the delegate elections were dominated by Republicans. Exact election figures are hard to come by, but many if not most districts did not have a real contest.

The state Republican Party, which was lead by more moderate members, worked to select slates of delegates that kept as many factions happy, but did tilt more in the moderate direction. The party leaders did select more white than Black delegate candidates despite the fact Black voters would make up the overwhelmingly majority of the votes for the convention question itself. As a result, the final list of elected delegates stood at 28 white and 18 Black.

There were two districts that did have major delegate contests. Both were led by the radical insurgents challenging the moderate establishment that had already been chosen by the state executive committee.

In Gadsden County, a radical slate led by Richards and Saunders swept the county. Marcellus Stearns, who was running for his own spot as a delegate after serving as bureau agent for the county, was humiliated in defeat.

The loss would further embitter Stearns toward Black political leaders. He traded barbs with Richards back and forth in the press, with radicals pushing for the freedman’s bureau to relieve Stearns of his command with the agency.

Meanwhile, the 14th District, made up of Nassau, St Johns, and Duval, likewise saw the radicals sweep into office. This delegation was led by Liberty Billings and included Jonathan Gibbs; who would go on to become one of Florida’s most prominent Black leaders during Reconstruction.

With these elections wins, the radicals were closer to even with the moderates heading into the 1868 Convention, scheduled to convene in January in Tallahassee. Moderates still likely had a narrow advantage, but as mentioned sides were fluid. The party would have to try and come together to draft a constitution.

Or one side could betray the other…..

The Convention Clash and New Constitution

Delegates made there way into Tallahassee for the January convention. The delegate list was a mix of assorted members from within and outside of the state. Native freedmen, Black and white Carpetbaggers, and handfuls of southern white unionists made up the roster. The black delegates made up the bulk of the radical wing of the convention.

Radicals Lead at First

In the early days of the convention, the radicals had a majority of those present; though several more conservative members had yet to arrive. The radical faction was able to secure a quorum and then elected Daniel Richards as convention chair. The radical majority worked quickly to attempt and draft a constitution. However, clashes with the growing moderate/conservative wing slowed progress down. Moderates argued that Billings, Richards, and Saunders were not eligible for their seats, as they’d not been residents of their respective county for long enough time. Efforts to remove them, however, initially failed in a 21-20 vote held on February 1st.

When it became clear the radicals had control of the convention for the moment, the moderate group walked out and made their way to neighboring Monticello to work on their own separate constitution. Left in Tallahassee by themselves, the radical faction passed their constitutional draft. They then sent the news to General George Meade, who was tasked with overseeing the process and reporting the events of the convention to congress.

Moderates Take Control

However, in the dead of night on February 10th, the moderates returned and took control of the convention hall. As this happened, Billings and Richards were barred from entry to the hall. The moderate slate, claiming a narrow quorum, then elevated their own man, Horatio Jenkins, as chairman.

As the whole process devolved into claims of rival conventions, General Meade worked out a deal where both Richards and Jenkins relinquished their claim to be chair and a new unified vote was taken. Here the moderate faction had managed to consolidate more support from the white delegates, and Jenkins was elected chair despite opposition from a majority of Black delegates.

The delaying tactic had given the moderates enough time to consolidate white delegates by spreading fear of a Republican Party dominated by Black politicians and their white radical allies. Radical successes in the delegate challenges had demonstrated the power of the radical movement and made it something the moderate faction sought to curb. Among the moderate faction, at least two sub-groups existed.

• The conservatives who saw Black citizens as inferior to whites and should support white Republicans, not lead them. This included figures like Stearns and Reed.

• The more moderate-liberal faction was not opposition to Black political growth, but worried going “too fast” would explode tensions with native whites who had been so far boycotting the process. This camp included figures like Ossian Hart, who would become Governor in 1872 but by that point had become a much stronger ally of Black voters.

This alliance succeeded in passing their own state constitution on February 25th. A majority of the Black delegation voted against the moderate document.

Two Constitutions

There were now two constitutions floating around Florida; the document the radicals had passed February 1st, and the moderate draft passed February 25th. These documents both included several progressive elements; including the guaranteed the right to vote, established equality of the races, and mandated the funding of public education. However, there were two key differences that would affect Black political power.

The first difference was the method of selecting local officials. The radical constitution allowed the voters to elect their local county officials; offices like county commission, sheriff, tax collector, clerk of court, and so on. The moderate constitution made most of these offices appointed by the governor. This appointment provision was designed to curtail the growth of political leaders in the majority-Black counties. Whoever became Governor would hold sway over who led every county in the state; making the office very powerful.

The second difference, and by far the biggest, was the differences in apportionment. The radical plan was designed to be closer to equal in population when it came to both its State Senate and State House districts. This population equality would improve the chances of Black voters electing a majority of the legislature. The moderate constitution, meanwhile, was openly designed to keep the legislature from ever electing a majority-Black body. The plan had no population equality requirements and guaranteed every county at least 1 member and no county more than 4. This plan weighed heavily in favor of the rural white counties with small populations.

Moderates Win

With two constitutions sent to General Meade, Congress was forced to decide which plan to go with. Meade, a more conservative military man himself, sent both documents to Congress, but argued for the moderate document. The Congressional Redistricting committee eventually agreed, declaring that the moderate constitution was to be placed before the voters in a May election for ratification. At the same time, the state elections would be held. The Republican nominee for Governor was Harrison Reed and the Lt Governor nominee was William Gleason, both men who were hostile to Black political power and only wanted them for their votes.

Around this time, Reed wrote a letter to Democrat David Yulee, a former rabid pro-slavery US Senator and Confederate politician. In the letter, Reed stated

“Under our Constitution the Judiciary & State officers will be appointed & the apportionment will prevent a negro legislature.”

The moderate faction, led by some of its more conservative members, had triumphed over the radical block. Openly hostile to Black political equality, figures like Reed believed they could work with native whites and sway them over to a business-friendly Republican Party. Black voters would have rights, but they would be secondary to the concerns of white men.

The moderate factions would fracture shortly after the 1868 elections, which saw Harrison Reed elected Governor. The more liberal side of the faction, represented by people like William Purman and Ossian Hart, would break with the more conservative Reed. Marcellus Stearns, who would become Speaker of the House, would remain a firm racist but break with Reed over other issues. All this can be read in my regular series.

So how much did the new constitution limit Black political power in the legislature? Below I will examine the hard numbers on how the new legislative maps performed. I will then compare it the radical plan that was rejected. The differences are stark.

How to Gerrymander Florida

There are two key variables for judging the enacted and alternative plans from this time. The first, and most important, is how the plans aimed to give representation for the newly freed Black population. The other is how equal the populations for each district were. At this time, no real mandates on population equality between legislative districts existed. Maps often had districts over-populated or under-populated; a concept known as malapportionment.

The moderate plan found in the constitution weaponized malapportionment to keep Black representation lowl

The Plan under the 1868 Constitution

The State House plan gave each county one member; with an additional member allotted for every 1,000 registered voters. No county, however, could hold more than 4 members. Thanks to the apportionment method of the plan; only 20 of 53 districts were majority-Black.

The plan passed was designed to undercut Black political strength. Seven of the eight majority-Black counties were “overpopulated” and warranted extra representatives. Leon County held the most house seats, hitting the maximum of 4. However, Alachua County was more populated than Leon, but retained only 2 thanks to a lower voter registration rate, making it the most over-populated districts; with 2 members for its 17,300 residents (or 8,600 per seat). Dade County, with just its 85 residents (and under 20 voters) was the most under-populated. With this system, the final plan skewed heavily in favor of white Floridians.

In the state senate, the story was similar. The constitution divided the state into 24 single-member districts. With no concern for population equality, the map had twice as many majority-white districts as it did majority-Black. Several state senate districts were horrendously under-populated.

The apportionment of this map was especially over the top. District 21, making up Dade and Brevard County, was the worst offender, sitting at just 1,300 people and only around 150 registered voters. The heavily Black areas, meanwhile, were entirely over-populated; with the Alachua/Levy based seat sitting at 19,300 residents.

Both plans were drafted with one concern in mind, as Harrison Reed openly admitted, and that was to prevent a black-majority legislature. These plans succeeded, as never in the next decade would Black lawmakers make up a majority of either legislative chamber.

The May 1868 State elections saw Republicans win a solid majority in both legislative chambers; especially as many native whites still boycotted politics. The first elections saw 17 Black men elected to the state house and 5 to the state senate; the first Black lawmakers in Florida history.

A deep dive into the trajectory of Florida legislative control during this period could be a topic for a future article. However, through the next 8 years, little would change in terms of Black representation. The highest number of Black state house members would his 19; while it would hit 7 in the state senate.

The maps served their purpose and kept Black power limited in the legislature. You can read my longer series for much more on the constant struggle of Black political leaders to assert their influence in state politics; all working against a rigged system.

The Radical Alternative

While the radical plan did not become law, we do have the records of what they proposed.

The State House plan did not give each county its own representative; instead combining counties as needed. In addition, counties could have far more than 4 members, with Leon topping out at 7. The plan had 55 seats, with 35 of them majority-Black; a near-inverse of the moderate plan.

The radical plan aimed to maximize Black influence in the district; possibly intentionally drawn as a reverse racial gerrymander. There was less malapportionment than with the moderates plan; though [populations were still far from equal. Also far more white districts were over-populated (in other words short on representatives) - an inverse from the moderate plan.

The State Senate plan worked differently than what the moderates came up with. Not all districts were single-member and instead several districts would have between 1 and 4 members. The plan layout can be seen below.

The result was a plan with FAR less population deviation than the moderate senate plan. Thanks to an underpopulated panhandle, the plan was likewise skewed toward Black voters.

Its harder to gage ether the map drafters intended to over-represent the Black population. The 1867 census data available does not indicate drastic differences from the 1870 census. They may well have factored in that likely future intimidation of voters, which was already showing up with the early Klan, would limit Black strength in some areas. The goal may well have been to create a “buffer” to ensure that even if some areas became embroiled in election violence, Black representation would be too large to be erased.

Its also possible this was just pure politics - that the radicals had strong support among Black voters - and aimed to maximize their influence to ensure the legislature elected would not just he a Republican majority, but a radical majority.

If you ask me to chose between the two, assuming both are partisan/racial gerrymanders. I’ll take the one that maximized Black political power. Native whites were hardly a sympathetic group - and considering the Klan violence soon to explode in Florida (see issue 2) - that lack of sympathy is well founded. Considering the crimes of slavery, some extra representation was fair.

My Own Alternative Plan

Since we are looking at two plans designed with their own racial and partisan motivations, I figured it was only fitting to look for a possibly middle ground map between the two. Could a plan be designed that protected Black political influence while also better balancing populations? I think so.

I created this alternative state house plan using the census data from the time. Removing a cap-per-county and combining smaller counties where needed, this proposal has much less population deviation and gives Black voters a narrow lead in the number of districts.

This plan allows for a possible Black-majority legislature or for sure a legislature where Black voters would always be a major force.

Similar plans with the state senate could be achieved; creating plans that had more minimal population deviation and racial balance.

Moral of the story, there was no shortage of ways to divvy up Florida for its legislative districts. However, it is clear, not only by how it performed but what politicians said at the time, that the constitutional plan of 1868 was a racial gerrymander designed to limit the influence of Black Floridians.

Sadly, sometimes things never change in Florida.

Final Thoughts

As of this writing, with it being the evening of April 22nd, Florida is about to enter a new period of redistricting. Next week, the legislature is coming into special session for mid-decade redistricting. Governor DeSantis is making this drive and for much of his tenure has directed his ire at minority districts. His 2022 Congressional plan was already an obscene gerrymander that destroyed Black representation in North Florida.

What the new plans will look like is up in the air. DeSantis was hoping the Supreme Court would have weakened the Voting Rights Act by this point - a move that would possibly allow him to target other minority seats. However, no such ruling has come yet, so how far DeSantis goes remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is he strongly desires to further weaken minority voters in Florida. What the legislature will go with remains up in the air. I wrote about this topic back in September. Until then, we await some maps.

Whatever DeSantis tries to pull off, he will be taking his cues from the past. I wonder if their is a portraited of Governor Harrison Reed somewhere in his office.

At the end of my last issue, the campaign of 1876 came to an end and the counting process began. Florida was expected to have a very close vote for President and Governor. For the state’s large Black population, a Democratic victory would spell disaster and the end of reconstruction in the state. Nationally, Republicans knew they needed to hold on to Florida, South, Carolina, and Louisiana in order to secure a narrow electoral college win.

With the Presidency in the balance, these three southern states would national political forces descend. Florida’s count, a slow multi-week process in such a rural and vast state, would be under intense scrutiny.

This article will look at the counting process and debate in Florida. The results of this count would lead to the end of reconstruction in Florida and America.

The Count Begins in Florida

Within a day of the conclusion of campaigning in Florida, tensions were already extremely high. The vote was expected to be very close and each county had to submit its returns to Tallahassee; a slow process often revolving on dirt roads and slow trains. Meanwhile, as the bitterly tight Presidential race came into focus, national forces for both Democrats and Republicans made there way to the state. Neither side trusted the other. Likewise, a campaign that had seen no shortage of violent threats (see my last issue) meant that a counting process could very well not be free of violence either. This account of events from this piece on fraud and intimidation in the 1876 Florida campaign sums the tension up in the days after the vote.

Although it would be many days before county returns reached the capital, both parties claimed victory almost immediately. Their claims were based on incomplete returns and partisan estimates. The Republicans feared that returns from outlying counties might be tampered with on their way to Tallahassee and accordingly sent couriers to the various county seats to obtain duplicates of the certificates. A train carrying some of these couriers was wrecked and Governor Stearns announced that it had been “ku-kluxed” by Democrats who wanted to alter the returns before the Republicans reached the county seats.

With tensions rapidly rising and the worry of insurrections taking place if the count went for Republicans, President Grant agreed to send federal troops to the three southern state capitals to protect the process. Grant, by all accounts, wanted an honest account of the vote and made it clear he saw his role as ensuring a fair canvass of the returns. In a letter to General Sherman, he wrote

Should there be any grounds of suspicion of fraudulent counting on either side, it should be reported and denounced at once. Either party can afford to be disappointed in the result, but the country cannot afford to have the result tainted by the suspicion of illegal or false returns.

Republican leaders, meanwhile, of course were willing to use tricks if needed to hold on to the state. They were matched by their Democratic colleagues, who likewise were willing to win by dishonest means if necessary.

National Figures Enter Florida

Both national parties sent visiting statesmen to Florida to view the counting, and of course to try and influence the results. The Republican team was led by New Hampshire Senator William Chandler. He was likewise joined by several additional men; including former General Francis C. Barlow, General Lew Wallace, and former Ohio Governor Edward F. Noyes. Barlow was the man sent by Grant specifically, and he would prove to be the most honest broker of the Republican dignitaries. Chandler, meanwhile, saw his role as to ensure a Republican victory. A letter he sent to Florida Republicans stating “render every possible assistance. Funds will be on hand to meet every requirement.” Bribe money would flow freely in Florida.

The Democratic Statesmen included Georgia Governor Joseph E. Brown, former New York World owner Manton Marble, and Pennsylvania Democrats John F. Coyle and C. W. Woolley. Marble was close friends with Tilden and was the clear money point-man for the Democratic efforts at bribery. Marble was found to have sent a note to Tilden’s nephew, Colonel W. T. Pelton, stating “We shall put Uncle Sammy through.”

The Counting Process

The national statesmen were there, more than anything else, to try and sway the state canvassing board on how to process results. This was the board that would receive returns from each county and decide on how to count them and make decisions on discrepancies. The statewide board was made up of three members, which was 2-1 Republican

• Republican Secretary of State Samuel B. McLin

• Republican Comptroller Clayton A. Cowgill

• Democratic Attorney General William Archer Cocke

There was no shortage of issues with the counting of the ballots. Many areas had reports of fraud and intimidation. The suppression of Black votes was obvious and well documented, but the fact that money was being handed out to people of all parties and races to attest to either intimidation or fraud made claims hard to distinguish in terms of truth or lies.

“Money and intimidation can obtain the oath of white man as well as black to any required statement. A ton of affidavits could be carted in . . . and not a word of truth in them, except the names of the parties, swearing.” - Lew Wallace

The southern counties, the latest to report returns, were also very hostile to questioning. When a group of the national Republican statesmen tried to travel to Manatee County, they were met by armed men in Polk County who said no could traverse further without permission of the local Democratic Party. With this threat in mind, the statesmen opted to return north to Tallahassee.

Returns continued to come in to Tallahassee as November went on. Florida law had December 9th as the deadline for the canvassing board to announce the results for the state. However, this data was three days after the December 6th deadline that the electoral college of each state needed to meet to cast their ballots. As a result, the canvassing board first dealt with the Presidential contest when they began to meet on November 27th.

Counties with Disputes

When the state canvassing board began its deliberations, party representatives could offer challenges to results. As challenges and affidavits were heard, several key counties stood out for disputed results.

• Baker County: Two sets of returns existed for the county. A set that included all four precincts and gave the Democrats a 94 vote lead. The other set omitted two precincts due to claims of fraud and the lack of signatures from proper officials. That set of returns gave Republicans a 41 vote lead. The Republican-leaning count was the “official” set of returns.

• Manatee County: Governor Stearns had not appointed the proper officials to conduct an election there. Locals had hence formed an ad-hoc team to run the vote. This technically violated the law but had been a response to Stearns inaction. Questions arose about admitting any Manatee returns. The county was heavily Democratic.

• Alachua County - Claims of Republican ballot stuffing existed at the Archer voter precinct by 200 or so extra votes. Republicans countered with affidavits saying the votes were legit.

• Jefferson County - Claims of large numbers of voting done by people under 21. Further investigation revealed about 60 Republican ballots that were from those not yet old enough to vote.

• Jackson County - Claims of Democratic ballot stuffing at two voter precincts, namely from Georgia voters. Claims of voter suppression were also rampant, including the possible destruction of a Republican ballots box. The total ballots cast in Jefferson were Democratic-heavy, despite the county being majority-Black. No doubt foul play was responsible for this result.

• Hamilton County - Disputes about the proper procedures being followed in two Democratic-friendly precincts. In addition, the ballot boxes has been stolen and hidden away for several days under the claims of “protection.”

• Clay County - Major claims of fraud and intimidation that put the entire county’s returns into question.

• Monroe County - Claims of ballot stuffing in a Key West Precinct that Republicans argued boosted the Democratic margin in the county. Republicans wanted to exclude the entire precinct, a move that would make the county go for Republicans.

As questions about the count in several counties became clear, there was little clarity on how far the canvassing board could go in denying or accepting questionable returns. Originally both parties agreed that the canvassing board should use its quasi-judicial ability to reject returns from selecting precincts if fraud clear. This would change as totals became clear. Democrats would eventually come to embrace a position of counting the returns as they were delivered, making no changes. This came as return totals showed a narrow Democratic edge.

Through the time the canvassing board met, both parties tried to influence the decisions with bribes. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were floated in efforts to get Republicans on the board to defect to the Tilden side. Likewise Republican officials worked to keep the canvassing board in the GOP camp with their own offers of money and positions. Republican board member Clayton Cowgill was considered the closet thing to a swing vote, and by all accounts was offered money and promises by both sides as he struggled with the pressure of the process. Among the national statesmen, former General Barlow, whom Grant had dispatched, was considered the most honest and eager to see a fair canvas of the votes. This upset his fellow Republican colleagues, who iced him out of their meetings and plans.

The canvassing board stuck to debates of irregularities and fraud. Intimidation, whether direct violence or economic tricks like the numbered ballots with the railroad company, were not considered due to the short time-frame. The lack of a focus on intimidation should be kept in mind, as it no doubt stopped hundreds if not thousands of Republican-aligned Black votes from being cast.

To highlight this suppression issue, below are the counties where the Republican vote had a notably smaller percent than the Black share of the population. While turnout and registration rates can affect things, you can see the difference in places like Polk or Marion rather than places like Leon. In several counties, there is a notable absence of Black ballots.

Counties like Marion and Alachua, while under Republican rule, had rural communities with far more white regulator activity and suppression. Jackson saw a notable Republican vote drop as white violence had swept the county in the early 1870s. Areas like Polk or Hernando were isolated and rural, and the Black minority had little recourse if threatened. Compare these returns with Leon, where the 6% difference could be more of a turnout/registration difference - the double-digit gaps are much more likely due to the intimidation issues discussed in my last issue.

However, despite these issues of intimidation, which without would likely have guaranteed Republican victory regardless of the counting debate, the canvassing board would focus on only the veracity of returns. HOW to count the ballots would decide the outcome. Never forget, however, that many people were denied their right to cast a fair vote at all.

The Original Results

As the December 6th deadline approached, the canvassing board met to make an initial count that the electors could go based on. Disputes over the board’s authority to reject returns based on questions of fraud rose up as the vote proved to be very close. Had all returns been counted as initially sent by each county, the margin would have been around 100 or so ballots for Democrat Tilden.

However, the Baker County dispute became a major issue. In that Democratic-heavy county, the local board had rejected two precincts for irregularities and sent returns that only covered the remaining two precincts. The difference would cost Democrats 130+ net ballots.

The Republican majority of canvassing board, using the official Baker returns (which were the smaller figure), announced a preliminary result that at Hayes winning the state by just 40 or so ballots. A final announcement would be made soon, but the informal declaration was a boon for Republicans nationwide. Democrats, including Attorney General William Cocke, cried fowl over the decision. The argument from Democrats was the board could use its quasi-judicial authority to count the “full returns.” Over the next several days, fierce lobbying with the canvassing board would go on, with both parties trying to influence board members regarding Baker and other disputed counties. Here there was no shortage of reports of money being offered to sway votes.

The canvassing board would opt to use its quasi-judicial authority on counting the ballots. They would opt to count the Democratic-friendly returns in Baker. However, the Republican majority also made several rulings against precinct returns that harmed Democrats.

On December 6th, the deadline for the electoral college, the state canvassing board announced 2-1 that Hayes had won the state by 926 ballots. The formal results can be seen below.

These results came by rejecting Manatee County returns entirely and rejecting disputed precinct returns in Jackson, Hamilton, and Monroe. This gave Republicans the victory in Jackson and Monroe counties, despite full totals saying the Democrats had won. You can see vote comparisons for the major disputed counties below.

The board also threw out some 60 Republican-heavy votes in Jefferson from purported youths, but did not reject the ballots from the questioned precinct in Alachua. While the board had sided with Democrats on Baker, their rejection of Manatee and the precinct changes in the above four counties allowed for an easy Hayes victory.

The Republicans quickly spread the news that Hayes had won Florida and the electors met to cast their ballots the same day. Democratic electors, however, also cast their ballots for Tilden, backed up by Attorney General Cocke. Hence two slates of electors were sent to Washington DC. Similar events were happening in South Carolina and Louisiana. Once the Hayes decision was made, many of the visiting statesmen left the state. However, the count for the Governor contest between incumbent Republican Marcellus Stearns and challenger George Drew was just beginning.

Initial reports showed that Stearns and Hayes had similar vote totals, but that Stearns was tacking a few hundred ballots behind. National Republican figures were less concerned with keeping Stearns above water, worried that if the board went too far in tilting the count for Stearns, it would open up the Presidential count to further scrutiny. Florida Democrats, meanwhile, aimed to stop the board from using any of its quasi-judicial authority. They now argued that the board had a mere ministerial role to count the returns as they were submitted; a process that would give Drew a modest lead.

Democrats originally received an injunction from Circuit Judge Pleasant White, which ordered the board to simply count the returns it had and not make decisions on counties/precincts to omit. The canvassing board ignored this order, and using the same decisions on counties and precincts as they had with the Presidential contest, announced that Stearns won by a narrower 456 vote margin. The results were announced December 8th.

As best I can see, the only difference between the two canvasses was that in Hamilton another Democratic precinct was excluded. Other than that, Stearns trailed Hayes thanks to getting fewer votes in key counties like Duval, Orange, and Volusia.

The Congressional canvass used same decisions on omitted precincts/counties. The board ruled 2-1 that Congressional District 1 Republican Incumbent William Purman was re-elected by just 300 votes.

Purman’s victory was very precarious and would remain so as challenges to the counting process went on. Adding Manatee would cost Purman his race, as good changes to Monroe or Jackon county figures.

In Congressional District 2, Republican Horatio Bisbee was declared the winner by a similarly razor-thin margin of 145 votes.

Bisbee, despite having a closer margin than Purman, was actually in a stronger position as challenges to the canvassing board emerged. Bisbee’s win had come with Baker County using the Democratic-friendly version. Finley could possibly flip the results if the disputed Hamilton precincts were re-added. However, Bisbee had more “outs” if returns were later altered by court order.

The canvassing board wrapped up its reports with the state legislative breakdown. Here the Democrats had control of both chambers of the Florida legislature. Florida would hence have divided Government if these results held.

However, things were far from done in Florida.

The Courts Decide

In Washington DC, Congress was meeting to sort out the electoral college disputes. An investigative committee was formed and more officials showed up in Florida, South Carolina, and Louisiana. Meanwhile, Democrats sued in the state court over the decision regarding the Governor count and the violation of the injunction. The suit only pertained to the state elections, not President. However, Republicans worried a negative result would give ammo to the Tilden campaign as Congress worked to sort out the Presidential contest.

An initial hearing before Judge White was scheduled for December 11 to answer on contempt chargers for violating his order. However, all sides eventually agreed to seek an answer with the Florida Supreme Court. Democrats appealed for the top court to order the canvassing board to count the returns they had, serving a pure ministerial function. Republicans remained confident such an order would not come, as the court was 2-1 Republican.

Republicans were shocked when on December 14th, the court unanimously rejected the canvassing board’s actions. The court stated that the rejection of the Manatee returns was wrong, as was the rejection of select precincts in Jackson, Hamilton, and Monroe. Reversing such decisions would mark the Democrats the victors in both the Governor and Presidential contest. Many recriminations were laid at the justices, with some arguing the court made its decision based on personal rivalries with Governor Stearns and other officials.

The canvassing board, which initially had agreed to abide by any court decision, tried for several days to reject the order. They claimed the body no longer formally existed since its work was done. They also considered appealing to federal courts. National Republicans worried such an order would further the cause for Tilden but were much more willing to let Stearns lose. Two weeks of back and forth maneuvering took place, which can be read much more about here. On December 27th, Governor Stearns, bowing to the situation, conceded the election and encourage compliance with the court order.

Finally, on December 28th, the Canvassing Board came back into session to vote on and submit amended returns. Following the court order, the board approved the returns as submitted by the counties, with two exceptions. Both exceptions were allowed based on the court opinion.

• The Baker County returns that only included 2/4 precincts were used, as these were the original reports certified and filed.

• The Clay County returns were subject to so little oversight or proper documentation that they could be dismissed entirely.

These decisions meant that Hayes was still the winner of Florida, securing a 222 vote margin.

The canvasing board decision may have saved the electoral votes for Hayes, but they did allow Democrat George Drew to claim the Governorship.

Drew was declared the winner of the Governor contest by 195 ballots.

On January 1st, the court accepted these returns. The reason for why Clay was allowed to be omitted but not Manatee is not clear, but it was a decision the court accepted. Accounts from the time indicate many believed the results were the most illegitimate of any county. Why they were counted to begin with is not clear.

With these results, Democrats finally had control of the Florida Governorship. Governor Stearns suffered from running several hundred ballots behind Drew. Ticket splitting was very rare at this time, but in several of the eastern counties, business-minded moderates preferred Drew. Below are the counties were the most ticket-splitting took place. These were small numbers, but they made the difference.

Stearns had no areas where he outperformed Hayes by more than a couple votes. His bleeding of ballots in the east and along the coast made the difference. Drew also got a modest home-county boost in Madison.

BUT do not forget this fact. If not for the economic or violent intimidation of Black voters in several key counties, Stearns would have won the Governor election.

The re-canvas also impacted the Congressional races as well. In the 1st District, William Purman ended up losing his re-election to Democrat Robert Davidson by 500 votes.

Purman’s lost marked an end 8 year political career in Florida. If you remember from my earlier articles, he was nearly killed in Jackson County back in 1869, surviving a gunshot blast to the face. The fact that Jackson, which was majority-Black, went Democratic, is a clear indicator of fraud in the county. Allegations of ballot stuffing were likely true and years of violence had suppressed the Black vote. This election marked the end of Jackson County as a Republican-friendly county.

The re-canvass of Congressional District 2 did not flip the results there. Bisbee’s margin actually expanded to 300 votes with the changes in Baker and the rejection of Clay. Finley got extra votes out of Hamilton, but nowhere else.

Bisbee would hold the seat until early 1878. Finley challenged the results with the US House Election committee and was eventually ruled as the rightful winner by the Democratic majority. The exact method is not available as of writing, but I believe the House committee used Clay and the Democratic-friendly Baker returns, and rejected the questioned precinct in Alachua, to come to a Finley win. Bisbee would be back, however, which I will get to in a future article.

The Florida legislature, meanwhile, entered its era of firm Democratic dominance. By the end of January 1877, the State Senate had a 2-1 Democratic majority. Thanks to the malapportioned legislative system, which I wrote about more here, this super-majority only made up 48% of the total population of the state.

Initial returns had put the Senate at 13 Democrats to 11 Republicans. However, the court-ordered re-canvass had seen SD3 (Jackson) and SD14 (Columbia) go Democratic. Then in January of 1877, Democrats seated the Democrat in Escambia County by ruling that ballots cast at a naval base were only applicable for federal contests, not state. The removal of that heavily-Republican precinct flipped Escambia blue.

The State House was a similar 2-1 breakdown. Like with the State Senate, the re-canvass and the rejection of the naval precinct in Escambia further added to the Democratic margin.

Florida’s legislature would not become Republican again until the 1990s.

I will be doing a special issue on the history of the Florida Reconstruction legislature in later this month. The results here, giving super-majorities to a body despite close statewide votes, were the results of the horrible apportionment system set up in the 1868 constitution. That plan, pushed by conservative carpetbaggers, was originally designed to limit the influence of the Black-majority counties, as I wrote about here.

The goal of the early Republican leaders, folks like Harrison Reed and Marcellus Stearns, was to rule Florida while using Black voters as a support voting block, but never letting them form a majority in the legislature. Thanks to their efforts and their inability to see that white voters would gravitate more and more to the Democrats, they’d created a legislative map that was biased heavily toward the Democrats. Now folks like Reed and Stearns were out of power. They would leave Florida, and let the native Black population suffer under Democratic rule and eventually Jim Crow.

Reconstruction Comes to an End

The results in Florida were catastrophic for the Black population. The elevation of Drew to the Governorship and the firm Democratic control of the legislature meant that Black citizens had no recourse with the state government. Thanks to the power of the Governor to appoint virtually all local officials, the majority-Black counties would find themselves ruled by commissions and sheriffs made up of white Democrats. The 1868 Constitution, which made the Governor very powerful, meant that every election was life and death for Florida’s Black population. The loss of the Governorship was far more critical than the loss of the legislature or the Presidency.

Speaking of the Presidency, the results nationally were no better for Black voters across the South. The protracted fight over the electoral college had dragged on into 1877, with both parties claiming to have won the contests in Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida. Congress eventually decided to form an Electoral Commission designed to decide the disputed states. After much deliberation, the board voted 8-7 to award all the disputed states to Hayes, with the argument being he’d won the official returns sent to Congress. This hardly settled matters, however, as House Democrats threatened to grind certification to a halt and many southerners called for an uprising.

Violence did not occur, however, and House Democrats backed off to allow Hayes to assume the Presidency. The reason for this is often coined The Compromise of 1877. This informal agreement, widely reported by historians but with nothing in writing, broadly argues that Hayes and Republicans agreed to formally end reconstruction in the south. Federal troops, now only remaining in South Carolina and Louisiana, would be pulled out. The South would have free pass on how to handle its ‘internal affairs’ - in other words suppressing Black citizens - and Washington would recognize that Democrats had won the disputed Governor contests in South Carolina and Louisiana. Hayes would become President, the man Black people risked their lives to to vote for, but the new President would do nothing to thank them.

The nefarious deal is best immortalized in this political cartoon by Joseph Keppler, which shows Hayes strolling off with the southern states as the demon Mephistopheles (portrayed by Republican Senator Roscoe Conkling) watches on.

The deal with the devil indeed.

Hayes’ presidency would do nothing for the Black population of the south as Jim Crow repression took hold. This inaction is often attributed to the supposed Compromise of 1877, but if you remember, Hayes was already very non-committal to reconstruction. Hayes had been a “moderate” on the issue in his 1875 Ohio Governor campaign and called for local rule when he accepted the Republican nomination. This “compromise” was no doubt one he had an easy time accepting.

The results were the end of Reconstruction in the South, including Florida. Many more elections would come before a new Jim Crow constitution was put into place, but never again in the 19th century would Black voters be able to find an ally in the Governorship. The era of “white government” was beginning. As these men would claim, they had “redeemed” Florida.

Looking Ahead

This is not the end of my series, far from it. The second half is going to cover Florida politics from this point and through the turn of the century. While white Democrats now had power of Florida, it would still take several elections to cement their control. Several counties and districts would still elect Black candidates through the next decade. However, these elections would come as the white Democratic leaders worked to limit Black power with threats or laws as much as possible. It would take the 1886 “Jim Crow Constitution” to formally end any hope of Black political influence.

The process of getting to and drafting that document is a warning about the ways to legally suppress votes - rather than suppression via violence. THAT will be the topic of future articles; the “legal suppression” of Black voices in Florida.

In my last issue, we looked at the growing divisions in the Florida Republican Party. When Governor Ossian Hart passed away in 1874, Lt Governor Marcellus Stearns, a much more conservative Republican, took office. Stearns was antagonistic toward Black political power and he clashed with members of his own party as he sought to win his own term for Governor in 1876.

In the above article, I also looked at the continued decline for Reconstruction from Northern voters. President Grant remained committed to protecting Black rights, but an 1873 Depression undermined the push to keep federal troops in the southern states to protect Black citizens. By the time 1876 came around, most Northern Republicans wanted to leave the south to its own self-rule.

This article will look at the battle for Florida in the 1876 elections. As Governor Stearns fought re-election, Democrats felt they had the strongest opportunity yet to win the top office and end Reconstruction in Florida. This came at the same time as the chaotic Presidential election. This issue will take us right to election day, with a separate issue out in the next day or two looking at the vote count fight.

Since much of the events in the Governor’s race are guided by the Presidential fight, lets set the national stage first.

National Environment

On paper, the political environment heading into 1876 was ripe for the Democrats to win. The 1873 depression, like all economic disasters before and after, was blamed on the party in power; Grant and the Republicans. The 1874 Elections saw Democrats sweep into control of the House of Representatives.

As the Grant administration continued to be dogged by corruption scandals, civil service reform and anti-corruption became the biggest issue of the upcoming Presidential contest. With that in mind, Democrats nominated reformer New York Governor Samuel Tilden for President. Tilden had come to the Governorship after battling the Tammany Hall machine in NYC. With his nomination, Democrats hoped to win over enough northern reformers to take the Presidency. The implication was also that Tilden would secure most of the southern states thanks to the suppression of Black votes.

Republicans headed into 1876 feeling the need to run away from the Grant administration. This was not only over corruption issues, but the increasing unpopularity of Reconstruction. Northern voters no longer supported using federal troops to protect Black voters; entering an era of “moral fatigue.” Grant quickly became one of the few Republican leaders that still wanted to fight for the security of Black citizens in the South. He was willing to consider a 3rd term (this was before the passage of the 22nd amendment) in office largely due to his worry about the party abandoning southern Blacks after the next election.

There was little desire for a Grant third term among the GOP however. This was made clear in a December vote in the US House in 1875. That month, Democrats put up a resolution that condemned the idea of anyone running for a 3rd term. While the language was about “freedom and institutions” - it was entirely a shot at President Grant. The measure easily passed, securing a vast majority of Republican members and all Democrats.

Only 18 Republican Congressmen rejected the resolution. These 18, except for one, included every southern Republican still in office in the south. Also of note, all six of the country’s remaining Black Congressmen were also in the NO camp. Southern Republicans, especially Black Republicans, knew that Grant and federal troops were the only thing keeping white violence at bay.

Knowing the public nor the party desired it, Grant would ultimately not make any real push for a third term. In the summer of 1876, Republicans opted to nominate Rutherford B. Hayes as their Presidential nominee. Hayes’ reputation as reformer and someone more moderate on Reconstruction made him a strong candidate as the party ran away from the Grant administration. Hayes had been elected Ohio Governor in 1875 while arguing reconstruction needed to come to an end.

In his acceptance speech, which you can find here, Hayes pledged support for Black and white southerners with some flowery language, but pointedly said that “local government” was needed.

With such a recognition fully accorded, it will be practicable to promote, by the influence of all legitimate agencies of the General Government, the efforts of the people of those States, to obtain for themselves the blessings of honest and capable local government.

Hayes was setting the state for the end of federal troops in the south. His nomination and the party platform showed a clear retreat from the Grant position of protecting Black rights in the former Confederacy.

The Southern Battle Ground

Much of the Presidential contest would focus on key northern swing states; namely New York, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Tilden was expected to take much of the former confederacy, which had been falling one by one back into Democratic hands as the 1870s went on. Some of these Democratic gains came from whites simply outnumbering Blacks by large margins. However, states like Alabama and Mississippi only fell to Democrats thanks to extreme violent voter suppression. While a fair vote would have likely given Hayes one or both states, neither were expected to have a fair votes in 1876 and were hence predicted for Tilden.

Only three southern states remained in control of Republican Governors, and only these three states would at least be possibly for Hayes: Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina.

South Carolina and Louisiana were in extreme states of violence throughout the 1876 campaign, with White League and Red Shirts paramilitary organizations roaming around both states. These white “rifle clubs” committed to “redeem” their state with violence if necessary; working to either intimidate Black voters from casting ballots or killing Black voters. These tactics gained national attention in July of 1876 with the Hamburg Massacre in South Carolina; which saw red shirt militias terrorize and kill Black citizens in a multi-day riot. The horror of the riots was captured in Harpers Weekly.

However, despite these outrages, northerners did not want federal troops to constantly occupy the south. Grant sent what soldiers he could to try and keep the peace but was politically limited in how far he could go. The economic depression limited funds for soldiers and the Democratic-led house definitely was not going to fund an occupation of the south. The Hayes campaign, meanwhile, had little hope of holding any southern states and worried southern intervention would only hurt them in the north.

While Lousiana and South Carolina would lead in violence and massive electoral fraud, Florida was not immune from troubles either. Lets now turn to Florida and see how the 1876 contest took shape and played out there.

The 1876 Florida Governor Election

As the Presidential election geared up across the country, Florida entered the 1876 contests with Republicans on the precipice of losing power. In the 1874 midterms, Democrats had won the State House and the State Senate was a tie. Republicans were desperate to hold onto the Governor’s office and Democrats felt they had the best opportunity yet to take control.

The Republican Nomination

Like so many years before, Florida Republicans entered the election year with deep internal divisions. This time, the war was between Governor Marcellus Stearns and US Senator Simon Conover as both men sought the Governor nomination. Stearns had little to no support with the state’s Black population, who made up a vast majority of the Republican vote. However, in an era before popular primaries, this deficit did not matter. As the incumbent Governor, Stearns controlled many of the party levers of power, with hundreds of appointments to give out, which made it easier to build a power base with influential men that relied on his administration for support. This made it easy for Stearns to secure delegate elections that would send supporters to the state convention that would choose a nominee.

Conover played from behind from the beginning in the nomination fight. As the Senator campaigned to get loyal delegates elected from the respective counties, the convention list was already stacked with a large number of Stearns men. Heading into the summer convention, Stearns likely already had a majority of the vote locked up. This, however, did not stop the convention from becoming a massive clash with little sign of mending fences. At the convention, Congressman William Purman, a fierce enemy of Stearns, read a letter from abolitionist Fredrick Douglas backing Conover. Fights over delegate posts, which saw several pro-Conover delegates rejected from the proceedings, led to violence. At one point, Madison County Sheriff G. W. Bogue was shot in the leg during a fight that had erupted.

Thanks to his early control of the party apparatus, the convention easily nominated Stearns for a Governor. The Conover team, meanwhile, left the event and launched a new convention, which nominated Conover as the Governor nominee. This wasn’t just some ragtag group of angry delegates either. This breakaway convention was chaired by Congressman Josiah Walls. This was a serious force, further seen later in the summer when the national Republican convention agreed to seat the Conover delegation instead of the Stearns group. There were now TWO Republican tickets; both guaranteed to split the vote and make Democratic victory easy.

The division lasted through the summer and into the early fall. In August the state held its Congressional nominating Conventions, which saw both Stearns and Conover campaign to be seen as the “rightful” Republican ticket. For the Congressional nominations, William Purman was re-nominated for the 1st district. In the 2nd, district, however, Josiah Walls, who had lost his seat after an election challenge (see my last article), was passed over. The nomination instead went to Horatio Bigsbee, the district attorney who had fought hard to protect Black voting rights heading into the 1872 contest. Walls was nominated for Alachua County State Senator. With this change, Florida had no Black candidate for statewide or Congressional office for the first time since 1868.

The split in the Governor nomination came to a head at the end of the summer. DC Republicans, warning of such a split ticket guaranteeing Democratic victory, pressured Conover to drop his campaign. Conover bowed to the request, but he would not campaign for Stearns in any way shape or form. Black voters as well felt very hostile to Stearns, knowing he was no ally of theirs. However, the prospect of a Democratic victory was also an unimaginable option; leading many to begrudgingly stick with the GOP ticket.

The Democratic Nomination

The Democratic Party of Florida was far more united than the Republicans. While William Bloxham, the 1872 Governor nominee, was still the most prominent Democrat in Florida, he would not be the nominee. The Party leaders believed that nominating a Southern Democrat would limit the path to victory for a few key reasons. First, a white Florida native nomination would keep Republicans largely united, especially Black voters, who did not trust any native white Democrats. Second, Florida’s white population was seeing growth from other states, voters with little Confederate sympathies but who craved stable politics for business growth. Democrats were eager to appeal to this growing non-southern white population, so they went with a non-southern themselves.

The Democratic nominee would be George F. Drew, a lumber mill owner based in Madison County. Drew was originally born in New Hampshire, but had been managing a iron and timber business in Columbus, Georgia when the Civil War broke out. Drew was a firm unionist but had also done business with the confederacy. This biography gave the ex-confederates some comfort (and they likely did not know how pro-Union he was) and made him appealing for those not interesting in re-litigation the Civil War or slavery. Drew’s politics also offered broader appeal, with him being a Grant backer in 1868 but a Greeley backer in 1872.

There were some confederate Democrats that rolled their eyes at Drew, considering him a once-radical. However, there was little reported revolt at the idea, as the Democratic leaders sought to win back power however they could. Drew was a very appealing candidate to the business-minded moderates of the state; many of whom were sick of Republican divisions and who cared little for the long-term plight of the Black population. Republicans recognized the threat, saying that Drew was designed to “give the ‘Lost Cause’ a Union flavor.”

The Democratic convention was a much less contentious affair than the Republican counterpart. Once Drew and the full slate were nominated, the Democrats began a major registration drive across the state. There were still many native white voters who’d lost interest in politics. The Party machine worked overdrive to re-engage these voters, pushing that the state was close to being ‘redeemed.’

The 1876 Campaign of Intimidation and Fraud

The fall campaign in Florida was far less violent and heated as the contests that unleashed in South Carolina and Louisiana. However, this does not mean violence and intimidation were not widely utilized in the state. The effort to suppress Black voters had far more effect on the outcome of the elections than any issues the candidates proposed.

Intimidation and Violence

Heading into the general election campaign, both sides predicted rampant violence to consume the polls. Democrats felt that they were on the cusp of taking back their state, and would not rest at any step to achieve this. Republicans likewise anticipated such actions, so much so that Alachua Republican leader L.G. Dennis told Black voters to bring their guns to the polls to ensure they could vote. The events leading up to the elections did warn of a bigger clash on election day itself. Senator Robert Meacham, the Republican leader of Jefferson County, saw his house besieged by gunfire. A Republican rally in Lafayette County saw the speaker attacked by white Democrats.

The most famous attack occurred in Columbia County. There, just outside Lake City, two Black men were accosted by white regulators. The regulators tied a nose around the neck of one of the men and warned that if they did not both pledge to vote Democratic, then they and everyone they knew would be killed. This attack was only reported due to the bravery of the men, but was an event that for sure took place in many parts of the state.

As violence and intimidation were reported, Governor Stearns struggled with how to handle events. Years later, Democrat William Bloxham would report that he and other Democratic leaders met with Stearns leading up to the vote, warning that state militia and troops better be kept at bay heading into the vote. Bloxham reported that he told Stearns….

We have come sir, to put you on notice that if a single white man is killed in Leon County on election day, there are 300 of us who have sworn that your life shall pay for it

Stearns would call for a peaceful vote, but did little to deal with reports of intimidation and threats.

While there was violence in Florida, it was not as open and public as what occurred in the 1870 midterms. That year had seen a massive wave of assassinations and militias surrounding polling sites. Here much of the violence was a more targeted intimidation with fewer public clashes. This was a marked contrast from South Carolina and Louisiana, where white voters worked to brutally suppress Black voters in massive attacks. The chaotic violence of those states made it seem like Florida was relatively peaceful, baring a few incidents. However, as one historian laid out

“If Florida Conservatives incited fewer riots than their Carolina colleagues, they were no less committed to the redemption of their state at any price”

The violence and intimidation was not as public as 1870, but it was still there. The Lake City story no doubt affected the vote in Columbia County, but was also an event that likely played out in similar ways across the state. Individual-level intimidation was a common tool - something seen the famous 1876 political cartoon titled “Of Course He Wants to Vote the Democratic Ticket!”

Counties like Polk, Hernando, or Hamilton saw Republican vote share that fell well below the Black share of the population. After the election was over, when investigators from Washington tried to talk to local residents about issues with voter intimidation, many Black residents were hesitant to talk. One observer noted the fear among those they spoke with, that many felt silence would keep them safe. Hence it is reasonable to assume a great deal of violent intimidation took place; but did not get heavy reported.

Economic Warfare

Another major driver of votes against Republicans was economic intimidation; which is covered in good detail here. The 1876 contest saw a massive spike in Democrats working to tie employment and wages to party loyalty.

By this point, the vast majority of farm land remained in the hands of rich white landowners. Across the state, wherever the landlord could get away with it, they directly threatened Black voters that a Republican ballot meant loss of a job. Merchants likewise said they would prioritize Democrats when it came to giving out credit or loans. The same blackmail took place in non-farming jobs. The Democrat-run Florida Central Railroad Company handed out pre-marked and numbered Democratic ballots. Workers were told that if such ballots did not show up at the polling sites, they would be fired. Black voters were given two options: vote Democratic or don’t vote at all.

This system was not secret either, as the Democratic-friendly The Weekly Floridian newspaper directly called for this tactic to be adopted. Ironically, the Democrats were able to get away with this because of the failure of the moderate Republican leadership to better shield Black voters from economic exploitation. The efforts of Governor Reed and Governor Stearns to cozy up with white landowners and merchants led to them rejecting expanded protections for Black citizens.

Now those lack of protections were going to bite Stearns in the ass.

Issues with Election Integrity

A final point to discuss heading into election day was the “integrity" of the process. As discussed a bit in Part 3 of my series, elections at this time were constantly subject to fraud by all sides. This stemmed from the lack of uniform election systems in the state, as well as the state’s rural nature. A few key issues could affect the tabulation and casting of ballots. These issues are examined in more detail in this article, but I will cover some key dynamics here.

Thanks to the lack of a centralized election system, Florida did not have a uniform ballot. Voters were expected to go to the polling booth to either verbally declare or submit a pre-filled out ballot. Party ballots were often printed to be handed out to voters, a fact that led to very little ticket splitting in this era. Ballot stuffing was a major issue at this time. However, trickery was also a major problem. The 1876 election came with multiple reports of Democratic organizations creating Republican-looking ballots that actually had Democratic names. An example of such a ballot used in Jackson County can be seen below.

Few counties were divided up into precincts and the opening or closing of voting sites could be weaponized to suppress turnout. Likewise multiple voting sites without modern technology made it easier for people to vote at multiple sites in one day. Both parties were guilty of these practice.

The final major issue was Florida’s vast space and lack of good public roads. The result of the state’s geography meant that it could take days or weeks for returns to come in from the southern counties. Since the Republican-heavy panhandle counties would be able to report their totals first, elections often saw the Republicans take an early lead and then it would be a matter of whether the slow-reporting rural, white counties could flip the lead. The issue here was that these slow-reporting counties could change their results as they learned about the early reports. Accusations of counties waiting as long as possible to send their returns in flew after election day. Despite the fact Governor Stearns had the ability to control the appointment of local officials across the state, he appointed or kept in place many Democrats in assorted counties; these late-reporting counties among them.

All of these issues would come to a head once voting was wrapped up.

Election Day and a Close Vote

Election Day came in Florida without massive violent clashes, unlike the events of 1870. However, the months of intimidation and economic threats did succeed in keeping many Black voters from the polls, or forced them to cast Democratic ballots. As election day went on, both sides had accusations of fraud levied. Ballot boxes became major sources of conflict. In Jackson County, a Republican ballot box was supposedly destroyed. In Hamilton County, the leaders took the ballot box and would not hand it over until right before the State canvassing board met. In Volusia County, an effort to steal a ballot box was thwarted with a dummy box.

Once the voting was done, it quickly became apparent that Florida would be very close. Both parties claimed victory, but Republicans maintained a lead from the early reported majority-Black counties. Despite Black repression, enough whites, namely northern transplants, still backed the Republican ticket to keep the election very close. However, it was expected that the final vote could be within a couple hundred ballots; meaning every challenge and question about the integrity of the vote could effect the ultimate winner.

The results took on a national importance as the Presidential contest remained bitterly close. While Samuel Tilden had a solid lead in the popular vote, the electoral college remained up in the air. As the state returns became clear, Tilden had a solid lead in the electoral college, but did not yet have a majority. The early returns in South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana showed all three states would be close. If Hayes could carry them all, he’d win the Electoral College.

Early into election night, Republican officials were dejected and assumed they had lost. Hayes went to bed that night assuming he’d lost the election. However, as the close returns became clear, Daniel E. Sickles, a Republican Party diplomat and former general, noted the close returns in the south. He quickly dispatched telegrams to the Governors in LA, SC, and FL.

With your state sure for Hayes, he is elected. HOLD YOUR STATE.

As Florida began to count its votes for President and Governor, national forces would descend on the state. Under the national spotlight, it would be come clear just how hard it was to determine who was the true winner of a very narrow contest for President and Governor.

In the next issue, out either tomorrow or Thursday, we will look at the results of the 1876 election in Florida. Who really won it? And how reconstruction came to an end.

Two of these districts were of special note. House District 87 covered the Mar-a-Lago resort that Donald Trump claims as his residence. Meanwhile State Senate District 14 was the seat held by Jay Collins, who Ron DeSantis tapped to become Lt Governor in 2025. Collins is currently running for Governor this year in the Republican primary.

Democrats believed their best opportunity for a pickup lied in House 87, with its suburban district dynamic and a very strong Democratic candidate. Senate 14 was seen as an uphill climb due to the Republican Party forces outspending Democrats 10 to 1 in the race. House 51, meanwhile, was a sleeper race expected to easily remain in Republican hands. If you want more backstory on each race, check out my election preview article.

Democrats went into election day holding out hope they would flip House 87. It was a tossup to be sure, and election day turnout would be closely watched. Few expected a Democratic victory in Senate 14.

However, once the results started to come in, the night quickly became a joyous one for Florida Democrats as early voting data showed flips of HD87 and SD14 were both in the cards. As the red-leaning election day vote came in, neither early Democratic lead was fully erased. In the end, Democrats flipped both HD87 and SD14!

In addition to these wins, despite virtually no money being spent in HD51, that district saw a swing to the left as well. The latest specials continued a streak of Florida Democrats outperforming special elections since 2025. The full list of specials and their swings from 2025 to Present in Florida can be seen below.

These results were especially impressive considering the partisan makeup of the vote cast. Thanks to each district have a Republican registration lead, the final vote cast was Republican-heavy in each contest. The Democratic candidate wins in HD87 and SD14 came despite Republicans holding a 9% lead in ballots cast.

These wins came not because Democrats had crazy strong turnout compared to the Republicans. No, these wins came thanks to NPA voters breaking heavily for Democrats. It also likely involves several moderate Republicans opted to cast their ballots for the Democratic candidate.

This article will look at each special election result and what notable trends stand out in the data.

House District 87

As mentioned, House District 87 was seen as the biggest prize for Florida Democrats on election night. The district, which includes the suburbs and exurbs in Jupiter to its north and stretches down Palm Beach’s coast, is home to Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago residence.

Democrats had a strong candidate in local businesswoman Emily Gregory, who raised $400,000 for her bid. Republican Jon Maples, who likewise raised around $400,000 , had extensive party backing; with countless mailers flooding the district. Democrats, however, were heavily backing the Gregory campaign as well, making it a high profile and expensive contest.

This Democratic flip came despite the fact the district still leaned Republican in votes cast. With a Republican registration advantage of 13%, Republicans would always lead in vote cast. The question was how much could Gregory outperform the partisanship of the vote. The final vote cast was GOP +9%.

Democrats led in getting their voters out to the polls; holding 37% turnout while Republicans got 32% to show up. However, thanks to the large Republican registration lead, the final vote was still 46% Republican to 36% Democratic. A partisan divide on voting method remained strong in this district, with Democrats leading in mail ballots and Republicans leading in in-person voting.

Btw, Donald Trump, who loves to attack mail-in voting, cast his ballot BY MAIL in this special election.

Despite Trump’s vote, Emily Gregory secured a 2% win for Democrats in House 87.

The swing in the district was a 13 point shift to the LEFT. Several communities swung over 20 points. Only a few precincts moved to the right. This did include the precinct of the Mar-A-Lago resort.

The fact that the Mar-A-Lago precinct (which includes not just the resort but other residencies as well) didn’t swing left may give Trump fans some comfort. Perhaps nothing could have been worse than the precinct itself flipping blue. This was never going to happen, however, due to how red the area is. In fact, the Maples over-performance came thanks to Trump being a historically WEAK Republican in his own precinct.

When Trump won his precinct in 2024, he did several points worse than other Republicans on the ballot, including Senator Rick Scott and Republicans running for county offices. The Maples showing is more about the precinct reverting to its normal deep-red nature; though Maples did not do as well as Senator Scott did.

This was the most likely Democratic gain, but it was always a tossup until the final moments. However, as it became clear the district had flipped, Democrats could breath a sign of relief that they had one win under their belt for the night.

But as as Senate 14 was continuing to count, suddenly a second Democratic flip came into focus.

Senate District 14

Few expected that Republicans would not hold onto Senate District 14. On paper, the district was less Republican than House District 87; having voted for Biden by 4% and then flipping to Trump by 7% in 2024. The district is also home to a sizeable Hispanic minority; almost half of whom are Cubans and who swung decidedly to the right in the last election. However, we have seen Hispanic voters swing back to the Democrats in recent elections in 2025; including the Miami Mayoral Election.

On paper, a Democratic win by winning back many of the Hispanics that voted for Biden in 2020 and making some modest gains with white suburbanites was possible. However, this race, more than any other, saw massive financial disparities between the two sides.

On the Democratic side was Brian Nathan, a first time candidate for office. Nathan and the local Democratic clubs worked as much of a grassroots campaign as possible while raising around $100,000 for the contest. Florida Democratic forces, much more strapped on cash, had to focus on the fight for HD87.

The Republicans, meanwhile, had no shortage of money for their candidate, State Representative Josie Tomkow. As the preferred candidate of the Florida Senate Republicans, Tomkow, who held HD51 in Polk County, was tapped to cross counties and run in Senate 14. Her campaign was awash in support from Florida lobbyists and businesses; all eager to get in good with the supposed heir to the seat. Republicans spent at least $1,000,000 on the race. This meant Brian Nathan was outspent at least 10 to 1 in the contest. As longtime Florida reporter Matt Dixon laid out, there was no shortage of lobbyists and prominent power players working to make nice with Tomkow - all assuming she would win the race.

Republicans were optimistic heading into election day as well. The absentee vote heading into election day was a virtual tie and in-person early voting had been solidly Republican. Then Election Day proved to be solidly red-leaning. While both parties had near even turnout, right around 32%, this left Republicans with a 9.2% point vote cast lead; slightly up from their 7.6% registration lead.

The final vote cast, being 9.2% GOP, was redder than the 6.8% lead from the 2024 election. This was a product of registration changes, something I discussed more in my preview article. As the polls closed, it certainly seemed like Republicans was poised to hold this district.

The Florida political world was in for a shocker when, after all the ballots were counted, Democrat Brian Nathan edged out Josie Tomkow by just 400 votes.

Nathan’s win, coming amid a GOP +9 electorate and a Republican candidate with everything going for her, was a true testament to voter sentiment at this time. Like in HD87, the Democrats could only win such a race with massive NPA support and a likely chunk of moderate Republicans.

Nathan improved on Harris across most of the district. Only a handful of precinct saw Tomkow out-perform Trump.

One item many wanted to know was how the Hispanic vote shifted in this race. Now we don’t have the final voter list yet to see how Hispanic the vote cast was'; so any analysis should be taken with some margin of error. However, I did look at the shift in the vote in the most heavily Hispanic areas of the district.

• Precincts that are over 45% registered Hispanic (17 in total) saw the vote go from Trump +12% in 2024 to Nathan +1% in 2026

• The most heavily Hispanic precincts in the Lake-Leto region, which are also heavily Cuban, went from Trump +20% to Tomkow +9%.

Regardless of your method or criteria, there was a clear Democratic shift in the Hispanic community of the district. However, as I said, we should wait for the final voter list to re-run the analysis to account for turnout dynamics.

This upset win shocked the Florida Republican Party far more than the result in HD87 did. That race was at least always seen as a tossup. Republicans were quietly much more confident in Senate 14. They had a rude awakening about where voter sentiment truly is that night.

House District 51

The last of our special elections, as mentioned, was the forgotten race over in Polk County. House 51, the seat Tomkow vacated to run in Senate 14 (in another county) was the most Republican seat up that night. It backed Trump by 13% in 2024.

The race for this seat was an incredibly quiet affair. Republican Hillary Holly had been hand-picked by Republicans to run for the seat. She easily raised $120,000 and the Republicans spent several hundred thousand more just to make sure no shockers happened. Democrats ran Edwin Perez, a former city commission candidate who filed to ensure the party had a name for the race. Perez did not have any major fundraising base and brought in under $20,000. He did what he could to campaign in the district but it was a shoe-string campaign.

The quiet nature of the race led to very low turnout for the race. Just 12% of voters showed up; with Republicans having a modest turnout lead.

The final vote cast in the district was 15% GOP, far ahead of the 8% GOP it was in 2024. By all accounts, this district could have seen a swing to the right.

However, despite the red electorate, Hilary Holley beat Perez by just 8.4%, notably down from the 2024 results.

Perez won back several precincts in the Davenport and Haines City area; all communities that have large Hispanic registration vote shares.

The Hispanic vote here is much more heavily Puerto Rican than it is Cuban. These heavily Hispanic precinct had the largest swings to the left in this special election; swinging between 15% and 30% to the Democrats.

Similar to the story with Senate 14, we don’t have the final vote cast list yet. However, using registration data, this is the key takeaway on Hispanic voters in the district.

• In the precincts with over 40% Hispanic registration, Perez won the vote by 19%. Those same precincts backed Harris by just 1% in 2024.

Just like with Senate 14, House 51 saw a sizeable swing with Hispanic voters.

Final Thoughts

The special election wins were a much-needed boost for Florida Democrats. Coupled with the Miami Mayor race last year, these wins will further aid Democrats in the sunshine state with raising money and showing important sings of life. No these special results cannot predict the future. These were lower turnout races and specials are not always predictive of general elections.

However, for Democrats in Florida, who face massive financial disparities to the Republicans, wins like these give much needed signs of confidence to big and grassroots donors, as well as national groups that may decide “hey that Congressional race might be worth investing in.”

It should also give Florida Republicans pause about their redistricting plans…… but on that front I guess we shall see what happens in a few weeks time.

"He is risen! He is risen indeed, Alleluia!"

If you went to Church service this morning, which if I had to guess was maybe 20% of my audience, you no doubt proclaimed this joyous news at the start of the morning. The Easter Service marks the conclusion of the Lent calendar that begins with Ash Wednesday. The weeks leading up to Easter see sermons that track the movements of Jesus as he heads toward his eventual betrayal and crucifixion. Depending on your denomination and tradition, some of you, like myself, spent Friday night in a “Good Friday” service that covers the crucifixion itself.

In my Lutheran Church, we hold a Tenebrae service, which recounts the final days leading up to Jesus’ arrest and death. The service is held in limited lighting as the sun sets, reflecting the darkness that came over the land as Christ gave up his spirit.

Today is now a day of celebration, a day where death was overcome!

We celebrate this day with the traditions of the Christian Church - eggs and chocolate bunnies.

Ok well that has nothing to do with Jesus. But the bunnies are tasty and I always loved Easter Egg hunts as a kid.

For this Easter, I wanted to give you, my readers, something to ruminate on. As you eat your mounds of chocolate (as I will be as well) - I wanted to tell the story of the Crucifixion and Resurrection of Jesus. However, I want to specifically approach this from the perspective of the women!

Sadly, as the absolutely Godless and cruel Trump administration continues to reign terror in America, an entire cohort of far-right men, many of who’s real Christian convictions I seriously question, have become more embolden to attack any group they find a threat to their power and influence. The moment that made me decide to write this article was seeing this video from the absolutely crazy Joel Webbon on how women speaking up is an “offense to God.”

This was, of course, not the first time women have been so directly attacked by a Christian “leader.” With Easter approaching, as I saw this video, my instinct, my very first reaction, was to post this reply.

I feel it is time for some people to get a reminder on the central role women play in the Gospel, especially at the death and resurrections of Jesus Christ.

Women with Jesus Through the Gospel

The role of women in Jesus’ teachings and eventual death is often overlooked in broad Christian circles. Scholars focus on women as do many Church leaders. However, I feel as a community, the Church peoples really don’t appreciate that the story of Jesus is not just of one guy and his buddies going town to town. We meet women throughout the Gospel stories and ample evidence is shown that women were part of Jesus’ caravan of supporters. Luke 8: 1-3 is clear example

After this, Jesus traveled about from one town and village to another, proclaiming the good news of the kingdom of God. The Twelve were with him, ² and also some women who had been cured of evil spirits and diseases: Mary (called Magdalene) from whom seven demons had come out; ³ Joanna the wife of Chuza, the manager of Herod’s household; Susanna; and many others. These women were helping to support them out of their own means.

Women do not get as much focus on the Gospel, but they are clearly a presence in it. They pop up in several moments interacting with Christ. The Chosen series has an excellent dramatization of the story of Jesus and the Samaritan woman, as documented in John 4. This account is most famous for showing Jesus’ mercy and love for a woman who has been shunned by her society.

The Gospel of Luke has more mentions of women than any of the four texts. Luke at times seems to directly praise women and then chastise men for their lack of faith. We will see more of that later on.

There has been no shortage of debate about if women were ‘erased’ from Gospels or early Church works. I am not a Biblical scholar so I am absolutely do not have such authority to make such a statement I take the Gospel text as it is. Debate over the role of the early Church pushing away women is something that has a good deal of historic merit. In terms of the Gospels themselves and the accounting of Jesus’ ministry, it is likely women were supporters, followers, and advisors, but could not take on the ministry role that the apostles undertook. This lack of female preachers reflected the patriarchal society of the time, as women preachers would be have been ignored or attacked. Jesus had to get the message out and used men as leading preachers, but he was a clear supporter of women and they were in his camp.

This role of women in Jesus’ ministry and their role in the broader church has been subject to debate for…. oh the last 2000 years. The sentiment that the Catholic church and other denominations continues today with is known as “complementarian” - a view of gender which dictates that women are not meant to be preachers or pastors; though it stresses women have important roles to play in Church function and Christian community. The easy example here is the Catholic Church and its male Priests but also Nuns have a great deal of authority. Even the rigid Catholic church is miles ahead of the “women shut up” nonsense we see from the modern far-right.

I am personally very much NOT in that complementarian camp. I hold an egalitarian view, which means any gender can be a pastor/preacher. I believe that Jesus was working to spread the message in the confines of 1st Century Roman/Judean society. We are not in that society anymore. This puts me in line with not only other liberal church bodies, but more conservative leaders like Beth Moore or Rick Warren, who have both clashes with the Southern Baptist convention over their views on letting women preach. Warren is far more conservative than me, but he lays out his Biblical justification for women preachers in this article.

One scripture he sites is from Acts 2…

¹⁷ “‘In the last days, God says, I will pour out my Spirit on all people.
Your sons and daughters will prophesy, your young men will see visions,
your old men will dream dreams.
¹⁸ Even on my servants, both men and women, I will pour out my Spirit in those days,
and they will prophesy

Regardless of your position in the complementarian vs egalitarian debate, the roll of women in the Gospel and New Testament cannot be denied. While they remain background characters for much of the text, they take on a major role in the end of Jesus’ life and were clearly part of his grand plan.

So lets take a look at the women amid Jesus’ death and rise.

The Women Who Didn’t Flee

The importance of women, and their devotion to Christ, is no better seen in the betrayal and crucifixion of Jesus. On the night Passover, after the famous “Last Supper,” Jesus was betrayed by Judas and arrested by cohort of priests and temple guards (and Roman soldiers in John’s account).

Once Jesus is arrested, it is noted in the Gospels of Matthew and Mark that his disciples fled. In all four Gospels, the famous moment of Peter denying knowing Jesus three times is present. Otherwise you do not see his disciples or followers with him at his trial and torture. As the populace call for Jesus execution, we do not see his followers try to shout for him or plead for his life.

When Jesus is taken to be crucified, the disciples are, by all accounts, not present. Only one apostle, John, who we believe to be the author of the Gospel of John, is said to have been at the crucifixion. All four Gospels, however, note that among the crowd witnessing Jesus’ execution - at least some of his female followers are present. Some are named directly, while others are referenced as a group.

Luke 23

⁴⁴ It was now about noon, and darkness came over the whole land until three in the afternoon, ⁴⁵ for the sun stopped shining. And the curtain of the temple was torn in two. ⁴⁶ Jesus called out with a loud voice, “Father, into your hands I commit my spirit.” When he had said this, he breathed his last.

⁴⁷ The centurion, seeing what had happened, praised God and said, “Surely this was a righteous man.” ⁴⁸ When all the people who had gathered to witness this sight saw what took place, they beat their breasts and went away. ⁴⁹ But all those who knew him, including the women who had followed him from Galilee, stood at a distance, watching these things.

Matthew 27

⁵⁵ Many women were there, watching from a distance. They had followed Jesus from Galilee to care for his needs. ⁵⁶ Among them were Mary Magdalene, Mary the mother of James and Joseph,^[f] and the mother of Zebedee’s sons.

Mark 15

⁴⁰ Some women were watching from a distance. Among them were Mary Magdalene, Mary the mother of James the younger and of Joseph, and Salome. ⁴¹ In Galilee these women had followed him and cared for his needs. Many other women who had come up with him to Jerusalem were also there.

John 19

²⁵ Near the cross of Jesus stood his mother, his mother’s sister, Mary the wife of Clopas, and Mary Magdalene. ²⁶ When Jesus saw his mother there, and the disciple whom he loved standing nearby, he said to her, “Woman, here is your son,” ²⁷ and to the disciple, “Here is your mother.” From that time on, this disciple took her into his home.

While we have several women directly named (and you can check this link out for more research on the topic) - it is also directly stated that additional female followers were present. By all accounts, the fast majority of Jesus-friendly onlookers were women.

These named women, often referred to as “The Three Marys” remain at Jesus’ side to the very end. A very good video on these women and the importance of women in this moment can be watched here.

These women were here until the end…..

Likewise, they will be there for his return.

The Burial of Jesus

After Jesus passed, he would eventually be laid in a newly-carved tomb. The empty tomb, outside of the cross, is arguably the most recognizable symbol in Christianity.

Here we see a male disciple of Jesus, Joseph of Armiathea, ask for possession of the body to be placed in a tomb. We then see Roman guards placed at the tomb to prevent the steeling of the body. Joseph is the most prominent MALE supporter of Jesus we see at this time. However, we constantly see the women as well.

Matthew 27

⁵⁷ As evening approached, there came a rich man from Arimathea, named Joseph, who had himself become a disciple of Jesus. ⁵⁸ Going to Pilate, he asked for Jesus’ body, and Pilate ordered that it be given to him. ⁵⁹ Joseph took the body, wrapped it in a clean linen cloth, ⁶⁰ and placed it in his own new tomb that he had cut out of the rock. He rolled a big stone in front of the entrance to the tomb and went away. ⁶¹ Mary Magdalene and the other Mary were sitting there opposite the tomb.

⁶² The next day, the one after Preparation Day, the chief priests and the Pharisees went to Pilate. ⁶³ “Sir,” they said, “we remember that while he was still alive that deceiver said, ‘After three days I will rise again.’ ⁶⁴ So give the order for the tomb to be made secure until the third day. Otherwise, his disciples may come and steal the body and tell the people that he has been raised from the dead. This last deception will be worse than the first.”

⁶⁵ “Take a guard,” Pilate answered. “Go, make the tomb as secure as you know how.” ⁶⁶ So they went and made the tomb secure by putting a seal on the stone and posting the guard.

It is unclear if Joseph was at the crucifixion itself. His exact relation to Jesus’ following depends on the gospel account. Some reference him as a disciple, though it also appears he was a prominent Jewish man and a secret supporter. The Gospel of John, in describing the burial, paints Joseph as a disciple, but a secret one.

John 19

³⁸ Later, Joseph of Arimathea asked Pilate for the body of Jesus. Now Joseph was a disciple of Jesus, but secretly because he feared the Jewish leaders. With Pilate’s permission, he came and took the body away. ³⁹ He was accompanied by Nicodemus, the man who earlier had visited Jesus at night. Nicodemus brought a mixture of myrrh and aloes, about seventy-five pounds.^{[e] 40} Taking Jesus’ body, the two of them wrapped it, with the spices, in strips of linen. This was in accordance with Jewish burial customs. ⁴¹ At the place where Jesus was crucified, there was a garden, and in the garden a new tomb, in which no one had ever been laid. ⁴² Because it was the Jewish day of Preparation and since the tomb was nearby, they laid Jesus there.

The Gospel of John is the only gospel to not mention the women at the moment of Jesus being put in the tomb, instead mentioning Nicodemus as also being present. Both the gospels of Luke and Mark reference women being present.

Luke 23

⁵⁰ Now there was a man named Joseph, a member of the Council, a good and upright man, ⁵¹ who had not consented to their decision and action. He came from the Judean town of Arimathea, and he himself was waiting for the kingdom of God. ⁵² Going to Pilate, he asked for Jesus’ body. ⁵³ Then he took it down, wrapped it in linen cloth and placed it in a tomb cut in the rock, one in which no one had yet been laid. ⁵⁴ It was Preparation Day, and the Sabbath was about to begin.

⁵⁵ The women who had come with Jesus from Galilee followed Joseph and saw the tomb and how his body was laid in it. ⁵⁶ Then they went home and prepared spices and perfumes. But they rested on the Sabbath in obedience to the commandment.

Mark 15

⁴² It was Preparation Day (that is, the day before the Sabbath). So as evening approached, ⁴³ Joseph of Arimathea, a prominent member of the Council, who was himself waiting for the kingdom of God, went boldly to Pilate and asked for Jesus’ body. ⁴⁴ Pilate was surprised to hear that he was already dead. Summoning the centurion, he asked him if Jesus had already died. ⁴⁵ When he learned from the centurion that it was so, he gave the body to Joseph. ⁴⁶ So Joseph bought some linen cloth, took down the body, wrapped it in the linen, and placed it in a tomb cut out of rock. Then he rolled a stone against the entrance of the tomb. ⁴⁷ Mary Magdalene and Mary the mother of Joseph saw where he was laid.

The role of Joseph of Arimathea in Jesus’ camp before the crucifixion is up for scholarly debate. Whether he was an open follower, or indeed a secret supporter, one thing is clear, he risked his life in the request for Jesus’ body. His action surely put him under closer watch by the Roman and Jewish leaders.

By and large however, the two genders reacted in very different ways when Jesus was arrested and killed. Joseph is the exception to the rule when it comes to male followers of Jesus, most of whom were nowhere to be found. This internet meme really can sum alot of these events up.

I’ve never loved something from the internet more than that.

The women staying close would matter, as it would make them the first to realize the good news to come on Sunday.

Women at the Resurrection

Each account of the Gospel has its own timeline of events slightly different. They all paint a similar picture however; women are the first to discover that Jesus is no longer in the tomb.

In the Gospel of Matthew, we two of the Marys going to the tomb and first seeing the angel at the rock and then the resurrected Christ himself.

Matthew 28

¹ After the Sabbath, at dawn on the first day of the week, Mary Magdalene and the other Mary went to look at the tomb.

² There was a violent earthquake, for an angel of the Lord came down from heaven and, going to the tomb, rolled back the stone and sat on it. ³ His appearance was like lightning, and his clothes were white as snow. ⁴ The guards were so afraid of him that they shook and became like dead men.

⁵ The angel said to the women, “Do not be afraid, for I know that you are looking for Jesus, who was crucified. ⁶ He is not here; he has risen, just as he said. Come and see the place where he lay. ⁷ Then go quickly and tell his disciples: ‘He has risen from the dead and is going ahead of you into Galilee. There you will see him.’ Now I have told you.”

⁸ So the women hurried away from the tomb, afraid yet filled with joy, and ran to tell his disciples. ⁹ Suddenly Jesus met them. “Greetings,” he said. They came to him, clasped his feet and worshiped him. ¹⁰ Then Jesus said to them, “Do not be afraid. Go and tell my brothers to go to Galilee; there they will see me.”

The Gospel of Matthew sees both the angel at the tomb and Jesus himself tell the women to spread the news. These Marys are, historically, the first to proclaim the resurrection.

The Gospel of Luke tells a similar variation of events. Here the women do not see Jesus, but rather see the angels. However, when they tell the news to the eleven remaining Apostles about what the saw, they are not believed.

Luke 24

¹ On the first day of the week, very early in the morning, the women took the spices they had prepared and went to the tomb. ² They found the stone rolled away from the tomb, ³ but when they entered, they did not find the body of the Lord Jesus. ⁴ While they were wondering about this, suddenly two men in clothes that gleamed like lightning stood beside them. ⁵ In their fright the women bowed down with their faces to the ground, but the men said to them, “Why do you look for the living among the dead? ⁶ He is not here; he has risen! Remember how he told you, while he was still with you in Galilee: ⁷ ‘The Son of Man must be delivered over to the hands of sinners, be crucified and on the third day be raised again.’ ” ⁸ Then they remembered his words.

⁹ When they came back from the tomb, they told all these things to the Eleven and to all the others. ¹⁰ It was Mary Magdalene, Joanna, Mary the mother of James, and the others with them who told this to the apostles. ¹¹ But they did not believe the women, because their words seemed to them like nonsense. ¹² Peter, however, got up and ran to the tomb. Bending over, he saw the strips of linen lying by themselves, and he went away, wondering to himself what had happened.

The Gospel of John has far more details on events leading up to the discovering of Jesus’ resurrection. The events start with Mary Magdalene discovering the tomb was empty, the disciples seeing this, and then Jesus appearing before Mary.

John 20

¹ Early on the first day of the week, while it was still dark, Mary Magdalene went to the tomb and saw that the stone had been removed from the entrance. ² So she came running to Simon Peter and the other disciple, the one Jesus loved, and said, “They have taken the Lord out of the tomb, and we don’t know where they have put him!”

³ So Peter and the other disciple started for the tomb. ⁴ Both were running, but the other disciple outran Peter and reached the tomb first. ⁵ He bent over and looked in at the strips of linen lying there but did not go in. ⁶ Then Simon Peter came along behind him and went straight into the tomb. He saw the strips of linen lying there, ⁷ as well as the cloth that had been wrapped around Jesus’ head. The cloth was still lying in its place, separate from the linen. ⁸ Finally the other disciple, who had reached the tomb first, also went inside. He saw and believed. ⁹ (They still did not understand from Scripture that Jesus had to rise from the dead.) ¹⁰ Then the disciples went back to where they were staying.

¹¹ Now Mary stood outside the tomb crying. As she wept, she bent over to look into the tomb ¹² and saw two angels in white, seated where Jesus’ body had been, one at the head and the other at the foot. ¹³ They asked her, “Woman, why are you crying?” “They have taken my Lord away,” she said, “and I don’t know where they have put him.” ¹⁴ At this, she turned around and saw Jesus standing there, but she did not realize that it was Jesus.

¹⁵ He asked her, “Woman, why are you crying? Who is it you are looking for?” Thinking he was the gardener, she said, “Sir, if you have carried him away, tell me where you have put him, and I will get him.” ¹⁶ Jesus said to her, “Mary.” She turned toward him and cried out in Aramaic, “Rabboni!” (which means “Teacher”). ¹⁷ Jesus said, “Do not hold on to me, for I have not yet ascended to the Father. Go instead to my brothers and tell them, ‘I am ascending to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God.’”

¹⁸ Mary Magdalene went to the disciples with the news: “I have seen the Lord!” And she told them that he had said these things to her. ¹⁹ On the evening of that first day of the week, when the disciples were together, with the doors locked for fear of the Jewish leaders, Jesus came and stood among them and said, “Peace be with you!” ²⁰ After he said this, he showed them his hands and side. The disciples were overjoyed when they saw the Lord.

Finally, we have the Gospel of Mark. This Gospel chapter we divide into two parts. The first part goes as follows

Mark 16

¹ When the Sabbath was over, Mary Magdalene, Mary the mother of James, and Salome bought spices so that they might go to anoint Jesus’ body. ² Very early on the first day of the week, just after sunrise, they were on their way to the tomb ³ and they asked each other, “Who will roll the stone away from the entrance of the tomb?”

⁴ But when they looked up, they saw that the stone, which was very large, had been rolled away. ⁵ As they entered the tomb, they saw a young man dressed in a white robe sitting on the right side, and they were alarmed.

⁶ “Don’t be alarmed,” he said. “You are looking for Jesus the Nazarene, who was crucified. He has risen! He is not here. See the place where they laid him. ⁷ But go, tell his disciples and Peter, ‘He is going ahead of you into Galilee. There you will see him, just as he told you.’”

⁸ Trembling and bewildered, the women went out and fled from the tomb. They said nothing to anyone, because they were afraid.

The next section of Mark is separated because it does not turn up in manuscripts until later on. Hence there is a degree of uncertainty if it was lost in original transcripts, or simply added later.

⁹ When Jesus rose early on the first day of the week, he appeared first to Mary Magdalene, out of whom he had driven seven demons. ¹⁰ She went and told those who had been with him and who were mourning and weeping. ¹¹ When they heard that Jesus was alive and that she had seen him, they did not believe it.

¹² Afterward Jesus appeared in a different form to two of them while they were walking in the country. ¹³ These returned and reported it to the rest; but they did not believe them either.

¹⁴ Later Jesus appeared to the Eleven as they were eating; he rebuked them for their lack of faith and their stubborn refusal to believe those who had seen him after he had risen.

Whether this second part of Mark is historical or not, it does not conflict with the other Gospel accounts. The combined Gospels all point to one commonality - that it was women who first discovered Jesus’ resurrection and proclaimed it to the male disciples.

Final Thoughts

So this Easter, be sure to give special thanks and blessings to the women in your life. Without them, the good news may have been lost.

And as a final note, for my secular readers. If you are wondering “Matt how do you know ANY of this is true.” My answer is really simple.

Can you imagine a bunch of guys in 50 AD making this story up and making women look so badass and dedicated and making men look like scared children?

Nope, I cannot. This must have happened, because otherwise the gender roles would have absolutely been reversed.

Just something to consider. Now one more time for anyone who made it this far…

“He is risen! He is risen indeed, Alleluia!”

The districts in question are…

• Senate 14: A Trump +7 district located in the Tampa region of Florida. Here Republican Jay Collins has vacated the seat to become Florida’s Lt Governor

• House 51: Covering northern Polk County, this seat voted for Trump by 13%. It is being vacated by Republican Josie Tomkow, who is running in the Senate 14 special election.

• House 87: This Trump +10 seat covers northern/coastal Palm Beach and includes the Mar-a-Lago resort that Donald Trump resides at! It is being vacated by Mike Caruso who has been appointed Palm Beach Clerk of Court.

While all three of these seats voted for Trump in 2024, none are as deeply red as many of the districts that held special elections in Florida last year. Senate District 14 was a Biden district in 2020 and House 87 was a virtual tie that same year.

In this article, I will look at each of the districts in question, mainly focusing on their partisan characteristics and offering some resources on campaign coverage. Before I begin my district-by-district look, I’ll go over a few key “macro” trends to keep in mind with all of these races.

Statewide Trends

Heading into these special elections, there are two broad trends pulling on both parties. One issue, registration, is bad news for Democrats. The other issue, special election swings, is bad news for Republicans. Here I want to discuss both before we dive into each district.

Statewide Registration Issues

One of the big issues for Democrats in Florida, and an issue in all of these districts, has been the registration trend we have seen in many parts of the state. I wrote about this in more detail right before the 2024 election, but registration has been trending badly for Florida Democrats for some time. Thanks to a combination of voter registration suppression laws and a lack of financial resources, Democratic groups and the party have not been able to register large batches of people.

As a result, the natural drop in voter rolls that happens (people fall off the roll for all sides every year) has hit Democrats and independents more. Republicans, with their stronger financial resources, can run voter registration programs that keep their numbers up with new sign-ups. Statewide, the total number of active voters as actually gone down.

There are large batches of voters in the “inactive” roll; which is where you go if you have not voted in some time. However, these inactive have very low turnout, often under 10%. So for the purpose of this analysis we are sticking with active.

I will be planning an article later in the spring on statewide registration issues, but I recommend the link above for more info on this topic in the meantime. I will talk about the registration trend in each district as I discuss them. The key issue is, every district holding a special election has a voter registration makeup that is notably more Republican than the 2020 Presidential election and the 2024 Presidential election. Each has large numbers of potential-but-unregistered voters.

Special Election Over-performances

Thanks to registration issues, the electorate casting ballots in these specials is likely to be more Republican-leaning than 2020, and maybe even 2024. However, the 2025 special elections in Florida did give Democrats reason for hope. I discussed EVERY special election that Florida had in 2025 in this article deep dive here.

A total of nine districts, two congressional and seven legislative, held specials in 2025. All these seats were either heavily Democratic or heavily Republican, but all districts saw major swings to the Democrats compared to the 2024 Presidential contest.

In every district, Democrats had a stronger turnout compared to Republicans; while Republican turnout had been stronger in the Presidential contest.

In addition, Democratic candidates outperformed the party makeup of the vote cast. This table below shows the party ID of ballots cast in each special and how the candidates performed. The “Party Loyalty” score at the end is how much the Democratic candidate margin compared with the Democratic margin for votes cast.

These strong over-performances mean the Democratic candidates easily won NPA voters and likely siphoned off batches of Republicans as well. Compare the “Party Loyalty” metric for the same districts in the 2024 Presidential election, and you see much closer scores. It highlights how much strong the special elections were in out-performing party metrics.

The over-performances seen in 2025 are what Democratic candidates in these races would need to pull off victory. All three specials will see more Republican than Democratic ballots cast.

Partisanship of Vote Method

One final point I want to touch on is for any of you tracking absentee and early voting reports leading up to Tuesday. Historically, as in the last 6 to 8 years, Democrats have dominated with absentee voting and Republicans dominated with in-person voting. This was exacerbated by the COVID pandemic and continued after lockdowns came to an end. However, Florida law changes have shifted this dynamic. A few years back, Florida’s legislature passed a law that caused the absentee ballot list to RESET after every election. As a result, anyone on the absentee ballot list now is someone who had to sign up post-2024.

The result is that the current absentee roll is far less Democratic-heavy than in previous years, making comparisons with past elections much harder. Below is the absentee ballot requests and returns for the three legislative races up Tuesday.

We see great variety in the requests depending on the district. Senate 14 has a narrow Republican lead in requests and a narrower lead in returns (thanks to a slight Democratic edge in return rate). House 87, based on Palm Beach where older Democrats historically vote by mail, has a more sizeable Democratic lean. Finally, House 51, where little Democratic campaign infrastructure exists, is much more Republican in requests and return rates.

As a result of this absentee ballot dynamic, predicting election day can be much trickier. Republicans are still voting more in in-person early voting; but both sides have large batches of voters who could show up on election day. The day-of voting could vary by district. I expect HD87 will see a more Republican election day, but Senate 14 is trickier to predict. In Miami last December, election day was Democratic-leaning. Meanwhile a special election for HD90 that same day was Republican-friendly.

Since Republicans have the registration advantage in all three districts, I fully expect the final vote cast to be more Republican-friendly. As I discussed in the party loyalty section, the issue then will be how NPAs break.

With that out of the way, lets dive into each district up.

Senate District 14

State Senate District 14 sits in western Hillsborough County, covering part of the City of Tampa. The district is majority-White, but has a sizable Hispanic community located in its Egypt Lake-Leto and Town n’ Country neighborhoods. In terms of voter registration, 21% of the district is Hispanic and 62% is white.

The district’s Hispanic community is historically Cuban, dating back to the Cigar Industry in the Tampa area from over a century past. Cubans make up around 38% of the Hispanic population, with Puerto Ricans making up an estimated 22%. This is the largest concentration of Cuban voters north in Central Florida.

Historically this district leaned Democratic. Increasing Democratic strength in the suburbs and upper-income “South Tampa” region allowed both Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden to win the district. Biden won the district by 4% in the 2020 election; losing ground with the Hispanic community, namely losing the Egypt Lake-Leto area, but holding strong in the white suburbs.

Two years before this, Janet Cruz won the district for Democrats in the 2018 midterm; defeating Republican Incumbent Dana Young. However, as Democrats were plagued with bad turnout in the 2022 midterm elections, Cruz lost her re-election to Republican Jay Collins as DeSantis won the district by over 10 points in the Governor’s contest.

While the loss of the district in 2022 could be heavily attributed to turnout issues, that was not the case in 2024. That year, despite decent turnout for both sides, Donald Trump easily won the district by 7%. This came thanks to a big win in the Hispanic community and narrowly reversing some of the upper-income suburban Democratic shifts.

You can see the political trend in the district below. The seat has never been a landslide-type seat; with 2022 being the lone double-digit margin.

Trump’s win in Senate 14 came amid a bad round of elections of Hillsborough Democrats across the board. Their efforts to win back the State Attorney post came up empty, as well as efforts to win several countywide posts. Shortly after the 2024 election, Democratic State House member Susan Valdes, who represented the majority-Hispanic HD64 that lied in the heart of the district, switched parties. This came as her district went from being Biden +16 to Trump +3.

We have seen major swings back to Democrats among Hispanic voters in the last year. We saw this in Miami back in December; which I covered here. So the 2024 election is not a permanent status quo.

The biggest issue for Democrats in flipping back this district has been the registration trend in the district. As the table below shows, the Republican total has largely remained the same, but the Democratic numbers and no-party numbers have dropped. The total active roll has dropped by 40,000 people and the registration gap is up to 7%.

When Biden won the vote in SD14 back in 2020, the Democrats had a 3.5% voter registration lead. However, by the time we got to 2024, the Republicans had a lead of 4.3%. The shifts in registration have a strong correlation with the support candidates get in the elections; which you can see in the table below. It shows the Dem vs GOP margin in vote cast and how the President/Governor candidates got in the district. The gap between the two “party loyalty” never got past 6%.

We did see in 2022 and 2024 that the Democratic candidates (Crist for Governor and Harris for President) under-performed the vote cast margin. This was partly due to Hispanic Democrats defecting; especially in 2024. The 2022 midterm gap was also driven by more conservative-leaning independents showing up compared with liberal-leaning ones. To flip the seat, Democrats will need a strong “party loyalty” showing, as the final vote will almost surely lean Republican.

The democratic candidate here is Brian Nathan, who serves as Vice President of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers local 915. He is facing Republican State Representative Josie Tomkow. A profile of the race can be seen here. A big issue in the campaign has been that Tomkow has been the representative for a Polk County state house seat, which is not in the district - or even in the same county. Nathan has made this a major issue.

However, Tomkow benefits from far more financial backing. Between her official campaign and a political committee, she has raised AT LEAST $600,000. Nathan, meanwhile, has pulled in $100,000.

As of Friday night, here is the turnout report. Republicans have held a solid lead in early voting, while absentees are a near-tie. Democrats have stronger turnout as a %, but Republicans already have the vote-cast lead, something I don’t expect to change.

Democrats will want to come in at least with a final vote cast that is no higher than 2024’s 6.6% lead; hoping that a NPA swing to the left (and Hispanic democrats coming home) can propel an upset win.

Regardless of the outcome here, the district will be up again in November. If you asked me for a ratings, I’d say Lean Republican. Democrats would need a decent election day, not a guarantee, to have a chance. The financial disparity here is massive. A democratic win would be the result of a monumental Hispanic shift. Not out of the realm of possibility, but this is still a GOP-favored seat at the moment.

House District 87

Next up for discussion is the special election being held down in Palm Beach County. Of all three seats up, this is the district that Democrats have expressed the most optimism about potentially flipping. The coastal district goes from the Jupiter region in the north and stretches down into Lake Worth. Its shape is dictated by a neighboring Black-access seat that includes much of West Palm Beach. By looping around the more racially diverse parts of the county, the district is 72% white. The seat backed Trump by 10 points in 2024. It is also notably home to Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort.

The district being home to Trump’s Florida residency makes it a tantalizing target for Democrats. The headline of “Democrats flip Trump’s own state house district” would definitely capture national attention.

In the 2020 election, the district was neck-and-neck, with Trump only winning the seat by 400 or so ballots.

Historically the district has been competitive, narrowly voting for both parties in major races. However, in recent years it has trended much more to the right. The 2022 Governor election aside, a product of turnout, the Trump +10 win in 2020 was far greater than previous narrow margins.

Like the story with Senate 14, the big culprit for shifting partisanship is the shift in voter registration. Republicans have always had a registration lead in this district. However, in recent years, the drop in Democratic registration has taken a narrow GOP lead into what is now a 13% lead in registered voters.

Even more so than in the case of Senate 14, the party makeup of vote cast has very closely mirrored how the district votes. With the lone exception of 2022, Democrats historically outperform the party metrics in this seat.

Both party candidates in this race have raised significant money. Democrat Emily Gregory, a business owner, has over $400,000 via her official campaign and a political committee. She has endorsements from many prominent Democrats and the state party has invested in the race; spending money and sending down staff to help with outreach efforts. Republican Jon Maples has raised over $400,000 and likewise has seen his party use resources for his campaign; with at least another $400,000 coming in from the state Republican party.

Maples, similar to Joe Tomkow, has seen issues of his residency come up in the contest. He was registered to vote at an apartment, but he insists his family has recently bought a house in the district. Republicans clearly feel the district is at risk, as a slew of direct mail from the state party has poured into the race. This race is really seeing both parties invest.

In contrast with Senate 14, the absentee ballot voting here leans Democratic. As mentioned earlier, this is driven by a larger Democratic retiree population, and they have re-signed up for vote by mail at a greater rate. This has, however, made in-person early much redder.

Right now the Democrats have a vote cast lead, but do NOT expect that to hold. Election Day will be red and Republicans will claim the lead. Remember the registration here is GOP +13. The issue for Democrats will be if the have a final vote that is less red than 2024 and how NPAs break.

I view this race as a tossup. Both parties are clearly taking it serious and the Democratic candidate is proving to be a real force.

House District 51

Of the three special elections being held on Tuesday, the race for Polk County’s House District 51 has been the most low profile. This district, which covers the north end of the county and includes several towns like Polk City and Davenport, is an increasingly diverse district that is 53% white and 29% Hispanic.

Unlike the Hispanic population over in Senate 14, the population here is heavily Puerto Rican. Estimates put Puerto Ricans at 45% of the Hispanic population, with Mexicans at 22%. However, since Puerto Ricans have a higher citizenship rate, they are likely over 50% of the Hispanic voter base.

The district has always leaned Republican, but often by modest margins. In the 2020 election, Donald Trump won the district by 6%; largely winning the whiter areas while Joe Biden won the Hispanic communities.

The 2024 election, however, saw a sizeable swing to the right; with Trump taking the district by 13.6%. Trump further consolidated rural white voters and won over many of the Puerto Rican community; who found affordability their main issue in the election. I covered the swing of Puerto Rican voters in my piece on neighboring Osceola County. You can read that post here.

Polk County does not have a strong bench for Democrats. The last Democratic official, Elections Supervisor Lori Edwards, lost re-election as an independent in 2024. As a result, this race has been a quite affair that most expect Republicans to win.

The two candidates for this race are Republican Hilary Holley and Democrat Edwin Perez. Holley, who once worked for Agriculture Commissioner Adam Putnam and currently works at the Florida FFA Foundation, was the Republican establishment pick for the seat. Perez, meanwhile, jumped in the race at the last minute to ensure the party had a candidate for the special, notably driving to Tallahassee the morning of qualifying to ensure he made the ballot. A former Haines City Commission candidate, Perez is a big underdog.

This sleeper race has generated much less money. Holley has raised $120,000 while Perez has raised just $15,000. With a quieter campaign, turnout is lower here, but the vote cast is decidedly Republican. It is the only race, as of right now, where Republicans have a higher % of their voters turning out.

Right now the vote in House 51 is solidly more Republican than the registration. This reflects the lack of Democratic resources to get the vote out. This is not Perez’s fault, as he is doing what he can. It reflects the lack of any real Democratic infrastructure in Polk County. With Senate 14 and House 87 dominating attention, this race has fallen to the wayside.

Barring a crazy swing in party loyalty, and a better-than-expected election day, this race will stay with the GOP. I’d say Likely Republican. Its not “safe” because of the inherent unpredictability of special election turnout. The GOP has a very clear advantage, however.

Final Notes

We will see how these races shake out on Tuesday. If Democrats fail to flip any race, or come flip HD87 but come painfully close in SD14, then alot of attention needs to turn to the voter registration dynamics. To me, the registration shifts in each district is a sign of a growing problem. Districts once much closer in 2020 are no longer easy to win because the electoral pool is redder than ever before.

Win or lose, Democrats need to get the registration shifts under control. This is something I will be writing about more in the spring and summer.

In the meantime, if you need some reading before Tuesday, check out my Florida History series on Reconstruction in Florida toward the rise of Jim Crow. I am currently still working on the next chapter of this detailed look at the rise of Black voting rights after the Civil War and the eventual crushing start of the Jim Crow era.

Perhaps worth reading as our modern democracy cracks under this autocratic President.

This issue picks up after the events of Part 3 in my series, which looked at the 1872 elections. These elections, held with federal troops protecting Black access to the polls, saw Republicans hold on to control of Florida’s Government.

The election saw Ossian Hart elected Florida Governor. Hart had secured the Republican nomination with Black support and proved to be a reliably ally for Black voters in his time as Governor. Unfortunately, Hart passed away in early 1874 after a long illness; elevating Marcellus Stearns to the Governorship. Stearns was not an ally to Black voters, and his elevation to the Governorship put the state’s Black population is a tough bind. With white Democrats eager to take back power and strip away Black political power, Florida’s Republican Party would struggle to hold itself together heading toward 1876.

This article will look at state and national dynamics heading toward 1876, the all-important elections that would tragically mark the end of Reconstruction.

Governor Marcellus Stearns

Originally born in Maine, Marcellus Stearns came to Florida like so many early Republican leaders, as a military man. While serving in the Union army as a soldier, Stearns was shot in his right arm and was forced to have the lower half amputated. This put an end to his battle career. However, while his fighting days were over, he remained with the military and eventually became part of the Freedman’s Bureau, which sent him to Gadsden County.

Early Clashes with the Freedmen

Stearns’ placement in Gadsden County made his elevation into politics almost inevitable. At the time, the county was 62% Black and one of the most populated in the state. As I wrote about in Issue 1, the Freedman’s Bureau agents were tasked by the reconstruction acts with registered the newly freed Black men to vote. Stearns hence was in charge of registering voters in a critical county for future elections. Like many of these agents, Stearns was brought into politics by these circumstances.

In the fall of 1867, as the planned November elections for Constitutional Convention delegates were approaching, Stearns was nominated to be a Republican candidate for delegate in Gadsden County. Stearns was part of the moderate slate of delegates that state executive committee had chosen - a slate aligned with future Senator Thomas Osborn. However, the Radical Republicans, unhappy with many of the moderate or conservative people floated, opted to run their own delegate slates in a few key districts; Gadsden being one of them.

Three delegate spots were up for grabs in Gadsden. Daniel Richards, who along with Liberty Billings ran the radical organization, moved from his base around Jacksonville to run in this seat. He was joined by William Saunders, another major radical leader, and Frederick Hill, who would go on to serve in the state house from Gadsden. Both Richards and Saunders were not longtime county residents, only Hill was local. They faced off against Stearns’ slate, which included local white Republican J.EA. Davidson and a Black man only reported in the paper as “Jones.”

The radical slate in Gadsden was shown to have wide support with the freedman. Thanks to conservative white boycotts, the choice of the Black population was a guarantee to prevail in Gadsden. This caused great anger to Stearns, who complained that Richards and the radicals had “lured” the Black population away from him. As Stearns and the radicals clashed on the campaign, Saunders sent a petition, signed by many freedmen, to have Stearns removed as Freedman Bureau agent. This did not come to pass. However, what did come to pass was the radical slate absolutely sweeping Gadsden’s delegate slots.

This loss did not keep Stearns out the convention, however. Due to Richards and Saunders not being longtime county residents, they were booted from the convention when the moderates took control of the proceedings (see Part 1). Stearns and Davidson, as the next highest vote getters, were installed instead.

These events no doubt soured Stearns, already a more conservative carpetbagger, toward the opinions of the Black population. Stearns was part of the class of military men who favored mending fences with the native white population after the civil war; even if that was at the expensive of equality for the Black population. This view, followed by his clashes with radical Republicans, left him firmly on the conservative end of the Republican spectrum.

After the moderate faction won control of the state party, Stearns would win election to the state house in 1868 and become the Speaker of the Chamber. When he and Ossian Hart clashed in the 1872 convention for the Republican nomination for Governor, it was Black delegates that pushed Hart over the finish line (see Part 3). Stearns had been named Lt Governor as a show of unity; arguably in a move similar to the selection of Andrew Johnson as Lincoln’s Vice-President.

Now he was Governor.

Early Clashes with Black Leaders

There was little time that Stearns was in office were he was not clashing with other Republican lawmakers. Stearns and newly-selected US Senator Simon Conover did not have a pleasant relationship. Stearns took special umbrage at Conover pushing the promotion of Black men to federal jobs in Florida; claiming it would antagonize the white population. These attacks on Conover saw Black lawmakers jump to Conover’s defense and lash out at Stearns. Leon County Senator John Wallace would remain a firm anti-Stearns voice for years.

Stearns also tried to pressure Jonathan Gibbs to resign as Superintendent of Public Instruction; a job he had been appointed to by Governor Hart. Gibbs was the most prominent Black official in Florida and the state’s only Black cabinet official, previously serving as Secretary of State under Governor Harrison Reed. This effort failed, with Gibbs refusing to step down. Gibbs was under constant threats to his life by white regulators and would tragically pass away in 1874. His death remains a major source of debate, as he got ill and suddenly passed the same night he had given a rousing speech as a Republican club event. Suspicion of poisoning has long lingered, but no real proof has emerged. What is notable is that at the time, suspicion for poisoning Gibbs did not just linger on Klan activity, but also on Republican rivals like Stearns as well. Again no proof exists, but that bipartisan suspicion shows how distrusted Stearns was with Black citizens.

Quickly into his Governorship, Stearns was firmly establishing himself as an antagonist for Florida’s Black community. Like Harrison Reed before him, he believed he could united conservative Republican with moderate Democrats to form a new political order.

He was wrong.

The 1874 Midterms

When Stearns assumed the Governorship, it came just 7 months before the State legislative and Congressional elections were to take place.

The elections, similar to 1872, were free of the rampant violence that had dominated the 1870 contests. However, intimidation continued to be an issue, whether from violence or from economic harm. As the white planter class continued to rebuild the plantations and businesses, and as Black voters still found themselves working for white bosses, economic threats were common. In an era of no private ballot, every election saw efforts by white leaders to warn they would prioritize Democratic employees over Republican ones.

Congressional Fights

In 1872, Florida had elected both its members of Congress statewide; but the 1874 contests would see the state divided into two districts; one covering west Florida and the other covering east Florida. White Republican William Purman would run in the west-based 1st and Black Republican Josiah Walls would run in the east-based 2nd. Governor Stearns, however, had issues with both men.

Despite the fact party unity was of upmost importance heading into the 1874 contests, Stearns made real heavy-handed efforts to oust both Walls and Purman from their positions. The effort to oust Walls in his Republican nominating convention failed, but it only led to several conservative Republicans in east Florida aligning with the Democratic candidate. Meanwhile, the effort to oust Purman in the 1st district likewise failed, but became so vitriolic that it led to an second Republican, State Senator Robert Meacham, running as a third candidate. The risk of splitting the Republican vote was so severe in the 1st district that eventually national party forces stepped in to get Meacham, who had Stearns’ backing, to drop out.

Despite the Stearns-driven drama, both Congressional races went well for the Republicans. In the 1st District, William Purman won re-election with a comfortable 6%. This win was driven entirely by massive margins in the four majority-Black counties in the district.

Purman’s victory shows just how important the Black vote was for Florida Republicans. The margins in Leon or Jefferson alone, if not counted, would have flipped the race to Henderson.

In the 2nd district, the race between Josiah Walls and Jesse Finley was much closer. Walls racked up strong margins in majority-Black counties like Marion, Alachua, Madison, and Duval. The initial count gave him a 400 vote lead.

This contest, however, would be challenged in Congress. Disputes arose about the vote in Alachua. In the meantime, however, Walls was certified as the winner and began his new term.

Walls would see his Congressional term cut short by the election investigation however. In April of 1876, the Democratic-controlled US House election committee threw out the votes from Precinct 3 in Alachua County, a heavily Republican precinct. The reasoning, as cited here (just search Alachua) was that proper procedures had not been followed at the site, and that up to 50 people may have illegally voted. However, in throwing out the entire precinct, they removed 700 net GOP ballots and hence awarded the election to Finley. There was no claim the entire precinct was fraudulent, but the committee argue the results were “tainted.”

Removing the entire vote of the precinct was an excessive move driven by the partisanship of the committee. It does, however, serve as a reminder about election issues as this time, similar to what I discussed in the last issue. Irregular procedures and questions about WHAT to count or not count based on said issues, were common, and often driven by the whims of those making the decisions at the time.

This decision cost Walls his seat. Similar debates about “tainted” returns would play out even more so in 1876.

The Loss of the State Legislature

While the Congressional elections were the main focus of Florida politics in 1874, the battle for the state legislature was far more impactful. The election results saw the State Senate come in at a tie, 12 Democrats and 12 Republicans. Democrats, meanwhile, secured a majority in the House of 28 to 24 (give or take, there were a few independents).

This outcome came despite the Republican Congressional candidates winning a majority of the statewide vote. However, the state’s apportionment makeup, which gave every county, no matter the size, at least one representative, resulted in a map that aided amplified white Democratic voting strength. In 1874, the Democratic candidates for Congress won a majority of legislative districts despite losing the popular vote.

I will write a special issue on Florida’s legislative apportionment issue in the future. For this article, I want to focus on the tie in the State Senate, which had several contested results that would matter heading into 1876.

This was the State Senate after the 1874 midterms. As you can see, the GOP seats made up 66% of the state’s population; a byproduct of a lack of population equality across districts. Most of the Democrat-held seats were way under-populated; with geography being a larger factor in maps than population balance.

Heading into 1874, Republicans had a narrow advantage in the chamber. The Democrats tied the Senate with their flipping of the 24th. That seat, which included Key West, had a large Cuban population that once leaned more Republican but had trended to Democrats over issues with the Grant administration’s handling of the ongoing revolution on the Cuban island.

Debated Results

Republicans also only had a tie in the Senate due to decisions made in after the 1872 contests. That election would have seen a tie, and hence given Democrats a majority in 1874, if the counting in Senate 21 had been followed properly.

District 21, covering Dade and Brevard counties, was decided based on just the Dade returns. Because Brevard was late reporting its vote totals till after the state canvass deadline, the 30 votes in Dade were used to decide SD21. This allowed Republican E. T. Sturtevant to win SD21 with a 14-13 raw vote margin. While I don’t have the Brevard totals, the reports from the time said that the Democratic candidate, Israel Stewart, secured at least 30 ballots more than Sturtevant. Had Brevard been counted, Stewart would have had the right to the seat.

That whole drama is not only an example of the flaw in such low-populated districts, but how subjective and corrupt counting could be. Even with Brevard, this low total of votes is less than useless for determining popular will for such seats. Random lot drawings would have been just as respectable. Oh and the other issue was Sturtevant was a poll manager for Dade’s lone voting precinct. In the count, Sturtevant had thrown out three Democratic ballots for questionable reasons. Hence its also entirely likely the Democrats won Dade County in 1872, but we will never know for sure if those three tossed ballots were legit or not.

This furthers my discussion from Part 3 about the issues with reliable vote counts from this era.

Violence to determine Control

The issues around Senate 21 would linger in the legislative investigative committee for years. However, in a different contested election, events took on a much more sinister turn.

In Senate District 14, based in Columbia County, Republican Elisha Johnson had been declared the winner of the 1874 contest. Columbia, the site of so much violence in the 1870s, was the site of intimidation as well as ballot stuffing. Democrats claimed Republican ballots had been added as key precincts, while Republicans charged the opposition with documented incidents of intimidation of Black voters. Johnson himself had been the target of assassination by the Klan multiple times.

The dispute over the Columbia County election came to a violent end in July of 1875. As Senator Johnson was walking to his home in Lake City, he was killed by a shotgun blast. Republicans insisted the motive was political while Democrats claimed the GOP was exploiting random tragedy. However, I would like to present this statement on the shooting, given by Democrat and hardened Confederate Henry A. L’Engle on the shooting, which also broke the tie in the Senate in favor of the Democrats

“In his death is our gain, . . . That gives us a clear majority without putting out Sturtevant. . . . In losing Johnson we gain a county. . . . If I was on a jury of inquest I should say shot by persons unknown and served him right. . . .”

L’Engle was one of the firm non-reconstructed Democrats. While too polarizing to win elections statewide he would serve in future Florida Democratic administrations. His sentiment showed how cold and callous politics was. Whether he or any Democratic official was involved in the shooting is unknown, but folks like L’Engle were more than happy to accept murder as a means to political ends.

Meanwhile, as violence and imitation continued to be an issue in the South, voters in the North were quickly developing fatigue about the whole issue of Reconstruction.

National Reconstruction Struggles

As Florida’s Republican party tried to hold its control of the state through the mid 1870s, events were happening nationwide that would bode ill for southern Black voters. Increasing violence in several prominent southern states, moral exhaustion from Northern voters, and an economic panic all began to contribute to a lack of support for Reconstruction politics.

The Moral Fatigue of the North

The 1872 elections, which saw President Ulysses S Grant easily secure re-election while committing to protect the Black population of the south, was the high point of popular support for Reconstruction. Quickly into Grant’s 2nd term, events conspired to weaken his admissions. It must be stressed that Grant was a true believer in securing the vote and security of the Black population. As long as he had the political and legal power to do so, he wanted to secure Black rights. This power, quickly got sucked away in his 2nd term.

Two issues really hampered Grant’s popularity through his 2nd term. The first was the Panic of 1873. This event was brought on the bursting of the railroad bubble and hit North America and a good portion of Western Europe. It was considered the biggest depression in American history until the Great Depression came in 1929. As we all know, economic issues are blamed on the party in power, and hence the Grant administration took the brunt of the blame.

As Northern voters reeled from the Great Panic, their concern for the plight of Black people in the south began to increasingly decline. This came as questionable journalists took pleasure in reporting stories from the southern states that portrayed Republican rule as incredible corrupt and Black voters are dumb lemmings who voted as they were told by white carpetbaggers. While corruption was an issue across every state in the union, it was framed as inherently worse in the reconstruction states. This sentiment was best encapsulated in a book by James Shepherd Pike called “The Prostrate State: South Carolina under Negro Government.”

The book, based on interviews Pike held while in South Carolina, framed the Reconstruction Government in the worst light and framed Black politicians as uneducated and corrupt. This book was taken at face value at the time, but has been subjected to much rebuke in recent decades. The book was made by relying almost entirely on interviews with native whites, most of them former confederates. This was not true journalism, but it was taken at face value. Such books and stories allowed once reliably abolitionists and radical Republicans to turn the heads away from the South, caring less for the plight of the Black population.

Cartoonists, even those that attacked the Klan and white violence, would also portray Black lawmakers in terrible light. Portraying politicians as borderline animals.

In the 1874 midterms, Democrats swept away 92 Republican seats and won control of the US House of Representatives. This ensured one chamber of Congress would be less receptive to any future investment in Reconstruction.

Grant’s administration was then further weakened by issues of corruption in his own administration. While no historic data has ever shown Grant was personally corrupt, he made mistake of putting many of his military friends in charge of several offices, and these men were corrupt. Corruption scandals in DC melded with the claims of corruption in reconstruction governments, and further moved northern voters away from concerns with politics in the South.

The Rise of Violence

While the Grant administration got increasingly weakened by scandals and economic conditions, white southerners did not let up on their plans to take back control of state governments. While the 1871-1872 period had seen the Ku Klux Klan beaten back, this only stemmed the tied of violence for a few years - varying by state.

Louisiana saw a new organization form in 1873/1874 - dubbed The White League. This organization formed by the men who’d perpetrated the Colfax Massacre, which saw between 65 and 155 Black men murdered after a dispute over elections in Grant Parish. The league, which came to be made up of several thousands paramilitary members, even overthrew the elected Governor of the state, William Pitt Kellogg. This event, which saw the league defeat state militia guards, is known as the Battle of Liberty Place.

It took Grant calling in federal troops to re-install the Government of the state. The League, however, was hardly crushed, and it continued to use violence to sway elections in Louisiana.

As violence increased in states like Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, national Republicans grew more exhausted with the issue. In early 1875, before the Democratic majority took its seats, Congressional Republicans debated legislation on Civil Rights and voting rights. In response to violence that had swayed the 1874 Alabama Governor election to Democrats, many radical Republicans and Black congressmen asked for federal voter protections to be continued and expanded. However, this did not have the support of many in the Republican caucus. Republican Speaker of the House, James G Blaine, rejected such a move, saying it would hurt Republicans in future elections.

Meanwhile, Mississippi was scheduled to have its state elections in November of 1875. Black Congressman John Lynch, a former slave, warned that without federal help, white reactionaries nonviolently suppress the vote. Indeed that was the plan, literally. The Mississippi Plan was an actual strategy by the white leaders of Mississippi to gain “home rule for their state.” Included in such a plan was violence and intimidation of Black voters. The goal was to win control of the state legislature and force Republican Governor Adelbert Ames out of office early. In their words, they would win these elections “peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must”.

Congressman Lynch begged the Grant administration for aid in securing peaceful voting in Mississippi. However, national Republicans convinced the President NOT to send aid. As many Republican politicians saw it, Mississippi was lost either way, and that northern voters were tired of money and manpower being spent in “controlling” Southern politics. Republicans were specifically worried about winning the Governor’s race in Ohio, being held the same time as Mississippi. There, the Republican nominee was Rutherford B Hayes, who was trying to distance himself from Reconstruction issues. Grant would later admit to Lynch that he caved to these Republican worries about the Ohio race, and hence did not send aid to Mississippi.

The Mississippi elections saw a Democratic sweep of offices amid violence and intimidation. Governor Adelbert Ames was faced with impeachment by the now-Democratic legislature. Eventually Ames agreed to resign and leave the state for his own safety. Congressman Lynch narrowly held on in his district. However, the new Democratic legislature then gerrymandered the district lines to eventually force Lynch out as well.

In 1876, the rights of Black southerners was dealt another blow. The Supreme Court case of United States v. Cruikshank severely weakened the Enforcement and Klan acts. The decisions reversed several convictions achieved against white perpetrators of the Colfax Massacre, arguing that such cases only could be tried in state courts. The opinion further ruled that violations of the 14th Amendment could only be applied to state actions, not individuals. In other words, the federal government could not bring charges against private citizens for violating the 14th Amendment; such charges could only be brought against state governments. This led back to the pre-1871 dynamic of local white juries being able to acquit whites who committed violence against Black citizens.

Looking to 1876

Heading into the 1876 Presidential election, only three southern states remained in Republican hands: Florida, South Carolina, and Louisiana. With northern Republicans growing more and more exhausted with aiding southern governments, Democrats in all three of these states saw 1876 as a prime opportunity to finish off these Reconstruction governments.

Internal state tensions and national dynamics would all come to a head in Florida in 1876. The year that Republican rule came to an end.

That will be the topic of the next part in this series…..

This issue picks up where Part 2 left off; the violent midterm elections of 1870 and the explosion of Klan violence in the state.

Like all of the former confederate states, the newly freed Black population in Florida was subjected to violence and threats from the Ku Klux Klan and assorted “regulator” organizations. These groups sought to kill or scare off white and Black Republican leaders, as well as ensure that Black communities could not effectively organize. The effect of this terror campaign was a massive drop in Black turnout between 1868 and 1870, allowing white Democrats to win several offices.

That violence was watched closely by Washington DC and the Grant administration. As a result, 1871 would see a major shift in federal policy around protecting the newly freed Black population; with federal troops being sent into the southern states to safeguard elections and human life. This would have major impacts on the elections of 1872.

Lets dive in.

Fighting the Ku Klux Klan

The violence that gripped the 1870 Florida election continued into 1871. More murders of prominent Republican officials took place across Florida. Justice continued to be selectively enforced, with violent attackers rarely caught or convicted of their crimes. This perfectly encapsulated in Lake City (Columbia County) - where Republican State Representative John Mahoney was shot and killed; with the killer then acquitted by a local jury. White raids and night-riding continued in many places; especially in Jackson County. That spring, Jackson’s last white Republican official, former union solider and then Clerk of the County Court, John Q. Dickinson, was gunned down as he returned to his home one night.

All of this sparked further action from Washington DC. At the start of 1871, the Second Enforcement Act was passed; which permitted federal oversight into state and local elections if complaints warranted from locals. Then in the summer of 1871, Congress placed the Third Enforcement Act, best known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. The act in question passed on a strict party-line vote; with all Republicans supporting and all Democrats rejecting the measure. Florida’s lone Congressman, Black Republican Josiah T Walls, voted for the measure.

This act had several major provisions designed to crush Klan violence.

• Made many Klan activities, from violence to intimidation, federal offenses.

  • Moving such cases out of the southern juries that refused to convict the guilty.

• Allowed the deployment of the army to combat Klan activities when the President declared

  • Several counties in South Carolina, for example, would be declared in a state of insurrection

• Allowed the suspension of habeas corpus, hence allowing suspects of Klan activities to be held indefinitely

• Made knowing of Klan conspiracies and not reporting them a crime

The acts greatly expanded the power of the Grant administration to combat the lawlessness that had spread across the south. Grant’s Department of Justice, led by Attorney General Amos T. Akerman, was aggressive and committed to stamping out the Ku Klux. Akerman gave the directive to his team of district attorneys

“If you cannot convict, you, at least, can expose, and ultimately such exposures will make the community ashamed of shielding the crime.”

Over the next several years, the Justice Department would bring over 3,000 indictments and secure over 1,000 convictions related to its war on the Klan.

Meanwhile, in Florida, a Congressional investigation committee was established that November to discuss Klan attacks and activities. The hearings revealed what many already knew, that Florida was in a state of violence and lawless thanks to the regulators and Klan.

Federal Justices Comes to Florida

With federal legislation and the examples from the 1870 elections, federal enforcement came to Florida. Those found to have committed violence in the midterm elections saw themselves brought before federal juries. The most high profile was Abraham Allison, the former acting Governor of Florida that had led armed men in keeping Black people from the polls in Gadsden the year before. The federal jury convicted Allison and he was forced to serve 6 months in jail.

The federal agents pushed indictments and brought people in for questioning even if cases could ultimately not go forward. At this time, being summed to court to answer on possible charges was a long affair involving travel and being away from your shop or farm. Even a lack of charges still left the accused with lost time and income. The point was clear, be involved with the Klan and you will pay for it, even if you don’t end up in a jail cell. Likewise at least three Democratic State Senators were hauled in for questioning and faced charges for their activities in the 1870 elections. Those found to be involved with violence were not seated in the legislature.

Lawless and killings remained an issue in many counties through the summer of 1871. White Republicans and Black citizens continued to be subjected to beatings or murder. However, by the end of 1871, the Klan violence began to get under control in Florida. A combination of indictments, the worry of federal intervention, and the sad reality that several prominent Republican and Black leaders were now already dead, likely contributed.

Troops Monitor Special Elections

The true test of the newly expanded federal powers under the Enforcement Acts came in December of 1871. In Jackson County, special elections for the state legislature needed to be held. The county had seen massive Klan violence against Black voters in 1870 that saw Republican margins collapse as a result.

A detachment of 20 infantry men set up camp in Marianna for the election. In addition, James Cooker, one of the leaders of the white regulator militias, was arrested and transferred out of the county for the duration of the election. While conviction was not likely due to lack of hard evidence, the point was to kneecap the leadership of the Jackson regulators before the vote. With this federal presence, no violence or intimidation was reported in the subsequent election.

As a result, both Republican candidates for the two vacant seats easily won their elections. The margins were reported to be 500 for both candidates; closer in line with the 1868 margins. In 1870, amid all the violence in Jackson County, the vote had been a near-tie. Considering Jackson was majority-Black, the special election results better reflected the popular will than the 1870 contests had.

The effect of the troops showed that orderly elections could be held.

The 1872 Elections

While federal force was being used to ensure the 1872 contests went smoother than 1870, this did not mean Republicans in Florida were guaranteed victory. The party was still very much divided; torn between factions and personal clashes.

Republicans Fracture

Republicans had a great deal to be divided about heading into the 1872 contests. Governor Harris Reed continued to fall out his own party as his four year term came to an end. Similar to the story that played out in 1868, Reed was again impeached by the Florida House in 1871 for claims of corruption. The State Senate, however, would eventually acquit him. This biggest reason Reed likely was not fully removed was because Republicans anticipated that Republican Charles Day would soon be replaced as Lt Governor with Democratic William Bloxham; as the court case of the 1870 disputed contest continued. Had Reed been removed and Bloxham eventually installed, it would have given Democrats the Governorship.

The longtime feud between Governor Reed and Senator Thomas Osborne continued to drive a great deal of Republican politics. The disfunction left many of the business-oriented conservative Republicans floating the idea of forming a coalition with the Democrats for the 1872 election. This sentiment was especially high in eastern Florida, were carpetbagger Republicans sought investment and tourism for Florida, but found Reed’s administration to be woefully incompetent.

In the legislature, Republican lines fractured even more and alliances changed as expediency dictated. No better example was seen with Liberty Billings, the once radical Republican Black carpetbagger who was denied the Governor nomination in 1868. Billings had eventually been elected to the Senate, and in this time he wound up aligning with Democrats and Conservative Republicans to rescue Reed’s fortunes as the impeachment debate had waged. Part of this alliances was Billings help in defeating a new Civil Rights bill. In the wake of this, Black House member Daniel McInnis of Jacksonville pushed a resolution directed at turncoats like Billings

“We, the colored members, and those who honestly sympathize with us, do unhesitatingly repudiate such friendship, and do now and henceforth withdraw from and decline from ever affiliating with, politically, or to aid in electing any such man or men who have so basely misrepresented our people.”

As Republicans went into the 1872 elections, it was clear Reed could not win re-nomination for Governor. Reed did not seem to want the job anyway. Instead, Reed wanted to be appointed US Senator by the legislature in 1873; when the term of Thomas Osborn would be up. Reed believed he could win such an appointment with a coalition of Democrats and Conservative Republicans.

Republican Nomination and Fights

Republicans would select their candidate for Governor in a August convention. Many of the Black delegates, tired of carpetbagger fights, flexed their muscle even more in the proceedings. Before this gathering, Black leaders had already secured greater proportion of the delegate seats, ensuring they would not be steamrolled like they had been in 1868.

A candidate many Black leaders would come to back was Ossian Hart, a Southern Unionist then serving on the state Supreme Court. Hart had started off as a much more conservative Republican at the start of reconstruction, but had become a hardened believer in Black voting rights by 1867. He expressed disgust at the treatment of freedmen by the native white population; leading to his shift in views. He was never a radical Republican, but over the years his support for Black political interests earned him more and more support with Black leaders. Hart was initially not seen as a frontrunner for the nomination, but his base built through the summer, with Charles H. Pearce, the Black State Senator from Leon County, having Hart speak at the opening of a Black Minister School in Live Oak.

Forces aligned with Hart and the Black delegates had to contend with the Osborn machine, which was eager to maintain control of the party. Osborn’s candidate for Governor was Marcellus Stearns, a carpetbagger and current house member for Gadsden County, and a much more conservative member at that. Stearns had been Speaker of the House and led the push to impeach Reed

Early in the convention, Black delegates began to unite around Hart, putting the Justice within striking distance of Stearns in informal balloting. Lower-listing candidates dropped out, and a formal ballot of Hart vs Stearns took place. By internal accounts, the vote was a virtual tie, with Hart dominating with Black delegates. The Osborne people, who controlled the convention, apparently tried to switch some votes and declare Stearns the nominee. This led to a near-riot at the convention, with the Black delegates refusing to allow such a move. In the wake of this, Stearns withdrew his name and Hart was nominated by acclimation. To thank Stearns, he was named the candidate for Lt Governor.

The result was a major victory for the Black delegates, who struck a major blow to Osborne’s machine. Many Republicans had high hopes for Hart, as his nomination would keep Black voters engaged and he could likely earn support from white southern unionists and old Whigs.

Congressional nominations came much easier than those for Governor. Josiah Walls, who’d been elected in 1870, but was still having his win challenged in the US House by his Democratic challenger, was re-nominated. Florida secured two House seats for the first time with the 1870 census, but lawmakers opted not to divide the district into two single-member seats. Instead two candidates would run statewide. The second Republican nominee was State Senator William Purman, the Jackson County Republican who’d survived an assassins bullet back in 1869.

The Democratic (or Liberal Republican) Nomination

While the Republicans attempted to keep their party together, the Democratic coalition believed that they were in a prime position to win the Governorship. William Bloxham, who by this point had been installed as Lt Governor after the disputed 1870 election was decided in his favor, was a lock to be the Governor nominee.

The question for Democrats was what to do about the “Liberal Republican” faction that had sprung up. Nationally, President Grant was not being challenged by a Democrat, but instead by Horace Greely, a defecting republican. Greely, while an early Republican Party founder and abolitionist, had broken with Grant on corruption and called for the end of military occupation of the South. They formed the “Liberal Republican” party. To clarify, here the term liberal was used in the classic anti-monarchical sentiment from Europe, not what we would modern Americans generally use to reference as “left leaning.”

In Florida, a Liberal Republican coalition did try to form, even sending delegates to a planned convention that would happen the same day as the Democratic convention. The emerging coalition did not always follow clear ideological lines, and included many Republicans who’d simply fallen out with all other camps. While many business-oriented conservative Republicans had gone to this camp, so had Liberty Billings, the once massive force in radical politics.

Bloxham endorsed creating a fusion ticket to unite with the disaffected Republicans. However, a vast majority of Democratic leaders did NOT endorse this view. Most hardened Democrats wanted to cast out Republicans of all stripes. At the Democratic convention in Jacksonville a major debate and series of votes raged over whether to make overtures to the Liberal Republican convention also in town. A meeting was held, but Democrats would not agree to Liberal Republican requests to name the candidate for LT Governor and one of the two Congressional seats. Talks broke down between the two camps.

The Democrats named Bloxham as their nominee for Governor and filled the rest of the ticket with their men. This left the Liberal Republican convention with a decision to make on how to move forward. Some delegates wanted to form their own ticket with Bloxham at the head and their own slate of Liberal Republicans for the down-ballot. Instead the majority voted to endorse the entire Democratic slate. As a result, a large number of the delegates in the minority walked out, refusing to back the full Democratic ticket.

The Democratic Party’s unwillingness to forge an agreement with the Liberal Republicans was a major blunder. While Bloxham himself portrayed his campaign as aiming to appeal to a broad swath of the state, the sentiment of the party was much more vitriolic. The party message, for any faint moderation in Bloxham speeches, was fully “radical rebel” - aka a firm return to home rule and white supremacy. The Democratic actions at the convention and subsequent campaign only succeeding in uniting the Republicans more, causing many Republican defectors to return to the Hart camp as the fall progressed.

The General Election

Heading into the fall campaign, Black leaders understood that victory was critical for Reconstruction to continue in Florida. Hart had firm support from Black officials and community leaders across the state, who canvassed extensively for Hart and the rest of the ticket. Congressman Josiah Walls laid it plain to a Black audience….

If Bloxham is elected it means the practical disfranchisement of the colored man. I would rather be defeated myself than see any one of the State ticket defeated. . . . It is your duty to support them as you do me, and it will be your fault if they are not elected.“

Governor Reed, meanwhile, continued to undermine his own party. Clearly aiming for a Senate appointment with Democratic help, Reed appointed several Democrats to vote counting positions in several counties. He likewise tried to get individual like Horatio Bisbee, a district attorney who was working to protect Black voting rights, removed from his post. Reed did stump the state for Grant, but at the same time he attacked Republican candidates like Purman. Reed proved in the end, as so many long believed, to not be any loyal Republican and no friend to Black Floridians.

Most importantly for the outcome of the contest, however, was the presence of federal troops. With the 1871 Klan Act passed; efforts to secure safe voting for Blacks across the south took place. Despite Reed’s interference, Republican leaders across Florida made sure to petition President Grant for troops to be present in major Black voting sites. These troops ensured that Black voting sites were free of major violence; leading is a massive spike in Black turnout compare to the 1870 midterms.

The Election Results

Both parties were optimistic they would win the 1872 contest. In the end, Ossian Hart easily prevailed in the state, winning by 5%; or 1,600 ballots.

Hart’s win came thanks to resounding margins in the heavily Black counties of the state. Bloxham won more land, but the heavily populated Black counties returned sizeable margins for the GOP.

The rest of the statewide ticket played out with little difference. Stearns won the Lt Governor race by a near identical margin as the Governor result. President Grant easily carried the state by 7%. Note these votes were technically for slates of electors, not the candidates themselves.

The biggest difference between the Presidential and Governor races was that fewer votes were cast for President. Some Democrats had little interest in backing the Greeley ticket, and his electors got 600 fewer votes than Bloxham. Grant’s electors and Hart got near identical vote totals.

In the Congressional contests, both Republicans William Purman and Josiah Walls easily prevailed by five points.

At the legislative level, Republicans retained narrow control of both chambers. The Senate was very close, just 13 to 11, while the State House was 29 GOP to 23 DEM. Both parties had a number of independent-minded members who would defect on different matters.

Democrats cried foul and challenged the results in courts, but these cases went nowhere. Correspondence from the time shows even the top Democrats knew they had been beaten. However, the narrative of an impose Government, elected by fraud, was core to Democrat’s “redeemer” narrative.

Analysis of the Results

The presence of federal troops was critical to boosting Black turnout. While both parties saw their total votes go up, Republicans netted 1,600 ballots compared with the 1870 Lt Governor contest. How the margin shifted by each county can be seen below.

The heavily Black counties of north Florida were the critical drive of the Republican gains. In the top 10 Black counties, the total votes increased by 4,600. Republicans made a net gain of 2,300 ballots compared with the Democrats. Jefferson, Gadsden, and Leon were the biggest source of these new votes.

The presence of troops saw Columbia and Jackson counties, the sight of so much violence in 1870, flip back to the Republicans.

Democrats had their strongest gains in a few key counties. Many of these, however, related to possible issue with vote tabulation.

Vote Tabulation Issues

One thing to keep in mind with this era of elections is that there is no shortage of issues with how the ballots were counted. Contrary to the statements from the current psychopath-of-a-President we have, elections today are more secure than they have ever been. In this era, however, vote counts could ofte seen discrepancies; sometimes due to human error and other times due to fraud. Disputes over polling site data and conflicting counts were common; leading to election challenges that would go on well past the election year.

We will see many of this counting debates rise with the 1876 contest in Florida. The 1872 debates did not effect the statewide returns, but they are worth highlighting. Issues here were not just the counting of ballots, but to what degree people had been kept from the polls. While violence and intimidation were way down, they were not zero, and order was much harder to enforce in the southern counties of the states.

Notable County Discrepancies

In Marion County, the Republican vote totals remained the same as 1870, a year that saw violence suppress votes there. Claims of intimidation came out of Marion, where the troop presence was lower, but the results of any investigation are unknown. Thanks to the static Republican vote total and a rise in Democratic votes, the county remained Republican but by a lower margin.

A similar story existed for Hamilton County, which is the 11th most Black county, at 41%. In 1870, the county had given Republicans 130 ballots to Democrats 430. In 1872, Democrats got 460+, but Republicans got just 16! This county was a site of major counting disputes, so much so that Hamilton County canvassing board was apparently arrested by United States Marshall Sherman Conant. It seems very likely the result in Hamilton is due to counting issues that were never resolved. Any alternative vote totals that might exist have not turned up in my research.

Another county of question was Hernando County, which was 30% Black at the time. Like Hamilton, the reported vote total was just 6 Republican ballots to 182 Democratic ballots. In 1870, where violence suppressed the Republican vote, the GOP had gotten at least 130 votes and Democrats 313. Despite the Republican vote being reduced to almost nothing, the Democrats lost more ground; with 259 fewer votes cast. This seems likewise an issue of vote tabulation issues. However, intimidation of Black Hernando County voters was a long-running issue.

The other major issue was Brevard County, which you will see was blank on my maps. Brevard, then a very small rural county with less than 100 voters, did not submit its returns in time for the state canvass. I have been unable to find even a report of the vote totals, but it was believed to be almost entirely Democratic-leaning. This would not have effected the statewide returns. It did however, impact a state Senate election. I will discuss that more in my next article, however.

The biggest Democratic swing in the state was located in Monroe County. Unlike possible issues in Marion or Hamilton, this swing was NOT due to tabulation issues. The vote in the county was heavily dominated by Key West, which had a sizeable Cuban population by this point. Cuban voters had been for Grant in 1868, but disputes over the administration handling of Cuba’s independence fight with Spain led to them defecting to the Liberal Republican/Democratic ticket. Republicans had gone to Key West to try and win back the Cuban vote, but this clearly failed.

The Election Aftermath

The 1872 elections were the best result for Black Floridians since the beginning of reconstruction. With Governor Hart, they had a much more supportive figure in the most powerful office in the state, Josiah Walls had been returned to Congress, and their party retained control of the legislature.

The elevation of Hart had immediate impact on the Black community, as Hart was much more willing to seek advice from Black leaders on local appointments. In Jackson County, where violence had ruled the county for several years, Governor Reed had caved to white demands to appoint people they liked to local offices. As a result, Jackson County, despite being majority Black and majority Republican, was ruled by a Democratic county commission. Governor Hart reversed such appointments, elevating Black leaders in heavily Black counties. Like Reed, he did seek to work with the Democratic officials, but he was much less hostile to Black concerns than Reed had been. Meanwhile, the 1873 legislature also passed a new Civil Rights bill; albeit an imperfect one.

The new legislature was also tasked with electing a new Senator in 1873. So much of the 1872 Republican internal drama had been driven by Governor Reed and Senator Osborne fighting over this Senate seat. Well when the time came, neither man would get the position. Reed had virtually no support in the chamber, and Osborne had little backing as well. Instead balloting quickly moved to new faces. After days of balloting, Republican Simon Conover, then the Speaker of the House, won the job over Democratic Supreme Court justice James D. Westcott.

Conover’s election itself was a reflecting of the odd coalitions that would sometimes emerge in Florida Politics at this time. The lawmakers that backed Conover were Black lawmakers, several “Liberal Republicans”, and a majority of Democrats. Many Democrats said it was because they wanted to keep Westcott on the Supreme Court. It showed, however, that Conover was an acceptable Republican to Democrats in the state. Black lawmakers, however, also trusted Conover, who proved to be a more effective advocate for them than Osborne or Reed had been. Once in DC, Conover made moves to get several prominent Black leaders federal jobs based in Florida.

Unfortunately, this was the height things for Florida’s Black community. Governor Hart, who’d become sick during the 1872 campaign, remained ill through the first year of his Governorship. On March 18th of 1874, he would pass away.

It is a tragedy that Hart did not have more time to carry out is governorship, who knows how he might have done. However, it was clear that the rise of Lt Governor Stearns would not be good for Florida Republicans or the Black community. A firm conservative, Stearns would clash with Black leaders and many of his fellow Republicans. It would leave the party bitterly decided heading into the most critical elections of 1876.

Today’s issue is my latest chapter in my series on Reconstruction in Florida; looking at the period after the Civil War where Black Floridians were able to exercise political power. My last issue looked at the early period of Congressional Reconstruction in Florida. With the 1867 Reconstruction Acts, military rule came to the former confederate states. Florida was re-organized and the military began the process of registering the freedmen to vote in elections. A new state constitution was passed in 1868 and Republicans won the May state elections, electing Harrison Reed as Governor.

That issue delved into the Republican factionalism that drove much of 1868. Moderate Republicans, largely white carpetbaggers, stopped more radical members, who had the support of the newly freed slaves, from winning control of the Republican Party. After the moderate faction under Reed won control for the party, Black voters were left with no choice but to support the administration, lest white Democratic rule take hold in the state and suppress their new rights.

This next article will look further into the Republican divisions. However, those internal fights came amid a massive wave of Klan violence; which will be the focus of today’s article. With the initial round of elections over and military presence in the state scaling down, the rage of the native white population would explode. This would make upcoming elections a life or death battle for the newly freed slaves.

Lets dive in.

The Rise of White Violence

In my first article in this series, Part 0: Dynamics of Reconstruction, I discussed how Florida reconstruction was marred by violent threats and intimidation from the very beginning. Early proto-Klan activities rose in Florida by 1867 or 1868. Even before this time, violence against the newly freed slaves was a major issue. However, things took on a more organized and damaging effect in the times following the 1868 State elections. This marked the rise of organized white attacks. Sometimes these people were known as the Klan, other times known as “regulators.”

As these Klan and regulator attacks would play out, much of the white population not directly involved would enter a code of silence. Rarely were the perpetrators able to be tracked down and rarely would juries actually convict someone caught. Even as white citizens would write letters to Democrat-friendly press “deploring the violence”, they covered for instigators and instead blamed Republican carpetbaggers for the trouble.

The goal of this violence was simple. Throw off Republican rule and restore Black citizens to a state similar to slaves.

Violence for Politics

In the original 1867 and 1868 elections, violence was present but more contained by the presence of federal troops. Many whites, meanwhile, opted to boycott the elections or target their efforts to assorted candidates. However, this argument from Ralph L. Peek in an article on the end of military reconstruction I think best lays out what was to come.

It seems that the Conservatives (Democrats) concluded that the only way to defeat the Republicans was by physical force and violence. The evidence also seems to indicate that rage and frustration created a recklessness within Conservative ranks that disdained consequences and risk, and invited a total war between the races. They regarded the Negro as less than human and the fact that Republican power in Florida rested squarely upon the Negro vote made them hate Republicans as well as Negroes. Subsequent events seem to confirm these conclusions.

Violence would boil up in the aftermath of those 1868 elections thanks to the removal of federal troops. Initially, Governor Harris Reed pleaded for troops to remain in the state, pointing out that no state militia was in strong form to repel attacks. The state was also under heavy Klan influence, as railroad and telegraph managers had Klan ties, leading to easy tracking of Republican officials. This culminated with Klan members stealing weapons that the state government had purchased for a militia. It was well understood that military presence was the only thing keeping white violence from breaking out against the Black population.

Florida military commander John Sprauge agreed that to leave would risk the state falling into the hands of the Klan. However, General George Meade, who ran the military district of Florida, Alabama, and George, dismissed this and pulled troops out at the end of the year. Meade was notably more conservative and in line with lame duck President Andrew Johnson. It would not be until Ulysses S. Grant was sworn in as President in March 1869 that the freedmen would have a more sympathetic ear in DC.

Reed’s please for help, however, we also undercut by his own actions. Many Black men were reading and willing to form militias to help protect their newly won freedom. However, Reed resisted these efforts, insisting it would only rile the population up even more. The merit of this is debatable, and if you read my last issue its much easier to see it as Reed just being the hardened racist that he was. Regardless of this sentiment, many Black citizens were not willing to be intimidated by white violence. At a Republican Party meeting in Leon County in 1868, one Black attendee (no clear name given) stated

“I understand the Ku Klux are here. If so, let them come on. We are armed and ready for them”

This bravery was unfortunately not able to stop the wave of death to come as anarchy began to rein in much of Florida.

Assassinations and Terror

Even before most troops left Florida, political assassinations in late 1868 became a major issues in Florida. Republican leaders, especially any emerging Black leaders, were targeted for death or exile.

This was not only a political tactic to tilt elections, but to demoralize the newly freed Black population. The killing of leaders was often part of broader demoralizing efforts; where night riders would go through the county making threats and warning Black citizens to remember it was a “white man’s country.” This terror campaign was perfectly seen in the 1874 Thomas Nast cartoon on Klan violence.

The deprivation of Black leaders was a major tactic employed by white regulators. Just some of these major assignations include Randal Coleman, a Black Republican leader in Madison County, or Timothy Francis, a Black leader in Columbia County. Columbia County saw a rash of Black murders through just 1868 to 1871; decapitating Republican leadership in the county.

Being an elected official did not make you any safer. In Lafayette County, John Kreminger, a white southern unionists that served in the state legislature and as a county judge, was murdered. Jacob Yearty, a State Representative for Calhoun County and the sheriff at the time, was murdered by the Klan in an ambush on a backroad. The same followed for Judge Archibald Carraway, a judge in Calhoun. In Jackson County, Calvin Rodgers, an elected Black constable, was gunned down. Also in Jackson County, Black State Representative Emanuel Fortune was forced to flee the county at risk of death.

No county had more murders than Jackson, which over just a two year period saw between 80 and 150 targeted murders, making it one of the most violent in the country and the most violent in Florida. The story of Jackson County is best covered in this book: The Jackson County War. If I were to tell you to read one book on reconstruction Florida, I would say pick that one. It gives you a broad Florida-wide picture but also localizes the terror.

Jackson was the site of the first Jewish murder by the Klan in Florida, when Samuel Fleischman, a longtime merchant, was murdered for his support of Black rights. Future Congressman William Purman, at the time a State Senator, was nearly killed in 1869 on the streets of Marianna when several men opened fire. While he survived the shooting, his colleague, Republican and southern local John L. Finlayson was killed. At the time Finlayson was also the Clerk of Court for the county and the most prominent doctor in the region. His replacement was John Q. Dickinson, a Vermont native who’d come to Florida as part of the Union Army. By 1871, Dickinson was the last white Republican in Jackson County, and in letters he predicted his eventual death. He was indeed gunned down on April 3rd.

Violence ranged by county. Jackson was the most violent, while Madison followed in 2nd. However, though all the counties with large Black populations, intimidation was a major tool. Leon County, for example, had less murders, but that was because its white mob, officially the known as “The Young Men’s Democratic Club” was under the rule of Joseph Williams, a former lawmakers and former Speaker of the Florida House. Williams, a large plantation owner before and after the war, was tactical in how he used his men; not allowing for random murders and instead the implicit threat of violence. People like Williams did this NOT because they cared about anyone’s life, but rather people like Williams did not want to lose their economic standing. More aggressive violence was seen in places like Jackson because it was led by younger and less-established men who reveled in the rough-neck lifestyle.

Regardless of of it was targeted assignations, mob violence, or quieter intimidation, the sentiment was the same. That sentiment was summed up in the (as best I can tell anonymous) sentiment of a prominent regulator….

The damned Republican Party has put niggers in to rule us, and we will not suffer it . . . intelligence shall rule the country instead of the majority . . . this is a white man’s government . . . [and] the colored man . . . [has] no right that white men . . . [are] bound to respect.’’

I highlight the line “intelligence shall rule the country instead of the majority” because it is a common line, albeit with different language or tone, you still see from the many of the far-right today. Of course their definition of intelligence is how light your skin is.

Terror for Economic Reasons

While this series is focused on political dynamics in Florida, I also want to highlight that terror was not just used for politics. Another common use of violence was for economic purposes.

The only thing that infuriated the native white population more than Black voting was Black economic independence. Many freedmen had gone into what would be known as “Sharecropping” in the immediate time after the war. This system, if the contract was just and fair, wasn’t a terrible idea in the early post-war period; a time when hard currency was rare and banking was shaky. Many Freedmen’s Bureau agents supported it. However, bad deals and cheating by the plantation owners, something that became a major theme in the Jim Crow era, made the system its own version of slavery.

When Black locals were able to, they purchased land to start their own farms. Some of them were able to set up their own shops, moving away from agriculture altogether. This was unacceptable to many white regulators, who punished Black families for daring to leave the plantation. Attacks on Black households was a common Klan tactic.

One example of this terror was the case of the Tutson family in Clay County. Samuel Tutson, a former slave, had purchased his own farm land. One night, the Klan ransacked his house, violently beat him, and his wife, Hannah, was sexually assaulted. By a miracle, they did not die, but their baby was severely beaten and grew up with physical and intellectual disabilities as a result. They were ordered to leave their farm and go back to sharecropping. The final insults came after the attack. The perpetrators were arrested but were quickly acquitted by an all white jury. Then Samuel and Hannah were charged and convicted for perjury.

This was the monstrosity and horror of Klan violence that existed across the south. It was these conditions that Black voters fought and struggled to maintain their access to the ballot.

The 1870 Midterm Elections

The rise of white violence in Florida came as Florida was looking ahead to the 1870 midterm elections. Republicans not only had to defend the State Legislature, but races for Congress and Lt Governor would be going on. It was clear to everyone that the goal of white regulators was to stop Black voting as much as possible and to sweep the elections.

Republican leaders worried about intimidation in Florida’s heavily populated, majority-Black counties in the north end of the state. The 1870 Census showed the population was nearly evenly split, but the old plantation counties had massive Black populations that were core for Republican wins.

As everyone worried about efforts to intimidate Black voters in these large counties, the Republican Party itself was bitterly divided.

Republican Divisions

While violence raged in Florida, Republicans that ran the state had to try and come together for the elections. Unfortunately, the party was in a bitter power struggle between Governor Harris Reed and US Senator Thomas Osborne. Both men had been united as moderates in the 1868 Convention, but broke quickly after the May elections that year. This power struggle came into full view in the 1870 August Republican convention to decide nominees for statewide office.

The race for Congress was the major driver at the convention. Incumbent Charles Hamilton was vulnerable for re-nomination. Many Black leaders wanted a proper seat at the table, and the nomination for Congress was a major driver. Hamilton had also burned his bridges with Senator Osborne, once an ally. Osborne backed Robert Meacham, a freedman native to Florida.

Several additional Black candidates ran, including Charles Pearce, Josiah Walls, and Jonathan Gibbs. The Black vote remained divided, and many Black leaders did not trust Osborne, and hence did not trust Meacham. As balloting went on, Black delegates slowly rallied around Josiah Walls; who at the time was the State Senator for Alachua county. Hamilton, recognizing he could not win, but wanting to stop Osborne and Meacham, threw his support to Walls, who cliched the nomination.

Upon the nomination going to Walls, Jonathan Gibbs stated…

“Not only a vindication of the honor of the Republican Party, but also a marked Triumph for the Negro race of Florida. This was the great point sought after and gained.”

While Josiah Walls was not a native Floridian, he was also not a “carpetbagger” in the classic sense. He had been born into slavery in Virginia and joined the union army. He originally came to Florida as part of the military and became a teacher in Alachua before getting involved in politics. His nomination did effect the choice for Lt Governor, however. Several Republicans believed that the needed someone who’d been in Florida before the war. They nominated Samuel Day, who was a southern unionist from Columbia County. Day secured the nomination with a large block of Black delegates.

The Republican ticket went into the general election against the democratic nominees. For Congress, Democrats nominated Silas Niblack and for Lt Governor the nominee was William Bloxham. Both of these men would benefit greatly from the violence to come.

A Violent General Election

The weeks and months of the summer warned of a violent election. Reports came in across the state of a ramping up of attacks and intimidation. Black voters in many counties, including Columbia, Suwannee, and Jackson were warned not to vote on election day. In August, Governor Reed warned that such threats would be met with militias if they did not cease their threats

“The seditious teachings of an unprincipled press and the treasonable appeals of prominent opponents of the State government are being responded to in several of the counties by the re-organization of bands of outlaws known as Ku Klux”

The “unprincipled press” referenced was newspapers like "The Weekly Floridian” - a Democratic paper that spent much of 1870 making excuses for murders (claiming they were for private disputes - not politics) and denying claims of threats to Black voters.

Violence continued to ramp up in the fall. Columbia continued to be a hotbed of attacks, with prominent Black Republican Robert Jones gunned down as he returned from the state convention. The Columbia Sheriff, Robert Martin, resigned in October after he was taken hostage by regulators who demanded he leave the post. US Marshalls recognized the trouble and tried to find men they could deputize to keep order in the election, but few wanted to sign up for such a dangerous job.

In Alachua County, a Republican rally of Black voters was attacked by white Klan members; who fired on the crowd and at least one Black man was stabbed to death. Meanwhile, the county’s Republican leader, Leonard Dennis, was nearly killed by the Klan and barely escaped.

Washington promised the Republican Party that troops were coming into several key counties; including Hamilton, Jackson, and Columbia, to ensure order. However, some of these arrived late and were not nearly enough to stem the tide.

Election Day Violence

The fears of Black voters came to pass in several counties on election day. Targeted efforts to dissuade Republicans from casting ballots were reported across several counties with large Black population. Detailed reports include

• Columbia County - horse-riding regulators stormed a Black gathering in Lake City at a church the night before the election. They threatened the crowd, which had traveled into town to vote the next day. Many fled the city and did not get to vote.

• Gadsden County - The Quincy voting site was guarded by armed white men, led by former acting Governor Abraham Allison. They refused to let Black voters come and cast their ballots

• Jackson County - The voting site in Marianna was constantly accosted by white regulators. The presence of some stationed troops allowed many votes to still be cast, but the chaos that unfolded in the afternoon led to the polls closing early and hundreds of Black voters not getting to cast ballots.

• Jefferson County - In the late afternoon, a mob of armed white men sought to stop any more Black ballots from being cast. Klan members from George had made there way to Monticello to aid this effort. The Black population responded with their won armed showing, and a standoff was eventually broken by the George whites fleeing. However, the delays led to several hundred Black voters being unable to cast ballots.

These were some of the most high profile moments reported, namely major clashes at polling sites. However, it cannot be stressed enough that the weeks and months of warnings and violence led to many never even attempting to make it to the polls on election day. Voting was not private and intimidation could be brazen, like we saw in the above counties, or more subtle.

The Disputed Returns

With all of the violence and with the fact that it took weeks for returns to be fully accounted for, Florida remained a very tense state after the polls closed. Early data indicated the results would be close, but Democrats believed they were likely to prevail. If they did not, the worry of an armed insurrection became so real that President Grant ordered four companies of soldiers to arrive in Tallahassee to protect the process. Grant was able to do this thanks to the 1870 Enforcement Act, which allowed the President to deploy the military to safeguard election procedures.

Depending on your sources, there is no shortage of estimate totals for these races. The Republican-led canvassing board scrutinized and threw out counts in several counties and precincts. Where some of these decisions on the up and up? Yes. Were some decisions made for partisan reasons? Also yes. When the canvassing board indicated that both Republicans Walls and Day had won by 600 or so ballots, this was not a reflection of the total returns. It only came with removing the ballots in several counties and precincts. However, I want you to remember, and I will delve into this more in a moment, that these races would not have been so close if not for the violence of election day. Several hundred Black voters were kept from the polls - which for sure would have secured Republican victory.

Here, for example, is the official returns for the Congressional Contest, which gave Josiah Walls a 600 vote lead. The counties in italics in the table were not officially counted in these returns.

Meanwhile, the returns from the Weekly Floridian, which was a firm Democratic paper, pointed to neck and neck races for both office. Their totals for Lt Governor had Bloxham winning by just a handful of votes.

The county returns, regardless of which were counted or not and if a few precincts were removed here or there, reflected an incredibly polarized state. The heavily Black counties provided the key block of Republican ballots, while the heavily white counties were firmly Democratic.

The effect of the violence in the Black counties had a clear effect. In the ten most heavily Black counties, 2200 fewer Republican ballots were cast. Democrats, thanks to their registration drives, also managed to up their total ballots by a similar number; leading to the Republicans losing ground by 4000 ballots JUST in these counties.

There were very few who voted Republican in 1868 that then switched Democratic in 1870. These swings were a result of dropping vote share among the Black voters due to violence and warnings, not people flipping in partisan support over the last two years.

Republicans were able to certify Walls and Day as the winners, whatever the true “count” was. However, both losing candidates challenged these results and eventually won in the courts. Bloxham, however, would not be declared the winner until 1872, at which point Day had already presided over the final State Senate session. Niblack would eventually be declared the winner, but not until 1873, just weeks before the term ended. Walls served in the house until then and would be running against Niblack in 1872 for a rematch.

A similar dynamic played out with the state legislature. If all returns had been counted as they were, Democrats would have narrowly won the House and tied the Senate. These results, however, had come with that same violence. Democrats, for example, flipped two of Jackson County’s house seats thanks to violence. The canvassing board rejected returns and a narrow Republican majority was maintained. You can read more about the counting back and forth and court challenges in the second half of this article on the 1870 contests.

Final Notes

Republicans managed to maintain control of the state Government, future lawsuits aside. This came almost surely tricks in how to count the votes. However, this was also in response to mass waves of violence that kept Black people from the polls. It is not remotely in doubt to me that a fair vote would have produced Walls and Day victories. That would be shown in the 1872 contests, which came after expanded federal protections for voters.

The close call also made Republicans realize they had to try and united heading into the 1872 Contests. If they did not, they risked Democratic victory, would for sure would spell the end of Black political influence in the state.

I do recommend that piece for more details on the broad “macro” trends going on in Florida at the time and in events to come. That article also includes a history of the events from the end of the Civil War in 1865 through the beginning for Congressional Reconstruction in 1867.

Today’s article, Part 1, the true official kickoff, is going to cover the events of 1867 and 1868. Not every part will include such a short window of time. However, these early moments set the stage for everything that would follow in coming years. Here we saw the Florida Republican Party take shape and assorted factions emerge within that organization. My next issue will delve much more into the violence that tainted future elections.

With no time to waste, lets get going.

Congressional/Radical Reconstruction Begins

In early 1867, with the passage of the Reconstruction Acts in Congress, Florida underwent reorganization under federal watch. This marked the end of the brief stint of white southerners being able to dictate their own course after the war; which had included not letting newly freed slaves vote.

Under the acts, Florida was reduced to territory status, with its incumbent government deemed provisional. Each former Confederate State would have to hold a referendum on a constitutional convention and subsequently pass a new constitution. Each state had to adopt the 14th Amendment, which guaranteed equal rights regardless of race, and these elections had to allow for Black suffrage. Of course this only meant Black men, as women would not have the right to vote in Florida until the 1920s.

Quickly after these acts, a mass shift in Florida Democracy began.

Registering the Freedmen!

Under the newly passed laws, the Freedmen’s Bureau, which already had agents in Florida, was tasked with working toward the registration of the newly freed slaves. Since the bureau was part of the military the officials tasked with these efforts were largely military men. Virtually all of them were from the north - and these are the first “carpetbaggers” that white southerners would spend the next century blaming for all the problems to come.

This hatred for the bureau agents did not start off that way. At first, agents aimed to find common ground between native whites and the newly freed slaves. These were the moderates/conservatives that I referenced in Part 0. Many of them were swayed by the “respectable white leaders” of Florida - who pledged to move forward with Reconstruction and put the issues of the past behind them and accept Black voting rights and economic rights. However, many of these leaders were lying, and those not lying did not speak for the vast majority of the white population, which chafed at the idea of Black voting rights and Black equality.

Congress’ 2nd Reconstruction Act specifically designated the military commander for each state/region to work toward the registration of the freedmen; with the task to be completed by September 1st. Once it was clear to the native whites that Black registration could not be stopped, they aimed to try and sway over the newly freed slaves to their side of politics. Whites attempted to adopt of a posture of being the “noble paternalistic” types that would help “guide” Black voters on how to exercise their votes. This was noticed by the bureau agents and military leaders, who worried about the freedmen being bullied and lied to. As the agents informed the freedmen of their rights and were seen as protectors against native white abuse, these freedmen gravitated almost entirely to the Republican Party. This turn of events led to increasingly hostile responses from the native white population, who’s original kind words turned to threats.

General John Pope, who was commander for the military district that included Florida, and his Florida commissioner, John Sprauge, worked to set up registration drives through the spring. These were done by a combination of military and civilian leaders but with the military overseeing all events to ensure intimidation and fraud were not being engaged in by the native white population. In addition, many ex-confederates were still barred from voting; either unable to or unwilling to pledge loyalty to the union. Those found to have been active confederates were also barred, though much debate continued over who could or could not be barred based on military activity - and whether they had been drafted or not.

When registration was completed in mid September, the voter roll was 26,000 total - with Black men making up 58% of the voter roll.

With this registration completed, the referendum for a state constitution would be held from November 14th through 16th. The main polling site would be the county seat; though county leaders were empowered to expand sites if needed.

The same day as that referendum, delegate elections would be held for such a convention.

The 1867 Campaign and Emerging Coalitions

With the election season underway, Floridians had to decide how to engage with the new political status quo. Here is where we see the Florida Republican Party take formal root. Likewise, native whites had to settle on how to engage, if at all, in the process.

Early Republican Party Coalitions

The summer or registration and looking ahead to the referendum led to the formal organization of Republican Party forces in Florida. Here again the early leaders were military men with the Freedmen’s Bureau. It was at this time that the Republican forces began to split into the moderate/conservative and radical camps that I discussed in Issue 0.

In the moderate camps were people like Harris Reed and Thomas Osborne; northerners who had maintained good relations with native white leaders in the few recent years in the state. They initially favored a more conciliatory tone with the local white population, aiming to make Florida a stable place for investment from businesses in the north. These individuals would have preferred to make alliances with the “respectable” white leaders, but those efforts broke down with time. Individuals like Osborne became especially disliked by native whites when he was found to be organizing Black voters into Lincoln Brotherhoods - secret society political clubs for the Republican Party. Osborne was a more moderate Republican, but he also came to understand the native white leaders would aim to control the vote of the freedmen. Secret societies were a way to allow for Black leaders to engage and emerge without fear of white retaliation. Osborne’s coalition would ultimately be made up white Republicans and a minority of Black voters. He would lose the battle for Black support to the radical camp.

At the same time as Osborne was organizing, the early “radical Republican” faction formed. This faction favored a much stronger push for racial equality, especially on economic issues. They were less tied in with conservative business interests and favored a more aggressive punishment for the former confederates. They formed The Union Leagues, a counter to the more moderate Lincoln Brotherhood. Main leaders here were Liberty Billings (a Black northerner), Daniel Richards (a white northerner) and William Saunders (a black northerner). It was this camp that a majority of Black voters would gravitate to in the 1867 elections.

These two camps vied for control of the Republican Party in the summer of 1867. Factional lines at times crossed between the radical and conservative camp, with debate over racial representation, carpetbaggers vs southern unionists, and many other clashes of personalities playing out.

A Conservative/Native Opposition

When relations with the freedmen’s bureau agents broke down, the leaders of the native white population had to decide what to do. While a handful of unionists and other ex-confederates went to the Osborne faction, a vast majority of native whites did not. They organized the “Conservative” coalition - which would eventually just be the Democratic Party. Many of these leaders, knowing that Reconstruction could not be stopped thanks to military presence, resolved to try and build a coalition with Black voters; hoping to persuade them to be “guided” by their former masters. The key driver for the conservatives was home rule and the removal of federal forces. Their efforts to recruit Black support failed entirely.

Several county conventions were held to ultimately set up this conservative opposition campaign. However, a vast majority of the native white population appeared unwilling to go along. Many planned to simply boycott the referendum vote; which needed a majority of REGISTERED voters to pass. They would not vote for delegates, as that might indicate support for such a convention. Hence no real opposition campaign emerge for the 1867 elections. Instead boycotting was deemed the way to go.

The 1867 Referendum Results

The referendum to have a convention, as well as the delegate elections for the convention itself, took place in November. The conservative white boycott did take place, leading to a near universal support for holding a convention. The only issue was if the support for a convention would manage to get the majority of registered voters.

The official returns gave the convention 51% of registered voters. The county returns are incomplete, gathered from newspaper reports; but those with results show the majority-Black counties paving the way for victory.

Of those who did not vote, 77% of them were white. The Yes side was heavily fueled by Black voters, with only 1,220 whites supporting the measure compared with 13,000 Black voters. No black voters rejected the convention referendum and a vast majority made their vote heard.

Delegate Coalitions

The delegate elections that played out the same day were largely conducted by Black Republicans. Most delegates were unopposed, with the party aiming to placate all factions and sides in delegate selections; though more white candidates were nominate than Black. However, in the Gadsden election district and the Duval/St Johns/Nassau election district; radical candidates challenged the moderate candidates. This insurgent radical slate included prominent Black leaders such as Liberty Billings and Jonathan Gibbs. Those radical challengers won their races. While these men were Black northerners, they were heavily backed by the newly freed Black population of Florida.

In total, 27 white delegates were elected to the convention along with 18 Black delegates. Note these are the totals that could be found, but there was some dispute over winners, which carried into the convention itself.

Ideologically, the radical Republicans had an advantage over the more moderate faction. However, its worth noting these allegiances would be fluid at times, and even within these factions, many disagreements existed.

This first round of elections would then set the stage for a major ideological and personality battle at the upcoming convention.

A Convention Clash/Betrayal

Delegates made there way into Tallahassee for the January convention. The delegate list was a mix of assorted members from within and outside of the state. Native freedmen, Black and white Carpetbaggers, and handfuls of southern white unionists made up the roster. Of the 50 delegates in the convention, some each claiming to have won seats and some not being seated, this was the layout (from this excellent analysis of the convention and its assorted roll call votes)

• 19 Black Delegates

• 16 Southern Whites (most were unionists and/or not confederates)

• 12 White Northerners

• 3 Whites without clear geographic origin

The early days of the convention did show that radicals had a majority of the seats; with radical Daniel Richards being named convention chair. Weeks of back and forth debate and fights over delegate seating took place. On many votes coalitions did waver. The convention was a very tense affair, with the internal divisions within the Republican Party breaking further.

When it became clear the radicals had control of the convention, the moderate group walked out and made their way to neighboring Monticello to work on their own separate constitution. Left in Tallahassee by themselves, the radical faction passed their constitutional draft and subsequently nominated Billings to run for Governor and Richards for Lt Governor. Jonathan Gibbs was also nominated for Congress. This would have been a bi-racial ticket, with a Black man at the head.

However, at the same time this happened, the moderates/conservatives, now led by Osborn, were working on their own draft in Monticello. They would then return to Tallahassee late the night after the radicals had passed their constitution. In the dead of night, and with a quorum via two Black delegates pressured/tricked into coming to the meeting, the moderate faction claimed a quorum and passed their own constitution. As this happened, Billings and Richards were barred from entry to the hall by the federal troops stationed in the city. This underhanded saga is covered in good detail here.

Constitutional Differences

There were now two constitutions floating around, one from the radical camp and one from the moderate camp. Both sides submitted their documents to General George Meade, who had taken over military control of the area. In many respects, both documents were similar, but three major differences existed. Among these differences, it was clear the moderate constitution aimed to limit the rise of Black rule and ensure the white moderates could still control events

• Local Officials - The radical constitution allowed for counties to elect local officials, like county commissioners or sheriffs. This mattered for majority-Black counties to elect their own leaders. The moderate constitution made most of these offices appointed by the governor

• Loyalty Oath - The radical constitution aimed to limit the involvement of ex-confederates, keeping many active supporters from being able to engage in future politics. The moderate constitution did not have this

• Apportionment - The radical constitution made the number of state legislative seats better match equal population. This would aid the heavily Black regions of the state. However, the moderate constitution limited each county to four house seats, with ever county guaranteed at least one. This elevated the white population well beyond their share of the population, guaranteeing no majority Black legislature could be elected, even if a majority of votes went to Black candidates.

The moderate faction had still produced a very progressive document. Their proposal guaranteed the right to vote, established equality of the races, and mandated the funding of public education. However, these leaders also wanted to control events, and did not want to antagonize the native whites that had boycotted the process. These people wanted a state harmonious for investment, and put that above equal representation and local rule for the freedmen. The goal of this is laid bare when we see that Harrison Reed, one of the leaders of the Conservative Republican organization, wrote to former Democratic Senator, and former Confederate, David Yulee that….

“Under our Constitution the Judiciary & State officers will be appointed & the apportionment will prevent a negro legislature.

After drafting their constitution, the conservative faction nominated Harris Reed as Governor and William Henry Gleason as Lt Governor. Gleason by all accounts was a pure opportunist. They then nominated Charles Hamilton for Congress. While Hamilton was in the more moderate wing, he also had many radical attributes and was well liked by Black voters is Jackson County where he had served with the freedman’s bureau.

Both radical and moderate documents were submitted by Meade to the Congressional Committee on reconstruction; which had to chose a document before elections for state offices could go ahead. Meade recommended the moderate constitution, but both sides lobbied in DC for their draft. In the end, the committee chose the moderate document; and with that giving the Reed/Osborn wing control of the party.

With this constitution, Black political power was already limited in Florida. The document in question created a very powerful Governorship, with the ability to control many appointments both locally and statewide. Other than for Congress, the only statewide elected posts would be the Governor and Lt Governor. This lack of devolved power meant that control of the Governorship was life and death for the freedmen moving forward. Regardless of their distaste for some of the moderate Republican factions, a Democratic win would be a disaster.

The constitution would still have to be approved at a referendum, the same day as the rest of the state elections would take place. That would be in May of 1868.

The 1868 Elections

The May elections saw contests held for Governor, Lt Governor, Congress, and State legislature. The biggest contests were Governor and the Constitutional Referendum. On both of these matters, many different coalitions formed.

Reed vs Democrats vs Radicals

Many Black leaders were upset with the chain of events that occurred at the convention and recognized the flaws in the constitution. Harris Reed was also an especially conservative candidate (in Republican terms). However, many radical leaders, both white and Black, came to the conclusion that a third party ticket only risked splitting the vote and risking a Democratic upset in the upcoming elections. Most Republicans would rally to the Reed ticket and constitutional approval, even as they held misgivings.

The radical leaders that did not rally around the Reed ticket found themselves with little hope of a victory. After some debate, the rump faction opted to put up their own slate of candidates as a way to rally opposition to the constitution (hoping for its defeat and a new effort to draft a document). They named Samuel Walker for Governor, William Christy for Lt Governor, and Liberty Billings for Congress. However, they continued to see defections, as prominent Black leaders like Jonathan Gibbs broke with Billings and opted to endorse Reed, hoping to gain influence in the administration to then advance Black economic and educational concerns.

Many Democrats, meanwhile, debated where to align with Reed or strike out with their won candidate. Some desired to influence the conservative wing of the Republican Party by working with them. Other desired to eventually cast out the Republicans all together and push for firm white supremacy. The hardened Democrats would not back Reed, instead nominating George Scott, a Florida merchant who also served in the Confederate Army. Democrats campaigned on firm white rule and the end of federal troop presence in the state. However, at the same time, many prominent Democrats did back the Reed campaign.

The moderate Republican ticket believed they were easy front-runners to win the elections, but took little to chance. Additional companies of soldiers were brought into the state to ensure Black voters could cast ballots and money came in from DC to help fund the campaign. Black voters in most counties came on to the moderate ticket, especially as Freedmen Bureau agents warned them of a fractured GOP field leading to Democratic/Conservative victory. Indeed the presence of a Democratic campaign kept much of the Republican voting blocks united. At the same time, Reed made overtures to Democrats; ensuring them that his appointment powers would be used to aid them if he was elected.

The Constitutional Referendum

Two key groups emerged to oppose approving the constitution at the referendum. The first was the Democrats; who did have some divide over whether or not to support the moderate document. While many leaders conceded that while Black suffrage was not good, the rest of the document was not especially offensive to them. As one leading Democrat said, if the Constitution was passed, it would “not absolutely ruin us.” Regardless of these sentiments, a large majority of whites rejected supporting the constitution, if they even planned to vote at all. How some leaders felt did not translate to the vast majority of voters.

The other major opposition block came from the radicals that refused to endorse the Reed ticket. Billings and Richards argued to reject the constitution; believing that a failure would lead to a chance at a new document. However, this sentiment to reject the constitution only seemed to catch on with those already willing to not vote for Reed. Few Black voters supporting Reed would subsequently vote to reject the constitution.

The Election Results

With the presence of federal troops, a Republican party that was largely united, and a voter roll still heavily Black, Reed and the moderate had reason to be confident in victory. The results showed that confidence was well founded. Reed easily won the election with 58% of the vote, with Scott back at 35%. Radical Republican Walker took 9%.

Most Black voters stuck with Reed, knowing that Democratic victory would be much worse than a Reed administration. Walker, meanwhile, won three majority-Black counties: Leon, Nassau, and Duval. The Nassau area was an especially strong radical base of support for Billings and others. In many counties, the Walker name did not emerge with any votes. Considering this was in an era before uniform ballots, with voters instead producing ballot sheets or verbally declaring their intentions, this reflects the lack of radical organization ability statewide.

That same day, the new state constitution was approved with 61% of the vote. The document got nearly the exact same number of ballots as Harrison Reed got. It won every Reed county, and also narrowly carried Taylor County. All three radical counties rejected the document.

The correlation between support for Reed and support for the constitution is nearly perfect. Only in a handful of counties was there a notable distinction in share of the vote for Reed and YES on the referendum.

The county level returns for Congress and Lt Governor are unfortunately not available, but it is safe to presume the correlation with Governor was likewise very strong. The Congressional results statewide saw Charles Hamilton get 59% of the vote, with radical Liberty Billings getting 9%, the same as Walker got in the Governor contest. It would be safe to presume Billings won the same three radical counties.

At the legislative level, the returns did produce a white majority legislature, but it was also a legislature that was firmly Republican. The Senate was 16 GOP to 8 DEM and the House was 37 GOP to 15 DEM. This legislature was then able to easily select two Republicans to serve in the United States Senate. Thomas Osborne was named Senator, with a term to serve until 1873. The other senate seat had a term that would end in 1869, and this went to Adonijah Welch. After Welch’s term would end, Abijah Gilbert would be appointed for the post that would run through 1875. No Black Republican was named. All white men.

The Tense Beginning of Republican Rule

On June 25th, Florida was officially re-admitted to the union and civil life resumed. However, it was not truly a “civil” time. Governor Reed came into office with a state in debt and with order breaking down in several parts of the state. Battles with DC over the keeping of federal troops in the region went on as Klan violence began to steadily rise. That violence would explode in the next few years, and will be a major topic of my next article.

Reed’s Early Betrayals

Governor Reed, meanwhile, proved to be the nefarious individual that many Black leaders worried he was. His early term saw him try and forge alliances with many conservative white Democrats; including naming one his comptroller and attorney general. Thanks to the constitution layout, he also had over 400 local posts to pick. While he would at times appoint Black officials in heavily Black counties, he also relied on recommendations from native secessionist whites.

Reed cared little for Black issues and preferred to try and forge a coalition with the native white establishment in the county. He truly seemed to believe these former confederates would come to the table to build a new bipartisan coalition that would make Florida a prime investment and tourism hub. His lack of Republican values was seen plainly a year later when he said to the legislature

“It was only as a Republican that I could get measures for the benefit of the state from the dominant party at Washington. We would be paralyzed without it.”

Reed’s view of being Governor can be best be summarized here.

The subsequent government led by Gov. Harrison Reed promoted the economic potential of Florida in search of Northern capital, prioritized moderate white involvement in future government operations, and cared little of the political future of African Americans in the state.

Reed’s relationship with his fellow moderates would quickly beak down. Quickly into 1868 he and Senator Osborn fell out; partly a battle of power and control but also Osborn being a much more steadfast Republican.

Reed Makes No Friends

For Reed’s constant backbiting at his own party, he gained nothing from the Democrats. That large majority of native white leaders did not see Reed as someone they could work with. They did not accept the new reconstruction status quo. The goal was always to eventually take control of the government and end Black voting and any notion of Black civil rights. Reed didn’t care about Black issues, but he also did not see that the native whites had no care to keep him around.

Reed managed to alienate everyone within the first six months of his tenure. He vetoed legislation that barred discrimination based on race on railroad cars and other public transport; claiming it was already in the constitution. He then antagonized white democrats when it was announced that Florida would NOT hold an election for President that November, but would instead have the state legislature appoint the state’s three electors. This used to be a more common practice before the civil war but was rarer by this period. While Republicans would have definitely won the election, the move infuriated Democrats who wanted to use the election to rally their cause against Republican nominee Ulysses S. Grant.

Embarrassing Dysfunction

Reed’s tenure as Governor almost came to an early end in 1868, and it was the type of dysfunction that you can only image. A very long story short, Reed scheduled a special election for December for the state’s lone Congressional seat, which Charles Hamilton had been elected to in May but who’s term expired soon. Reed also scheduled special elections for fifteen state legislative seat. Why did he schedule these? Well he had appointed these men to other jobs, and since the state constitution didn’t allow people to hold two different government jobs, he decided these seats were vacant. While some of these members had planned to resign, others were blindsided and perhaps did not realize about the rule on two offices.

What happened next? Well in November when lawmakers came to Tallahassee to give Grant the state’s three electoral votes, an effort to impeach Reed began. The State House, including supposedly removed members, voted to impeach the Governor and suspend him until the Senate could decide his fate. Then Reed’s own Lt Governor, William Henry Gleason, declared that HE WAS NOW THE GOVERNOR. Really really really long story short, Reed eventually got the Supreme Court of Florida to affirm that he was still the Governor and that the House impeachment was void.

The whole saga was an embarrassing debacle. It did have two major effects however. One was that Secretary of State George Alden had sided against Reed. He was hence removed and replaced with Jonathan Gibbs, which pleased many Black leaders. Black lawmakers aimed to woo Reed by taking his side in the post-impeachment world. Meanwhile, William Gleason was also removed from being Lt Governor by the courts, with this largely stemming from him not being a resident of the state for three years.

The entire saga was a perfect parody that white natives would use to lampoon reconstruction governments for generations to come.

The December Elections

Despite all the internal Republican chaos in Tallahassee, the December elections went fairly smooth. Federal troops were still a major presence in state. While Democrats made a few legislative gains, Republicans returned a large majority of the vacant seats. The Congressional election saw Charles Hamilton easily win re-election with 56% of the vote.

The county returns seen below are incomplete and were reported almost five months after the fact, but they give some illumination into dynamics. Hamilton won thanks to massive support in the heavily Black norther counties. William Saunders, one of the radical Republicans from earlier in the year, got 6% and won Alachua County. How active Saunders’ campaign was, I am not sure. However, its notable that Saunders had been a radical that then backed Reed that May.

What helped this election run smooth and Republicans to win was the presence of federal troops still stationed in Florida. There were acts of violence and intimidation, but it paled in comparison to what would come in the next year.

That violence, and the elections held in its wake, will be the topic of the next issue.

In between the end of slavery and the rise of Jim Crow, newly freed Black men we able to exercise their vote for the first time. Then just before things could take root, these rights were stripped away state by state. Several decades of “managed Democracy” would follow; with only white men allowed to vote. It would take over half a century before this would change. Florida was no exception to this chain of events.

While much has been said about Jim Crow and slavery before it, I feel that the period of democracy in Florida, the Reconstruction Period, is often truncated. We often talk about the 1860s as the era of newly freed slaves being able to vote and then that ending around 1876; the time that federal troops left the south. However, this short timeline ignores the many voting rights battles that took place through the 1880s and 1890s. The timeline of events shows a much longer struggle to hold on to the Democracy in the post-war era than most history textbooks will cover. For this series, I want to give more attention and discussion to this multi-decade period. Florida’s Reconstruction story offers us important history that not only deserves more attention, but should also be seen as a warning to the future.

This first article, Part 0, is me wanting to set the stage for events to come. I want to look broadly at the different groups and individuals that will play major roles in upcoming articles. This will make the articles covering direct elections and political debates flow smoother. Trust me, reading this will make your future reading much richer. And Part 1 will be out on Monday!

With that said, lets dive into the events and dynamics heading into Florida’s Reconstruction Period.

Reconstruction Comes to Florida

Slavery came to an end in Florida on May 20th, 1865. That day, federal troops read the Emancipation Proclamation from the steps of the Knott House in Tallahassee. From this high point, many political battles would wage over what rights the newly freed population would have.

The timeline of Reconstruction in Florida really has two starting points. The first era of Reconstruction was a brief window from 1865 to 1867. This era was guided by the actions of President Andrew Johnson, who took a much softer line with the former slave states. Under his directive, the southern states were not mandated to give equal rights or voting rights to the newly freed slaves. In Florida, early Reconstruction saw efforts to simply move the newly freed slaves into a state of being second-class citizens.

In 1865, President Johnson appointed William Marvin as acting governor of Florida. The goal was to get a new constitution in place, largely just removing secession and slavery. Marvin was not a supporter of giving the vote to freed slaves. Already that year, some local communities, namely Fernandina, had seen newly freed black voters go to the polls for local races. The goal of Marvin and others was to restore white rule. Marvin himself said that giving the slaves freedom did not mean they were ready for the “privilege” of voting.

The elections held for delegates to the 1865 Constitutional Convention did not allow black people to vote. In the end, the delegates of that convention passed a document that enshrined voting only for white people. That November, David Walker was elected Governor as a Democrat. Democracy was so weak at this point that Walker was elected unopposed; with just 5800 people showing up to cast ballots.

During his tenure, Walker was dealing with the likelihood that the Republican Congress, especially after their 1866 midterm landslides, would impose new rules on the south. Walker and many took the stance that they would rather have no civilian government than have one that allowed black people to vote.

Walker would get his wish about the end of civilian Government. In 1867, the expanded Republican majorities in Congress would pass the Reconstruction Acts; overriding Johnson’s veto. These acts divided the south into five military zones and set new mandates for a state to rejoin the union under civil administration. The key requirements were allowing Black men to vote and passing the 14th Amendment; guaranteeing equal rights regardless of race. This marks the second era of Reconstruction; often known as the era of “Congressional Reconstruction” or “Military Reconstruction” or “Radical Reconstruction.”

With that short history out of the way, let's now look at the dynamics of the congressional reconstruction that came to Florida.

The Key Players in Reconstruction

Politics in Florida reconstruction was dominated by the political clashes of white Republican carpetbaggers, local Black leaders, some southern unionists, and the violent white secessionists. Understanding each group is critical for understanding the elections and events to come.

The Carpetbaggers: Radicals vs Conservatives

A key issue for Florida reconstruction was the motives of the early Republican leaders that would run the state. Florida was not majority-Black at the time of the civil war, and the most prominent early reconstruction leaders were white men. Many of these people were from other states - carpetbaggers - as was the common saying. They largely came into Florida as part of the military; often via the Freedmen’s Bureau. Initially many of these men may not have expected to reside in Florida for a long time, but many found themselves in politics before long.

By and large the carpetbaggers have not enjoyed a good reputation in history books. They have been portrayed as Republican partisans that only sought power and wealth; using the defeated south for their own purposes. This was the narrative that drove the historic view of Reconstruction until historians began to look back at the events with new eyes in the 1960s.

While there was no shortage of carpetbaggers that used reconstruction just for their cynical own ends, there many who engaged to try and elevate the legal and political rights of newly freed slaves. Many of the future carpetbagger leaders were military men who came to Florida to maintain order and protect the Black population. As Congress set mandates for the Freedman’s Bureau to work toward the education and voter registration of the newly-freed Black population, many Bureau officials saw getting involved in politics as the best way to ensure new rights for freedmen were respected. Others were enticed into politics for the power.

In early Reconstruction, many internal battles were waged between two camps among the carpetbaggers: the radicals and the conservatives.

The radicals were more true-believers in Black equality, not just in voting but in economic concerns. This philosophy was best seen in the “40 acres and mule” principle; giving freed Blacks the chance to maintain economic independence and have the vote. Nationally, figures like Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner carried this mantra. Contrary to the revisionist history pushed by the south after reconstruction, many of these radical carpetbaggers cared about the fate of the newly freed slaves. In Florida, individuals like Daniel Richards, who was white, and Liberty Billings, who was Black, were both early radical leaders in the 1868 constitutional convention.

The moderates were those that sought to fill out their mission to register voters and establish a civilian government that had protections for the newly freed slaves. However, these individuals also did not want to overtly antagonize the native white population, instead aiming to placate them. Some where incredibly racist, only begrudgingly supporting Black voting rights to ensure they stayed in power. Others were more egalitarian and support Black rights, but also foolishly believed the native white population would eventually be swayed to accept the new status quo. Others were more cynical and closely tied with business interests who wanted peace and order in Florida, as it would be good for future investment and tourism, but who cared little about economic equality for Black people. Harrison Reed, who would become Governor, was a good example of this type.

Few carpetbaggers fit neatly into either of these camps. Some leaders did see future equality for Black citizens, but held paternalistic views that they were “not ready yet.” The other reality is some officials would flip between the two sides based on political expediency.

Individuals like William J. Purman, a future Congressman, was against radical reconstruction that would overtly antagonize whites, but he also risked his own life to protect Black political power in Jackson County amid major unrest. With time a figure like Purman would move further into the radical camp as he came to see the native white population as impossible to win over. Meanwhile, one of Purman’s closest political allies was Charles Hamilton, a fellow Congressman, that was much more in the radical camp. Both men fought hard for Black political and economic equality in Jackson County. Hamilton especially infuriated white plantation owners via his efforts to invalidate unfair contracts foisted upon freedmen. Both men would have hot and cold relationships with Black leaders however - showing that coalitions were fluid and depending on the moment.

Like any political group, the carpetbaggers had good and bad members. The narrative of all of them being power-hungry frauds was driven mostly by white southerners; with the legitimate gripes of freed slaves used to back up such critiques.

Unfortunately, some of the true power-hungry would be elevated very high in Florida. The first Republican Governor, Harris Reed, was firmly in the conservative wing of carpetbagger circles and used Black voters as a tool rather than seeing them as equals. Others like Senator Thomas Osborne became increasingly only concenred about his own power. Figures like Reed and Osborne would shape a very negative image of carpetbaggers, especially among the Black population.

As Civil Rights leader T. Thomas Fortune said….

“The black voters of Florida and of all the South were true to the carpet-baggers and the national Republican machine, but the carpet-baggers, like true rogues, were true only to themselves.“

Fortune had reason to know of these issues, as his father was Emanuel Fortune, a former slave that became a State Representative in Jackson county. As my series will get into, there was indeed plenty of nefarious men who came to Florida from the northern states. However, I hope you will also see that there were many who fought, and in some cases died, for the freedom of Black citizens in Florida.

Early Black Political Leaders

One narrative that came out of the south post-reconstruction was that white carpetbaggers and scalawags had ruled the states and used “uneducated” and “compliant” black people for their votes; with black voters nothing more than lemmings who voted as told. The narrative of any Black leader being hopelessly corrupt or uncivilized also spread itself across post-reconstruction narratives. This flies in the face of the leaders we see emerge in early Reconstruction. Many prominent Black leaders emerged in Florida and Black populations organized to assert their rights post slavery.

Many of the most notable Black leaders were carpetbaggers themselves Jonathan Gibbs, born free to a Black minister in Pennsylvania, was one of the most prominent leaders in Florida, white or Black.. His education and eloquence was noted by the New York Tribune, who said of him at the 1868 Constitutional Convention

“I suppose there is no fitter man in the Convention, white or black.”

Gibbs would go on to serve as the highest level Black leader in Florida, spending time as both a Secretary of State and Florida Superintendent of Public Instruction.

Josiah T Walls was another prominent early leader in Florida reconstruction. Born a slave in Virginia, he eventually was able to escape to join the Union Army and eventually made his way to Alachua County Florida; where he started to work as a teacher. Walls was elected to the state legislature and was eventually elected the state’s first Black Congressman in 1870.

Another early leader was Charles H. Pearce, who was born into slavery in Maryland. Pearce was able to purchase his freedom and became an ordained minister in Connecticut. He came to Florida right after the war and became a prominent Minister and politician in Leon County. He served in the state senate all the way into the late 1880s, before Jim Crow rule finally took the county.

While many of the most prominent leaders were not born in Florida, they worked with the local Black populations to assert their rights. Many, like Emanuel Fortune, were elected to the state legislature or named to county posts. Local freedmen organized themselves quickly once Radical Republican reconstruction began. Events varied by county, but many areas saw local Black communities establish schools, push for proper wage contracts in jobs, and form militias to preserve their freedom.

These Black leaders would at times work closely with the white carpetbaggers, and at other times clashes would take place over party nominations and other matters of political control.

Southern Unionists: Scalawags

In addition to those from the north, there were some white longtime Floridians who were part of the Republican-led reconstruction efforts. These people, dubbed scalawags by the ex-confederates, also varied in their motivation. Some were radicals that favored equality, others were more business-minded conservatives. Perhaps no better representation of this mixed dynamic was that of Ossiah Hart, a future Governor of the state. While he came from a slave holding family, Hart was also an adamant unionist during the war. This was a dangerous posture for people like Hart to take, as Florida by and large was strongly secessionist leading up to the Civil War.

After the war, Hart would align with Republicans on giving newly freed Black men the vote. His political tenure would often come with strong support from Black voters and Black leaders. This was despite the fact he was in the more moderate camp with of Republican politics, not a radical.

Scalawags came in the form of people who remained loyal to the union through the war as well as those that served in the confederate army. People like John L. Finlayson, who served as Clerk of Court in Jackson County, was originally part of the confederate army. Finlayson, however, showed care for the newly freed slaves, serving as their main doctor (as well as a doctor to poor whites) often free of charge. He likewise served as a teach for a Black school in early reconstruction

After the war, many people like Finlayson decided to accept the new order of things and move forward. Others were indeed motivated by the chance for advancement and less so about ideology. Motives aside, they were hated by their white neighbors.

White Regulators and Redeemers

Most of the white population in the South would never come on board with reconstruction or Republican rule. They especially did not support anything remotely considered equality for freed Black citizens. Quickly into reconstruction, southern whites would frame themselves as the “redeemers” - those meant to redeem the south after its loss in the war and occupation by federal forces. This was the political arm of the emerging Ku Klux Klan. Another band of whites were “regulators” - the more paramilitary side of white resistance.

In Florida, these were often younger men who saw their role as the violent “regulation” of freed Blacks or “corrupt white Republicans.” In early reconstruction, these bands of men would randomly attack, but were much more coordinated around elections. Threats of violence were not random. White leaders and papers often called for direct violence, as seen from this political cartoon in 1868.

Early versions of the Ku Klux Klan made there way into Florida as early 1867 and began to be noted in documentation by 1868. Often dubbed “Young Men’s Democratic clubs” - these organizations would intimidate freed Blacks and white Republicans; resorting to direct murder whenever the saw fit. An early founder was Leon County regulator Joseph John Williams, who also served as Florida Speaker of the House in 1866.

Early Klan organizations in Florida had far more formal rules and makeup than one might expect. They all sworn a code of silence; leading to arrests for murders being rare, even when officials actually wanted to bring perpetrators to justice. Before the formal Klan set up its base of operations in Florida, proto groups like the Constitutional League of Florida founded in Putnam County in 1867. This organization stated four key rules - the same rules adopted by clubs across the state

• To Support the US Government “according to the constitution”

• To counter the “evil” of the Union League (a Black voter registration org)

• Opposition to Black suffrage

• Support electing officials to support the club’s program

Jackson County famously devolved into a near civil war between 1869 and 1871 as white regulators tried to re-assert control of the majority-Black county. This time, known as the Jackson County War, saw a massive spike in mob violence and targeted assassinations. These events arguably kicked off in 1869 with the assassination of John Finlayson and near-murder of William Purman; both whom were shot on the streets of Marianna. Purman barely survived a shot to the face while Finlayson died instantly; depriving many in the county of the only doctor they knew.

If you want a good local account of what these violent attacks were like, getting stories on a personal level vs broad summaries, I recommend this book on the Jackson County War.

It hence must be remember that for whatever faults came from the carpetbaggers, and there were many, Republicans in Florida were operating under constant threats of death.

While nowhere close to the entire white population used violence to attack Black citizens and their white sympathizers, rarely did native whites rat out of seek to stop the violence of others. Attacks would be met from broad condemnation of violence from some white communities, but attacks would continue; and the carpetbaggers were often blamed for “stirring up trouble.” Murders of Black citizens, if they ever went to a trial, often came back with quick not-guilty verdicts from all white juries. Even before Jim Crow took hold, this common practice played out.

Another major source of white resistance and suppression of Black voting power was economics. White plantation owners sought to limit the economic independence of newly freed Black farmers as much as possible. Keeping Black people tied to the farm system, or any industry owned by a white man, gave whites the ability to influence voting. In an era well before the secret ballot, whites would often try to coerce Black men from casting Republican ballots. The presence of Republican officials, namely through the Freeman’s Bureau, limited this economic blackmail for some time. However, economic pressure would become a common tactic once reconstruction came to an end and would vary by county.

Southern whites did not support the elevation of Black people to be equal citizens. For all the Republican intrigue I will be covering in this series, always remember that underneath it all was Klan violence and conservative white sabotage.

Looking Ahead

Starting Monday, the timeline of Reconstruction in Florida will begin. See you all then.

There are three states that held referendums on the topic, all to remove defunct language invalidated after the Supreme Court legalized interracial marriage nationwide and all in the deep south; the heart of Jim Crow. I am going to look at each of these votes.

First, lets cover the backstory.

History of Anti-miscegenation Laws

Most states in America had bans on interracial dating and marriage (known as Anti-miscegenation laws) at one point or another. It was the 1967 Supreme Court decision of Loving v Virginia that overturned bans nationwide. At the time of the decision, most bans were relegated to the south. The map below when states repealed their bans if before the Loving decision, with all the red states being bans overturned in 1967. The grey states never had bans on their books.

Of the states that had now-defunct bans on their books, most were statutory laws, not part of the state constitution. Over the years, the defunct legislation would be removed via legislative votes. However, four states had bans in their constitution; North Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama and South Carolina. Repealing these provisions would not be as simple as an act of the legislature. In these cases, a public vote would most likely be needed.

North Carolina never had a vote on the issue of interracial marriage; as it voted for a New Constitution in 1970. That document made many changes, and one of them was the removal of the interracial marriage ban. The other three states, however, have not revamped their entire state constitutions, instead making changes as needed via the amendment process. As a result, these states would all eventually have votes over the removal of the defunct language.

Mississippi would vote to remove the language in 1987, South Carolina in 1998, and Alabama in 2000. In the case of South Carolina and Alabama, I am looking not only at results and news coverage, but at a racial voting analysis done by Cambridge University that I purchased access too (that’s right readers, I paid money to give you this free article - sign up to my Patreon if you wanna show some love). This analysis points out that such referendums are valuable for studying racial attitudes, as they come with less social pressure than answering a poll.

These referenda offer a useful context for exploring White racial attitudes. First, unlike survey research, referenda are conducted in the privacy of the voting booth. Consequently, social acceptability pressures are greatly reduced, since voters are free to express their true opinions without worrying how their responses might reflect upon them.

These referendums were relatively low stakes. Had repeal failed, nothing would change with the laws. If it passed, it would show the state was “moving forward.” All three referendums saw little heated argument or debate, but their results still show where pockets of opposition lay.

With that said, lets dive in.

Mississippi’s 1987 Election

It would be 20 years after the Loving decision before a public vote was held in any state on the matter of removing the old language. That came in 1987 with Mississippi’s State Elections. The same day that the state held its votes for Governor, legislature, and other statewide offices; a series of ten amendments were voted on. All of these were meant to update old language from the state’s 1890 Jim Crow constitution.

At this time, a push for a brand new constitution was being debated and pushed by many. However, the legislature, for the time being, opted to move forward with a series of amendments to the document. Many elected officials and groups were worried about the uncertainty of what a constitutional convention could bring. Amendments making changes were a more “controlled” version of reform.

The most high profile amendments were Measure 3, which removed the old language banning interracial marriage, and Measure 2, which would guarantee public schooling for all kids. Many of the remaining measures were more mundane. None generated a real public opposition campaign. Newspapers and politicians endorsed the amendments. All were expected to pass.

All the measures did indeed pass, often with over 70% of the vote. The lone exception was the removal of the inerracial ballot language. Repeal of the defunct ban secured just 52% of the vote.

The close vote was noted in the press. Many commenters at the time assumed that opposition must have been tied to personal dislike for the concept of interracial marriages; which remained rare in the state. No major opposition campaign had been waged, but the results showed a large share of the voters were not favorable of the idea.

The measure passed in most of Mississippi’s majority-Black counties; though without turnout data I cannot say if the vote share in all of them was majority-Black. While a large number of white county rejected the plan, few counties saw overwhelming support or opposition. Instead, 51 of the state’s 82 counties were within a 10% margin between YES and NO.

The data shows that Black voters supported the measure while white voters rejected it; though the extent of that could vary by area. Black opposition to repeal is not a surprise, as historic data shows white and non-white voters had qualms about interracial marriage dating back decades; though white voters were less favorable than non-whites.

Using the census data and county results, we can gleam some historic racial data from this vote. The most heavily Black and least Black counties are below, showing their level of support for the measure.

Race and support did not have a perfect correlation, however, we see clearly that the heavily Black counties were more supportive. The most heavily white counties opposed the measure, but notably they did not do so by massive margins.

Below we have the top 10 counties for “YES” share and lowest “YES” share. These tables reveal even more to us. The counties with the largest opposition to the measure were counties with sizeable Black populations, but where whites still were the largest group.